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RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Research: Game Theory, Mechanism Design

Teaching: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Mechanism Design

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

Dissertation: Essays on Communication and Efficiency in Auctions

Committee Chairperson: Professor Asher Wolinsky

Date of Completion: July 2008 (expected)

PREDOCTORAL STUDIES

B.A.: Economics, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2003

M.A.: Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 2004

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Distinguished Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, Northwestern University 2007

Northwestern University Fellowship, 2003-2004

Zois National Merit Fellowship, 1995-2005

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University, 2004-2007

Graduate:

Microeconomics Core: General Equilibrium

Mathematical Methods

Undergraduate:

Intermediate Microeconomics

Economics of Risk and Uncertainty

Economics of Growth and Development

Intermediate Macroeconomics

Introductory Macroeconomics

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant to Professor Wojciech Olszewski, Summer 2006, Summer 2007

Research Assistant to Professor Nabil Al-Najjar, Spring 2006 – Fall 2007

Research Assistant to Center for Economic Theory, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Fall 2007

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Communication and Efficiency in Auctions”

ABSTRACT: We study auctions under restricted communication. Bidders have valuations in a compact interval, but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide a characterization of welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the symmetric independent private values case

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when bidders report simultaneously. We show that the seller choosing how to allocate the fixed communication capacity allocates it evenly over the bidders. The optimal auction is asymmetric, contrasting the symmetry of optimal auctions when communication is not restricted. The analysis is extended to the case of multiple identical objects and single unit demand.

Finally, we characterize welfare maximizing auctions under restricted communication when two bidders report sequentially and there are only two periods of reporting. These auctions can be thought of as a two step procedure. In the first step, the first bidder chooses a price from a finite menu of prices. In the second step the object is offered to the second bidder at a higher price. If the second bidder accepts it he receives the object and pays the offered price, otherwise the first bidder receives the object at the price he chose.

OTHER PAPERS AND WORK IN PROGRESS

“Congestion in a Global Game”, October 2006

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Age: 26

Marital status: Single

Citizenship: Slovenian

REFERENCES

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