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# SILVIA CONSOLE BATTILANA

## DISSERTATION

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*Lobbying the European Union versus Lobbying the United States: A Contribution to Formal Theory*

Primary Advisors: Douglas Bernheim ([bernheim@stanford.edu](mailto:bernheim@stanford.edu), (650) 725-8732) and David Baron ([baron\\_david@gsb.stanford.edu](mailto:baron_david@gsb.stanford.edu), (650) 723-3757)

Other Advisors: Ronald McKinnon ([mckinnon@stanford.edu](mailto:mckinnon@stanford.edu), (650) 723-3721) and Romain Wacziarg ([wacziarg\\_romain@gsb.stanford.edu](mailto:wacziarg_romain@gsb.stanford.edu), (650) 723-6069)

## EDUCATION

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2002 – 2007, Stanford University, PhD in Economics

1997 – 2001, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy, BA in Economics (Advisors: Professors Guido Tabellini and Gianmarco Ottaviano)

Fall 1999, Wharton Business School, Philadelphia, USA, MBA Exchange Program

## FIELDS OF INTEREST

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Primary: Political Economy. Secondary: Game Theory, Microeconomics, International Economics

## AWARDS

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Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award, Fall 05, B.F Haley and E.S. Shaw Fellowship scholar 05-06 (Stanford Institute of Economics Research Dissertation Fellowship), O'Bie Shulz Fellowship scholar 05-06 (Stanford Institute for International Studies Dissertation Fellowship), Economics Department Fellowship Winter 05, Littlefield Fellowship 04-05, Marco Fanno Fellowship Award Winner 03-04, Marco Fanno Fellowship Award Winner 02-03, Ciriéc Thesis Award Winner 2002, Rotary Harris Fellow, Magna cum Laudem Undergraduate Thesis 2001

## RESEARCH PAPERS

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“Uncovered Power: External Agenda Setting, Sophisticated Voting, and Transnational Lobbying,” August 2006

In a multiple round majority rule game with sophisticated actors, we show that the agenda setter obtains its most preferred policy outcome even if all lobbies and legislators prefer the status quo to the proposal (i.e., the proposal lies in the covered set). A lobby with the ability to recruit supermajorities can counterbalance this power. If contributions are conditional on the entire voting profile, such a transnational lobby can veto any proposal at no cost. If contributions are conditional on the votes of each recipient legislator, the transnational lobby has only to possess a greater willingness to pay than the median national lobby to achieve this result. We use our formal model to explain external tariff policies in the European Union following the creation of an internal market.

“Nominations for sale,” with Kenneth Shepsle, July 2006

Models of nomination politics in the US often find "gridlock" in equilibrium because of the supermajority requirement in the Senate for the confirmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present paper we explore the possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nominal (gridlock-producing) preferences through contributions from the president and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and confirming the nominee. We model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment schedules are conditioned on the entire voting profile, the vote of a senator, or the outcome. We analyze several extensions to our baseline approach, including the possibility that lobbyists may find it more productive to offer inducements to the president in order to affect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to induce senators to vote for or against a given nominee.

“Agenda power and pre-commitment,” with Douglas Bernheim, August 2006

Previous literature has established that a monopolistic agenda setter could reach her most preferred point under myopic voting, but only points in the uncovered set under sophisticated voting. We reestablish the absolute power of the agenda setter, even under sophisticated voting. If the agenda setter precommits to an agenda contingent on the status quo of each round, or precommits to a fixed agenda with the possibility of adjournments, the agenda setter can reach her most preferred point, even if all voters prefer the status quo. If the agenda setter does not precommit to an agenda ahead of time but instead makes proposals in real time, the agenda setter can achieve a policy outcome infinitesimally close to her most preferred point

“The Incentive to Lobby under Alternative Electoral Rules,” with Gianmarco Ottaviano, July 2005

“Why Did the Mafia Emerge in Italy? An Institutional Answer,” November 2003

#### WORK IN PROGRESS AND PROJECTS

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“Explaining USA and EU Trade Policy Outcomes: Business and Government Response to Institutional Environments,” August 2006

“Economic Development Impact of Rotary India Rainwater Harvesting Projects,”  
[http://www.stanford.edu/~silviacb/india\\_files/frame.htm](http://www.stanford.edu/~silviacb/india_files/frame.htm)

#### RELEVANT PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

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Research Assistant, Political Economics, Professor David Baron, Stanford Business School, Fall 2006

Teaching Assistant, Economics 111: Money and Banking, Professor Ronald McKinnon, Stanford University, Fall 2004

Teaching Assistant, International Economics, Professor Fabrizio Onida, Bocconi University, Fall 2001

Research Assistant, International Economics, Professor Fabrizio Onida, Bocconi University, Fall 2001, Winter 2002, Spring 2002

Research Intern, Privatization in Malaysia, Alfonso Di Riso, Embassy of Italy, Malaysia, Winter 2001

#### RELEVANT ACTIVITIES

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Founder, NBER Student Political Economics Conference; Organizer, First, Second, and Third NBER Student Political Economics Conferences (2005-2006); Guest Lecturer, Stanford Political Economics Undergraduate Class, 2006; Organizer, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Political Economics Group Postering Sessions (2005-2006); Coordinator, Public and Political Economics Dissertation Group, Stanford Department of Economics (2004-2006); Founder, Political Economics Group (144 student members from 15 universities--[www.stanford.edu/group/peg](http://www.stanford.edu/group/peg)); Founder, Political Economics in Progress Network ([www.stanford.edu/~silviacb/PEPR](http://www.stanford.edu/~silviacb/PEPR))

#### LANGUAGES

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Italian (native speaker), German (native speaker), English (fluent), Spanish (good)

#### VISA STATUS

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Holding J1 visa through 2007. German and Italian citizenship.