## Appendix

Table A.1: Use of funds by frequency of ROSCA meetings in 9 research sites (Note multiple answers are allowed per respondent)

|  | Daily | Weekly | Every <br> 2weeks | Monthly | Every <br> months | Every <br> months | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Business investment | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 7 | 18 |
| Investment in agriculture | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 4 | 17 |
| Investment in livestock | 4 | 3 | 4 | 15 | 29 | 24 | 79 |
| Investment in aquaculture | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Durable goods (TV, VCR, |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Motorbike) | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 14 |
| Food | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| Education | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 17 |
| Debt payments | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 8 |
| Saving | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 7 |
| Clothes, shoes, household |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| items | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 1 | 13 |
| Wedding / funeral | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Medical expenses | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 6 |
| Fixing / buying houses | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 9 | 17 |
| Buying land | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Tax payments | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 7 |

## Table A.2: Variable definitions

| Variable name | Description |
| :---: | :---: |
| Age | Age of the subject |
| Gender | Gender of the subject, $1=$ male |
| Education | Number of years the subject attended school |
| Acquaintance ratio | Number of other subjects the subject knows by name divided by the total number of subjects in the session |
| Farm/livestock | Subject's main occupation is farming or raising livestock |
| Fishery | Subject's main occupation is fishing |
| Trade | Subject's main occupation is trading |
| Business | The subject is engaged in household business |
| Government officer | The subject works for a local government |
| Relative income | Subject's household income divided by the mean household income of the village |
| Mean income | Mean household income of the village (million dong) |
| Gini coefficient | Gini coefficient of the income among 25 households surveyed in 2002 |
| Distance to market (Table 6) | Distance to the nearest local market (km) |
| ROSCA | $1=$ the member of ROSCA, $0=$ otherwise |
| ROSCA*Bidding <br> (Table 7) | $1=$ the member of Bidding ROSCA, $0=$ otherwise |
| Dummy (Field) | $1=$ field experiment (non-student subjects) |
| Dummy (South) <br> (Table 8) | $1=$ field experiment in the South (non-student subjects) |
| Trusted agent | The subject is a trusted agent of delayed delivery of money |
| Log (savings) | Logged savings. Savings is measured as the total value of savings in cash, gold and savings accounts |
| Exp/income ratio (Table 9) | Household expenditure divided by household income per year |
| Weekly ROSCA | The subjects participates in weekly ROSCA |
| Monthly ROSCA | The subjects participates in monthly ROSCA |
| Relative order <br> (Table 11) | The order of receipt of funds divided by the total number of meetings |
| Expected return | Expected amount of return divided by the amount sent by Player 1 |
| Oversea remittance | Whether the subject is receiving remittance from overseas, $1=$ Yes |
| Number of officers | Number of local government officers in the session |
| Receiver M | $1=$ Player 2 is in Group M |
| Receiver L | $1=$ Player 2 is in Group L |
| Present bias | Number of times the subject chose to receive money today in time discounting experiment |

(Table 12)
Received Amount received from Player 1 divided by 20,000
Group M $\quad 1=$ Player 2 is in Group M
$M^{*}$ Mean income The cross effect of mean income and Player 2 being in Group $M$
Group L $\quad 1=$ Player 2 is in Group L
L*Mean income The cross effect of mean income and Player 2 being in Group L

Table A.3: Switching point (question) and approximations of $\sigma$ (parameter for the curvature of power value function) and $\alpha$ (probability sensitivity parameter in Prelec's weighting function), Full table

| $\sigma$ | Switching question in Series 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |  | Never |
| 1 | 1.50 | 1.40 | 1.35 | 1.25 | 1.15 | 1.10 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.55 | 0.50 |
| 2 | 1.40 | 1.30 | 1.20 | 1.20 | 1.10 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 |
| 3 | 1.30 | 1.20 | 1.15 | 1.10 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.45 |
| 4 | 1.20 | 1.15 | 1.10 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.40 |
| 5 | 1.20 | 1.10 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.40 | 0.35 |
| 6 | 1.10 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.35 |
| 7 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.30 |
| 8 | 1.00 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.25 |
| 9 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.20 |
| 10 | 1.00 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.15 |
| 11 | 0.80 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| 12 | 0.70 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| 13 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| 14 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.05 |
| Never | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.15 | 0.30 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.05 |


| $\alpha$ | Switching question in Series 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series 2 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |  | ever |
| 10.60 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.20 | 1.20 | 1.25 | 1.30 | 1.40 | 1.45 |
| 20.60 | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.15 | 1.20 | 1.30 | 1.30 | 1.40 |
| 30.50 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.20 | 1.20 | 1.30 | 1.30 |
| 40.50 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.20 | 1.20 | 1.30 |
| 50.40 | 0.50 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.20 | 1.20 |
| 60.40 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.15 |
| 70.40 | 0.40 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.10 | 1.10 |
| 80.30 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.05 |
| 90.30 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 1.00 |
| 100.10 | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.90 | 1.00 |
| 110.20 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.90 |
| 120.20 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.85 |
| 130.10 | 0.15 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.80 |
| 140.10 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.70 | 0.70 |
| Never 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.60 | 0.60 |

Table A.4: Determinants of risk aversion (Data with interior switching points only)

|  | $\alpha$ (Weighting function) | $\sigma$ (Value function) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Age | -0.001 | $-0.003^{*}$ |
| Gender (1=male) | $-0.088^{*}$ | -0.016 |
| Education | -0.006 | $-0.019^{* * *}$ |
| Farm/livestock | -0.048 | 0.027 |
| Fishery | 0.019 | $0.217 * * *$ |
| Trade | 0.015 | 0.040 |
| Business | -0.032 | -0.047 |
| Government officer | $0.110^{*}$ | 0.032 |
| Relative income | 0.023 | -0.022 |
| Mean income | $-0.005^{*}$ | $-0.006^{* *}$ |
| Distance to market | -0.000 | $-0.029^{*}$ |
| ROSCA | 0.048 | -0.033 |
| ROSCA*Bidding | -0.104 | $0.200^{* *}$ |
| South | 0.140 | -0.149 |
| Constant | $0.942 * * *$ | $1.037 * * *$ |
| Observations | 155 | 155 |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.09 | 0.20 |
| Note: ${ }^{*}$ Significant at the $10 \%$ level. ${ }^{* *}$ Significant at the $5 \%$ level. ${ }^{* * *}$ Significant at the $1 \%$ level. |  |  |
| We estimated $\alpha$ and $\sigma$ by OLS with robust standard errors. 26 subjects who did not have an |  |  |
| interior switching point (so $\alpha$ and $\sigma$ values can only be bounded), are excluded to test for |  |  |
| robustness. |  |  |

Table A.5: Determinants of risk aversion by region

|  | $\alpha$ (Weighting function) |  | $\sigma$ (Value function) |  | $\lambda$ (Loss aversion) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | South | North | South | North | South | North |
| Age | -0.006* | -0 | -0.002 | -0.005* | 0.067 | 0.024 |
| Gender (1=male) | -0.026 | -0* | 0.095 | -0.075 | -1.399 | 0.375 |
| Education | -0.001 | -0 | -0.019* | -0.020* | 0.329** | 0.064 |
| Farm/livestock | -0.08 | -0 | 0.021 | -0.025 | -0.601 | -1.459 |
| Fishery | -0.105 | 0.3** | 0.206* | 0.270* | -0.199 | 0.855 |
| Trade | 0.084 | -0 | -0.054 | -0.024 | -0.383 | 1.825 |
| Business | -0.027 | 0.1 | -0.131 | 0.022 | -1.024 | 1.633 |
| Government officer | -0.132 | 0.1 | 0.067 | 0.074 | -1.102 | -2.383 |
| Relative income | 0.005 | 0 | -0.029 | -0.044 | -0.595 | -0.284 |
| Mean income | -0.005 | -0 | 0.001 | -0.003 | -0.095 | -0.157** |
| Distance to market | 0.018 | -0** | -0.033* | -0.013 | -0.203 | 0.497 |
| ROSCA | 0.087 | -0 | -0.073 | 0.098 | -0.407 | -0.932 |
| Constant | 1.173 *** | 1*** | 0.816*** | 1.119 | 2.837 | 3.814 |
| Observations | 98 | 83 | 98 | 83 | 98 | 83 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.12 | 0.20 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 0.37 | 0.78 |

We estimated $\alpha$ and $\sigma$ by OLS with robust standard errors, and $\lambda$ by interval regressions with robust standard errors.
Note: ${ }^{*}$ Significant at the $10 \%$ level. ${ }^{* *}$ Significant at the $5 \%$ level. ${ }^{* * *}$ Significant at the $1 \%$ level.

Table A.6: Pairwise time discounting choices

|  | Option A | Option B |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1-1 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 20,000 dong today |
| 1-2 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 40,000 dong today |
| 1-3 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 60,000 dong today |
| 1-4 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 80,000 dong today |
| 1-5 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 100,000 dong today |
| 2-1 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 20,000 dong today |
| 2-2 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 40,000 dong today |
| 2-3 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 60,000 dong today |
| 2-4 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 80,000 dong today |
| 2-5 | Receive 120,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 100,000 dong today |
| 3-1 | Receive 120,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 20,000 dong today |
| 3-2 | Receive 120,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 40,000 dong today |
| 3-3 | Receive 120,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 60,000 dong today |
| 3-4 | Receive 120,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 80,000 dong today |
| 3-5 | Receive 120,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 100,000 dong today |
| 4-1 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 50,000 dong today |
| 4-2 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 100,000 dong today |
| 4-3 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 150,000 dong today |
| 4-4 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 200,000 dong today |
| 4-5 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 250,000 dong today |
| 5-1 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 50,000 dong today |
| 5-2 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 100,000 dong today |
| 5-3 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 150,000 dong today |
| 5-4 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 200,000 dong today |
| 5-5 | Receive 300,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 250,000 dong today |
| 6-1 | Receive 300,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 50,000 dong today |
| 6-2 | Receive 300,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 100,000 dong today |
| 6-3 | Receive 300,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 150,000 dong today |
| 6-4 | Receive 300,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 200,000 dong today |
| 6-5 | Receive 300,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 250,000 dong today |
| 7-1 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 5,000 dong today |
| 7-2 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 10,000 dong today |
| 7-3 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 15,000 dong today |
| 7-4 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 20,000 dong today |
| 7-5 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 week | Receive 25,000 dong today |
| 8-1 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 5,000 dong today |
| 8-2 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 10,000 dong today |
| 8-3 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 15,000 dong today |
| 8-4 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 20,000 dong today |
| 8-5 | Receive 30,000 dong in 1 month | Receive 25,000 dong today |


| (Continued) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Option A | Option B |
| 9-1 | Receive 30,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 5,000 dong today |
| 9-2 | Receive 30,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 10,000 dong today |
| 9-3 | Receive 30,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 15,000 dong today |
| 9-4 | Receive 30,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 20,000 dong today |
| 9-5 | Receive 30,000 dong in 3 months | Receive 25,000 dong today |
| 10-1 | Receive 240,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 40,000 dong today |
| 10-2 | Receive 240,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 80,000 dong today |
| 10-3 | Receive 240,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 120,000 dong today |
| 10-4 | Receive 240,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 160,000 dong today |
| 10-5 | Receive 240,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 200,000 dong today |
| 11-1 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 40,000 dong today |
| 11-2 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 80,000 dong today |
| 11-3 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 120,000 dong today |
| 11-4 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 160,000 dong today |
| 11-5 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 200,000 dong today |
| 12-1 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 40,000 dong today |
| 12-2 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 80,000 dong today |
| 12-3 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 120,000 dong today |
| 12-4 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 160,000 dong today |
| 12-5 | Receive 240,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 200,000 dong today |
| 13-1 | Receive 60,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 10,000 dong today |
| 13-2 | Receive 60,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 20,000 dong today |
| 13-3 | Receive 60,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 30,000 dong today |
| 13-4 | Receive 60,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 40,000 dong today |
| 13-5 | Receive 60,000 dong in 3 days | Receive 50,000 dong today |
| 14-1 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 10,000 dong today |
| 14-2 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 20,000 dong today |
| 14-3 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 30,000 dong today |
| 14-4 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 40,000 dong today |
| 14-5 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 weeks | Receive 50,000 dong today |
| 15-1 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 10,000 dong today |
| 15-2 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 20,000 dong today |
| 15-3 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 30,000 dong today |
| 15-4 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 40,000 dong today |
| 15-5 | Receive 60,000 dong in 2 months | Receive 50,000 dong today |

Table A.7: Determinants of Present Bias and discount rates (Data include inconsistent choices)

|  | + Demographic <br> variables for r | + Demographic <br> variables for $\beta$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| r (Discount rate) | 0.340 | 0.144 |
| $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ (Present bias) | $0.904 * * *$ | $0.769^{* * *}$ |
| $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ | $6.370 * * *$ | $6.411^{* * *}$ |
| Age | -0.004 | 0.003 |
| Gender (1=male) | $-0.121 *$ | 0.050 |
| Education | 0.012 | -0.004 |
| Acquaintance ratio | -0.081 | -0.188 |
| Trusted agent | -0.048 | 0.004 |
| Farm/livestock | $-0.084 *$ | 0.041 |
| Fishery | $-0.159 * * *$ | 0.073 |
| Trade | -0.093 | 0.005 |
| Business | 0.459 | -0.123 |
| Government officer | $-0.109 *$ | -0.015 |
| Relative income | $0.079 *$ | -0.004 |
| Mean income | $-0.009 * *$ | 0.006 |
| Distance to market | 0.018 | 0.003 |
| ROSCA | $-0.191 *$ | 0.132 |
| ROSCA*Bidding | $0.293 *$ | $-0.214 *$ |
| Log (savings) | 0.001 | 0.008 |
| Exp/income ratio | 0.003 | -0.002 |
| Loss aversion $(\lambda)$ | 0.001 | -0.013 |
| Value fctn curve ( $\sigma$ ) | 0.029 | -0.030 |
| South | -0.019 | -0.005 |
| Observations | 2670 | 2670 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.78 | 0.77 |
| Note: ${ }^{*}$ Significant at the $10 \%$ level. ${ }^{* *}$ Significant at the $5 \%$ level. | Significant at the $1 \%$ level. |  |
| We conducted robust regressions, and adjusted standard errors for correlations within |  |  |
| individuals. 3 subjects who completely randomized their answers are excluded from the |  |  |
| estimations. |  |  |
|  |  |  |

Table A.8: Determinants of Present Bias and discount rates by region (Nonlinear regressions)

|  | + Demographic variables for r |  | + Demographic variables for $\beta$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | South | North | South | North |
| $r$ (Discount rate) | 0.417 | -0.004 | 0.041 * | 1.441 |
| $\beta$ (Present bias) | 0.888*** | 0.874 *** | 0.561 | 1.491 |
| $\theta$ | 4.811 *** | 4.917 *** | $4.598 * * *$ | 5.982 *** |
| Age | -0.006** | 0.002 | 0.01 ** | -0.001 |
| Gender (1=male) | -0.021 | -0.078 | 0.043 | 0.09 |
| Education | -0.007 | 0.008 | 0.015 | -0.024 |
| Acquaintance ratio | 0.006 | 0.004 | -0.169 | -0.201 |
| Trusted agent | 0.649 | -0.058 | -0.102 | 0.181 |
| Farm/livestock | 0.005 | -0.031 | -0.08 | 0.171 |
| Fishery | -0.038 | -0.109* | 0.038 | 0.233 |
| Trade | -0.011 | 0.03 | -0.036 | -0.157 |
| Business | 0.131 * | -0.057 | -0.223* | 0.04 |
| Government officer | -0.017 | 0.003 | -0.133 | 0.117 |
| Relative income | -0.085** | 0.051 | 0.057 | -0.138 |
| Mean income | -0.002 | -0.007 | 0.002 | 0.011 |
| Distance to market | -0.011 | 0.027 | 0.017 | -0.089 |
| ROSCA | 0.109 | -0.151* | -0.059 | 0.343 |
| Log (savings) | 0.01 | -0.001 | -0.002 | 0.01 |
| Exp/income ratio | 0.002 | 0.001 | -0.002 | 0.001 |
| Loss aversion ( $\lambda$ ) | 0.001 | 0.009 | -0.01 | -0.03 |
| Value fctn curve ( $\sigma$ ) | -21 | -0.007 | -0.027 | -0.17 |
| Observations | 1113 | 1245 | 1113 | 1245 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.77 | 0.83 | 0.75 | 0.82 |

Note: * Significant at the $10 \%$ level. ${ }^{* *}$ Significant at the 5\% level. ${ }^{* * *}$ Significant at the $1 \%$ level. We conducted robust regressions, and adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. For the South, 312 data points with inconsistent answers are excluded from the estimations. There is no inconsistent answer in the north because research assistants suggested subjects to reconsider their choices when they found inconsistent choices.

Figure A.2: Correlations among risk parameters



$$
\text { Correlation coefficient }=-.03 \quad(\mathrm{p}=.56)
$$



Figure A.3: Correlations between risk parameters and income



Figure A.5: Cumulative distribution of amount set by Player 1 by session (by group of receiver)

## Student Subjects

## SS1



## SN1



## South

S1
———Receiver: Group $\mathrm{H} \rightarrow$ Receiver: Group M
$\rightarrow$ - Receiver: Group $L \longrightarrow p=.5$


S3



## S5

Amount sent (1000 dong)

S2
—— Receiver: Group H $\rightarrow$ Receiver: Group M
$\rightarrow$ Receiver: Group L $\longrightarrow \mathrm{p}=.5$


S4


## North

N1


N3


## N2

-O—Receiver: Group $\mathrm{H} \rightarrow$ Receiver: Group M $\rightarrow$ Receiver: Group $L \longrightarrow p=.5$


## N4

$\rightarrow$ - Receiver: Group $\mathrm{H} \rightarrow$ Receiver: Group M -——Receiver: Group L—p=.5


