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# **Belief Overreaction and Stock Market Puzzles**

**Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli, Rafael La Porta, and Andrei Shleifer<sup>1</sup>**

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## **Abstract**

We construct an index of long term expected earnings growth for S&P500 firms and show that it has remarkable power to jointly predict future errors in these expectations and stock returns, in both the aggregate market and the cross section. The evidence supports a mechanism whereby good news cause investors to become too optimistic about long term earnings growth, for the market as a whole but especially for a subset of firms. This leads to inflated stock prices and, as beliefs are systematically disappointed, to subsequent low returns in the aggregate market and for the subset of firms. Overreaction of long term expectations helps resolve or asset pricing puzzles without time series or cross-sectional variation in required returns.

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## 1. Introduction

In the textbook asset pricing model, the price of a stock is the rational expectation of future dividends discounted by a time-invariant required return. That required return is higher for stocks that are riskier, in the sense of being more exposed to aggregate market movements. Over the past four decades, this approach has been challenged by two key findings. First, the return on the aggregate stock market is predictably low following periods of high valuations, as measured for instance by a high aggregate price to dividend ratio (Campbell and Shiller 1988). This fact is inconsistent with the assumed time-invariance of required returns. Second, large cross-sectional average return differences are traceable to firm characteristics, not to market exposure. For instance, high market-to-book stocks have lower average returns than low market-to-book ones (Fama and French 1993). Ultimately, the key stock market puzzles concern excessive return predictability, both in the time series and the cross section.

The conventional approach to these puzzles enriches the theory of required returns while maintaining rational expectations of future dividends. In the time series, required returns are assumed to vary due to changes in risk preference (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1999), or in long run or disaster risk (Rietz 1988, Bansal and Yaron 2004, Barro 2006). In the cross section, required returns are assumed to vary due to exposure to characteristics-based “risk factors” (Fama and French 1993). A challenge for this approach is that investors should rationally expect low future returns during a stock market boom. In survey expectations of returns, however, the opposite is the case (Greenwood and Shleifer 2014). A deeper problem is that changes in risk preference and risk are hard to measure, and cross sectional risk factors remain a black box.

In this paper we try to address these puzzles by pursuing an orthogonal approach: keep required returns constant and relax rational expectations. In this approach, return predictability arises from the eventual correction of systematic pricing errors caused by non-rational beliefs. Using data on analyst expectations of future earnings growth of listed firms, we empirically characterize belief errors and connect them to realized returns. We show that errors in expectations

of aggregate long-term earnings growth, *LTG*, offer a promising source of return predictability in both the time series and the cross section, helping to reconcile key anomalies.

In the first part of the paper we study survey expectations and return predictability in the time series. Section 2 shows that high expected aggregate long-term earnings growth predicts sharply lower future aggregate stock returns. The predictive power of *LTG* is robust to controlling for the current price dividend ratio and other prominent macroeconomic predictors of returns. Expectations of short-term earnings growth, in contrast, do not predict future returns.

Section 3 studies the mechanism linking beliefs and return predictability, documenting three facts. First, *LTG* overreacts: upward *LTG* revisions predict future disappointment of growth forecasts. Second, such predicted disappointment is associated with low returns. Third, systematic unwinding of aggregate *LTG* forecast errors accounts for a large share of the link between the price dividend ratio and future returns. These findings point to a mechanism in which overreaction to good news causes excess optimism and inflated stock prices. Going forward, systematically disappointing aggregate earnings growth causes a price reversal and hence low returns.

In Section 4 we consider cross sectional return differences. We ask whether variation in the aggregate *LTG*, which captures systematic belief biases, can also produce cross sectional return comovement and average return spreads. We first revisit the return spread earned by stocks with low *LTG* compared to stocks with high *LTG* (La Porta 1996). We find that this spread varies systematically with aggregate *LTG*: current optimism about aggregate fundamentals is followed by lower returns and more disappointing forecast errors for high *LTG* stocks than low *LTG* ones. This evidence is consistent with a mechanism in which high *LTG* exhibit stronger overreaction to aggregate good news, perhaps because these firms belong to the “hot sector” of the moment. Remarkably, we find that a similar mechanism also sheds light on the well-known book-to-market, profitability and investment factors (Fama and French 1993). The short arm in these factors disappoints more sharply, both in returns and in realized earnings growth, after periods of high aggregate optimism, again measured using aggregate *LTG*.

Our evidence indicates that high aggregate *LTG* captures periods when the aggregate market and specific stocks are overvalued, in the sense of having subsequent disappointing returns. In the language of standard finance, these periods look like moments of low risk aversion, when the price of the aggregate market and particularly of risky firms is elevated. One concern is that perhaps survey expectations spuriously capture time varying risk aversion. This could occur if analysts mechanically infer expectations about long term growth by fitting stock prices. Our analysis, however, shows that *LTG* is a genuine proxy for expectations, and that return predictability to a substantial degree reflects belief overreaction. First, consistent with our interpretation and inconsistent with expectations inferred from prices, our results are robust to controlling for price ratios. Second, excess optimism in *LTG* arises as an overreaction to news: we find that both *LTG* revisions and subsequent errors are predictable using news about fundamentals, even after controlling for stock returns. Finally, and crucially, we show that much of the predictability of aggregate returns attributed to price ratios comes from predictable reversals in *LTG*. After controlling for these reversals, price ratios have little predictive power for returns.

A few recent papers study stock market puzzles using measured expectations.<sup>2</sup> Bordalo et al. (BGLS 2019) account for the La Porta (1996) *LTG* spread through belief over-reaction, but do not connect the spread in returns and forecast errors to systematic belief biases.

Using analysts' forecasts of short-term earnings growth, De la O and Myers (2020) construct a dividend discount index and show that it strongly correlates with the aggregate price to earnings ratio. This exercise showcases the usefulness of expectations data, but does not shed light on return predictability: unlike *LTG*, short term expectations do not predict stock returns. Nagel and Xu (2019) show that past aggregate dividend growth correlates negatively with future aggregate returns and positively with earnings growth expectations. However, they do not directly

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<sup>2</sup> Frankel and Lee (1998), Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Bachetta et al (2009), and Koijen and Nieuwerburgh (2011) also use beliefs data to study asset prices. Cutler, Poterba, Summers (1990), DeLong et al (1990b), Barberis et al 2015, Adam, Beutel and Marcet (2017) study price extrapolation, which is also consistent with returns expectations data (Greenwood and Shleifer 2014, Giglio et al 2021).

connect expectations to forecast errors and returns, and therefore do not show that return predictability is driven by belief overreaction. In fact, the growth of past dividends might affect required returns through consumption as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Furthermore, to the extent that past dividend growth correlates with expectations, it does so only partially: beliefs and stock prices may overreact to other news, such as the arrival of new technologies.

More broadly, we are the first to show that a parsimonious mechanism of belief overreaction throws new light on both aggregate return predictability and cross sectional return differentials by characterizing the joint behavior of returns and forecast errors.

Our work offers a new angle on macro volatility. In macroeconomics, departures from rational expectations typically take the form of rational inattention (Sims 2003, Woodford 2003, Gabaix 2019), or overconfidence (Kohlhas and Walther 2021). These mechanisms generate rigidity in consensus beliefs and prices (Mankiw and Reis 2002). We document the importance of the opposite phenomenon of belief overreaction. Compared to Bordalo, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (BGMS, 2020), who find overreaction by individual professional forecasters, we find overreaction in consensus expectations and connect it to excess stock market volatility. Our analysis points to belief volatility as a source of macro-financial volatility, in line with recent work in macroeconomics (Bianchi et al. 2021, Bordalo et al. 2021, L’Huillier et al. 2021).

## 2. Predictability of Aggregate Stock Returns: Data and Basic Facts

We gather monthly data on analyst forecasts for firms in the S&P 500 index from the IBES Unadjusted US Summary Statistics file. We focus on median forecasts of a firm’s earnings per share ( $EPS_{it}$ ) and long-term earnings growth ( $LTG_{it}$ ). IBES defines  $LTG$  as the “...expected annual increase in operating earnings over the company’s next full business cycle. These forecasts refer to a period of between three to five years.”<sup>3</sup> Data coverage starts on 3/1976 for  $EPS_{it}$  and

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<sup>3</sup> It is not obvious whether  $LTG$  captures  $g = \sqrt[T]{\mathbb{E}[(1 + g_1) \dots (1 + g_T)]} - 1$ , or the average point estimate  $g = (\hat{g}_1 + \dots + \hat{g}_T)/T$ . We take the former interpretation, but the distinction is not key for studying return predictability.

12/1981 for  $LTG_{it}$ . (Data on dividend forecasts starts in 2002 and uses shorter horizons.) We fill in missing forecasts by linearly interpolating  $EPS_{it}$  at horizons ranging from 1 to 5 years (in one-year increments). Beyond the second fiscal year we assume that analysts expect  $EPS_{it}$  to grow at the rate  $LTG_{it}$  starting with the last non-missing positive  $EPS$  forecast.

Analysts may distort their forecasts due to agency conflicts. As showed in BGLS (2019), this is unlikely to affect the time series variation in forecasts, which is key here. Furthermore, all brokerage houses typically cover S&P 500 firms, so investment banking relationships and analyst sentiment are unlikely to influence the decision to cover firms in the S&P 500.<sup>4</sup> Our focus on median forecasts further alleviates these concerns, reducing the impact of outliers.

We aggregate the earnings forecasts of S&P 500 firms into an index of aggregate beliefs. We multiply each forecast  $EPS_{it}$  by the number of shares outstanding in month  $t$  and sum these forecasts across all S&P 500 firms. We then divide this aggregate earnings forecast by the total number of shares in the S&P 500 index to obtain the expected earning per share  $EPS_t$ . (Log) earnings growth one or two-years ahead are computed based on  $EPS_t$ .<sup>5</sup>

We aggregate  $LTG$  forecasts by value-weighting firm level forecasts:

$$LTG_t = \sum_{i=1}^S LTG_{i,t} \frac{P_{i,t} \cdot Q_{i,t}}{\sum_{i=1}^S P_{i,t} \cdot Q_{i,t}}$$

where  $S$  is the number of firms in the S&P 500 index with IBES data on  $LTG_{it}$ ,  $P_{it}$  is the stock price of firm  $i$  at time  $t$ , and  $Q_{i,t}$  is the number of shares outstanding of firm  $i$  at time  $t$ .<sup>6</sup>

Figure 1 plots one year ahead and long term expected earnings growth.  $LTG_t$  is more persistent than expected short term growth. In particular, it does not exhibit short run reversals


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<sup>4</sup> For example, in December of 2018, nineteen analysts followed the median S&P500 firm, while four analysts followed the median firm not in S&P500. Analysts are also less likely to rate as “buy” firms in the S&P500 index.

<sup>5</sup> The number of shares in the index (what S&P refers to as the divisor) is the ratio of the market capitalization of S&P 500 and the S&P 500 index. It is 100 in the base year and it is adjusted due to shares outstanding, the index composition, and corporate actions. We compute growth forecasts using aggregate earnings because many firm-level observations have zero or very low current earnings. We set an observation in a given month to missing if the market cap of firms for which we have forecasts at a given horizon is less than 90% of the market cap of the index.

<sup>6</sup> Nagel and Xu (2019) weigh  $LTG_{i,t}$  using firm level earnings forecasts. The correlation between their index and our  $LTG_t$  is 95.44%. Since stocks with high  $LTG$  often have negative earnings, our preferred measure is  $LTG_t$ .

such as the expected short term growth peak in 2009. As we show later, the persistence of  $LTG_t$  is crucial, for it allows it to capture the low frequency predictability of returns.



**Figure 1.** We plot the expected short- and long-term growth in earnings ( $\mathbb{E}_t^O[e_{t+1}] - e_t$  in green and  $LTG_t$  in red, respectively, where  $e_t = \log EPS_t$  and  $\mathbb{E}_t^O$  represents measured expectations). The scale for short-term earnings ( $\mathbb{E}_t^O[e_{t+1}] - e_t$ ) is on the right. The sample period is 12/1981 to 12/2020.

De la O and Myers (2021, 2022) use measured expectations of one year ahead earnings growth to construct a discounted expected stock market index. They show that this index is highly correlated with the actual price earnings ratio. One issue is whether the correlation arises because expectations of earnings track current earnings or because they capture stock price anomalies (Adam and Nagel 2022). From the viewpoint of market efficiency, the key question is whether beliefs produce excessive price variation and hence return predictability.

To address this issue, we regress future cumulative raw aggregate stock returns over 1, 3 and 5 years on our three measures of expected earnings growth: at one and two years, and long term. Table 1 reports the results. We also run a horse race between the different expectations measures. In this and other tests, we focus on raw returns but the results are very similar if we use excess returns, see Appendix B, Table B.1.



**Table 1**  
**Return Predictability and Expectations of Earnings Growth**

We examine the association between earnings growth forecasts and returns at different horizons. The dependent variables are the (log) one-year return in column [1] and the discounted value of the cumulative 3- and 5-year return in columns [2] and [3], respectively. Here  $\alpha = 1/(1 + e^{dp})$  where  $dp$  is the average price dividend ratio in our sample ( $\alpha = 0.9779$ ). The independent variables are the forecast for earnings growth: (a) in the long run  $LTG_t$ , (b) one-year ahead,  $\mathbb{E}_t^O[e_{t+1} - e_t]$ , and (c) between year  $t + 1$  and  $t + 2$ ,  $\mathbb{E}_t^O[e_{t+2} - e_{t+1}]$ . All variables are standardized and intercepts are not shown. The sample period is 1981:12-2015:12. We adjust standard errors for serial correlation using the Newey-West correction (number of lags ranges from 12 in the first column to 60 in the last one). Superscripts: <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5% level, <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10% level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	$r_{t+1}$	$\sum_{j=1}^3 \alpha^{j-1} r_{t+j}$	$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{t+j}$
<b>Panel A: Returns and LTG</b>			
$LTG_t$	-0.2389 <sup>b</sup> (0.0928)	-0.4019 <sup>a</sup> (0.0944)	-0.4349 <sup>a</sup> (0.0831)
Observations	409	409	409
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	9%	24%	25%
<b>Panel B: Returns and growth forecast for year 1</b>			
$\mathbb{E}_t[e_{t+1}-e_t]$	-0.0335 (0.1027)	0.0467 (0.0716)	0.1556 <sup>a</sup> (0.0587)
Observations	404	404	404
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0%	0%	3%
<b>Panel C: Returns and growth forecast for year 2</b>			
$\mathbb{E}_t^O[e_{t+2} - e_{t+1}]$	-0.0527 (0.0885)	0.0408 (0.1556)	0.2113 (0.1686)
Observations	404	404	404
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0%	0%	6%

High current expectations of long term earnings growth strongly predict low future returns.

$LTG_t$  accounts for 25% of variation in realized returns over the following five years.<sup>7</sup> In contrast, expectations of short term earnings growth do not predict returns or have a very weak explanatory

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<sup>7</sup> It is well known that the OLS estimator in predictive regressions using lagged stochastic regressors, such as  $LTG_t$ , may be biased (Stambaugh 1999). The bias arises because the disturbances in the regression for returns may be correlated with future values of  $LTG_t$ . We follow the methodology of Kothari and Shanken (1997): we use simulations to compute the coefficient that we would estimate under the null of no predictability and bootstrap a p-value for the OLS value in Table 1. See Appendix E for details of the methodology, and Table E.1 for the results, which confirm those in Table 1. Even a priori, the Stambaugh bias is unlikely to be important for  $LTG$  (as compared to the usual price scaled variables). The correlation between the residuals of univariate regressions of annual returns  $r_{t+1}$  and  $LTG_{t+1}$  on  $LTG_t$  is 0.07. By comparison, Kothari and Shanken report that the correlation between shocks to book-to-market and to annual returns is -0.80.

power (one year ahead earnings expectations only account for 3% of five years ahead return variation). To our knowledge, this is the first time series evidence of strong return predictability using measured expectations of fundamentals. The lack of predictive power of short-term growth expectations suggests that this proxy likely captures earnings variation rather than mispricing.<sup>8</sup>

We next assess two questions. First, does the predictive power of  $LTG$  actually reflect non-rational market beliefs? Second, how does it compare to stock return predictors studied in previous work? As a first step, Figure 2 graphs  $LTG$  and the price dividend ratio together with realized stock returns in the coming five years.



**Figure 2.** We plot the standardized values of expected long-term growth in earnings, 5-year return and price-to-dividend ratio ( $LTG_t$  in red,  $\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{t+j}$  in black,  $pd_t$  in green, respectively). The sample period is 12/1981 to 12/2015.

$LTG$  and the price dividend ratio are positively correlated, as one would expect if current stock prices,  $p_t - d_t$ , are determined in part by expectations of long-term earnings growth,  $LTG_t$ . In the internet bubble of 1999-2000, both  $LTG$  and the price dividend ratio were very high compared to historical values, followed by disappointing stock returns, consistent with stock prices reflecting excessively optimistic expectations of long-term earnings growth. In the

<sup>8</sup> De la O and Myers (2022) show that short term earnings expectations predict returns at a very long (10 year) horizon, consistent with Table 1, panel B. However, this relationship disappears once we control for  $LTG$  (see also Table 2).

financial crisis of 2008, both  $LTG$  and the price dividend ratio fell sharply, followed by high stock returns, consistent with stock prices after the crash reflecting excessive pessimism about future economic performance. More generally, movements in  $LTG$  orthogonal to movements in the price dividend ratio allow us to assess whether  $LTG$  contains independent information about long term beliefs useful to predict future returns. This can also help address the concern that  $LTG_t$  spuriously reflects time varying required returns. This could happen, for instance, if analysts estimate  $LTG_t$  by fitting the growth rate of earnings that justifies the current stock price, while erroneously assuming that required returns are constant.

Table 2, Panel A, performs several tests by controlling in the predictive regressions of Table 1 for price variables and for proxies of required returns. Columns (1) and (2) assess the predictive power of  $LTG_t$  controlling for the current price dividend and price earnings ratios, respectively. If  $LTG_t$  is reverse engineered from stock prices, these controls should eliminate its explanatory power. If instead  $LTG_t$  retains some explanatory power, it must be because it captures market expectations about long term fundamentals (with price ratios instead capturing the independent role of expectations at other horizons as well as perhaps variation in required returns). Note that these are challenging tests: prices incorporate market expectations while  $LTG_t$  is a noisy proxy for them. This means that even if all price variation was due to expectations as opposed to required returns, controlling for market prices may overshadow the predictive power of  $LTG_t$ .

To further assess the ability of  $LTG_t$  to capture beliefs, columns (3), (4) and (5) control for the three leading proxies of time varying required returns: surplus consumption (Campbell and Cochrane 1999), the consumption wealth ratio (cay, Lettau and Ludvigson 2001), and  $SVIX^2$  (Martin 2017). The first proxies for fluctuations of marginal utility in habit formation models, the second for required returns in a large class of rational expectations models, and the third for the required return of a rational log utility investor fully invested in the market.

**Table 2**

**Return Predictability, Expectations and Measures of Required Returns**

We study the association between realized returns, ex-ante proxies for required returns and macroeconomic predictors of returns. The dependent variable is the discounted value of the cumulative return between year  $t$  and  $t + 5$ . All regressions include the forecast for earnings growth in the long run  $LTG_t$ . In Panel A the additional independent variables are: (a) the price to dividend ratio,  $pd_t$ , in column [1], (b) the price to earnings ratio,  $pe_t$ , in column [2], (c) the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) surplus consumption ratio,  $spc_t$ , in column [3], (d) the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) consumption-wealth ratio,  $cay_t$ , in column [4], (e) the Martin (2013) expected one-year return on the market,  $SVIX_t^2$ , in column [5], and (f) the forecast for one-year ahead,  $\mathbb{E}_t^O[e_{t+1} - e_t]$ , in column [6]. In Panel B the additional independent variables are: (a) the term spread defined as the log difference between the gross yield of 10-year and 1-year US government bonds from the St. Louis Fed in column [1], (b) the credit spread defined as the log difference between the gross yield of BAA and AAA bonds from the St. Louis Fed in column [2], (c) the Baker et al. (2016) economic policy uncertainty index in column [3], the Kelly and Pruitt (2013) optimal forecast of aggregate equity market returns in column [4], the forecast for CPI inflation in year  $t+1$  by the Survey of Professional Forecasters,  $\mathbb{E}_t^O[\pi_{t+1}]$ , in column [5], and (12) the Nagel and Xu (2021) experienced dividend growth from,  $exp(d_t)$ . Adj  $R^2 X_t$  is the adjusted R squared value from a univariate regression of five-year returns on  $X_t$ . The sample period is 1981:12-2015:12. Data is quarterly in column [4] of Panel A and column [6] of Panel B, and monthly elsewhere. All variables are standardized and intercepts are not shown. The sample period is 1981:12-2015:12. We adjust standard errors for serial correlation using the Newey-West correction (with 60 lags). Superscripts: <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5% level, and <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10% level.

<b>Panel A</b>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$LTG_t$	-0.2350 <sup>b</sup> (0.1162)	-0.4675 <sup>a</sup> (0.1081)	-0.4522 <sup>a</sup> (0.1033)	-0.5569 <sup>a</sup> (0.1179)	-0.3946 <sup>a</sup> (0.1016)	-0.4881 <sup>a</sup> (0.1036)
$X_t$	-0.5826 <sup>a</sup> (0.1397)	-0.1803 (0.1662)	-0.1387 (0.1035)	0.1894 (0.1766)	0.3852 <sup>b</sup> (0.1782)	0.1001 (0.0851)
Obs	409	409	409	137	193	404
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	52%	28%	27%	28%	47%	26%
Adj R <sup>2</sup> $X_t$	48%	7%	9%	0%	19%	3%
$X_t$	$p_t - d_t$	$p_t - e_t$	$spc_t$	$cay_t$	$SVIX_t^2$	$\mathbb{E}_t^O[e_{t+1} - e_t]$
<b>Panel B</b>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$LTG_t$	-0.4345 <sup>a</sup> (0.1031)	-0.4682 <sup>a</sup> (0.1217)	-0.4761 <sup>a</sup> (0.1198)	-0.7542 <sup>a</sup> (0.2648)	-0.5052 <sup>a</sup> (0.1002)	-0.3450 <sup>a</sup> (0.0483)
$X_t$	0.1672 (0.1365)	0.1945 (0.1994)	0.2297 (0.1875)	-0.2800 (0.2708)	0.3848 <sup>a</sup> (0.1346)	-0.6142 <sup>a</sup> (0.1177)
Obs	409	409	372	13400%	409	137
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	27%	29%	37%	27%	40%	59%
Adj R <sup>2</sup> $X_t$	12%	8%	15%	10%	15%	48%
$X_t$	Term Spread <sub>t</sub>	Credit Spread <sub>t</sub>	Uncertainty Index <sub>t</sub>	Kelly Pruitt MRP <sub>t</sub>	$\mathbb{E}_t^O[\pi_{t+1}]$	$exp(d_t)$

Columns (1)-(5) in Panel A show that  $LTG_t$  is unlikely to proxy for required returns. Its explanatory power is robust to controlling for prices (columns (1) and (2)). Compared to predicting returns using only the price dividend ratio,  $LTG$  adds modest explanatory power in terms of adjusted  $R^2$ , but this is expected: the two variables are conceptually highly correlated under the interpretation that beliefs about long term earnings determine market prices (together with beliefs at different horizons than those captured by  $LTG$ ). Importantly,  $LTG$  in columns (1) and (2) retains independent explanatory power even after controlling for stock prices, which renders unlikely the possibility that it is inferred from prices themselves. Instead, the price dividend ratio predicts returns at least in part because it captures market expectations. In Section 3 we offer a test based on our theory to assess this possibility directly.

The explanatory power of  $LTG_t$  is also robust to controlling for proxies of time varying required returns (columns (3), (4), and (5)). The coefficient on  $LTG_t$  is fairly stable between  $-0.4$  and  $-0.5$  and highly statistically significant. The *spc* and *cay* proxies are themselves insignificant and do not add explanatory power.  $SVIX^2$  adds explanatory power, but in a way orthogonal to  $LTG_t$ : the  $R^2$  of  $SVIX^2$  alone is 19%. Overall, then, columns (1)-(5) in Panel A validate  $LTG_t$  as a measure of beliefs and confirm its high predictive power for returns. In the case of these model-based proxies for risk,  $LTG$  adds substantial explanatory power. These model-based proxies are themselves dependent on stock prices, but their limited predictive role compared to that of  $LTG$  suggests that beliefs play a significant role.

In Panel B of Table 2 we compare the explanatory power of  $LTG_t$  to that of determinants or predictors of stock prices/returns from previous work. In Panel A, column (6) we control for short term earnings growth expectations. The predictive power of  $LTG_t$  is robust to introducing this control which is itself insignificant, consistent with Table 1. In Panel B, columns (1)-(4), we control for well-established macroeconomic predictors of stock returns: the term spread, the credit spread, Bloom's uncertainty index, and the Kelly Pruitt factor (Kelly and Pruitt 2013). None of these predictors is statistically significant once we control for  $LTG_t$  and the gain in  $R^2$  compared

to Table 1 is modest. Adding  $LTG$  as a predictor significantly increases explanatory power for future returns compared to using these variables alone.

Finally, we consider the role of expected long term inflation and past dividend growth. De la O and Myers (2022) view expected long term inflation as a determinant of beliefs about real fundamentals: excessively high (low) expected inflation should be associated with excess pessimism (optimism) about future earnings, predicting high (low) future returns. In column (5) of Panel B the predictive power of  $LTG_t$  is shown to be robust to controlling for expected long term inflation, confirming that it captures significant variation in real expected fundamentals.<sup>9</sup>

We control for past dividend growth based on Nagel and Xu (2021), who see it as causing excess optimism about future dividend growth, in turn leading to low future returns. Column (6) of Panel B show that  $LTG_t$  is robust to this control as well. This evidence strengthens the link between beliefs and return predictability: past dividend growth may affect returns by also changing preferences and hence discount rates. In addition, even if past dividends only affect expectations, the predictive power of  $LTG_t$  shows that beliefs do not just reflect past performance, but also news about the future (Daniel and Titman 2006). This resonates with Kindleberger’s (1979) idea that new technologies help inflate asset bubbles.<sup>10, 11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Based on the predictive role of long term inflation expectations, De La O and Myers (2022) argue that expectations about real short-term earnings growth is what predicts returns, not  $LTG$ . This conclusion is however flawed for three reasons. First, the predictive role of long-term inflation expectations may be spurious, for it reflects the high inflation of the 70s, which was followed by low inflation and high stock returns in the 80s. Second, their analysis does not address the basic fact that the predictive power of short-term earnings growth expectations for returns is weak (Table 1, Panel B), and disappears when one controls for  $LTG_t$  (Table 2, Panel A, column (6)). On a related note, short term inflation expectations would seem to be more relevant than long term ones for their emphasis on short term real earnings growth. Third, they propose a test that is sufficient, but not necessary, for return predictability and use the wrong definition of  $LTG_t$  as growth between years 3 and 5. When using the correct definition of cumulative growth over the next 3 to 5 years,  $LTG_t$  passes the test. Specifically, future  $LTG_t$  errors, both actual and predicted using the model in Table 4, are negatively correlated with the current price dividend ratio,  $cov(pd_t, \Delta e_{t,t+5}/5 - LTG_t) = -0.2681$  ( $p = 0.077$ ) and  $cov(pd_t, \Delta \widehat{e_{t,t+5}/5} - LTG_t) = -0.3915$  ( $p = 0.055$ ). In Section 3 we perform a more systematic “horse race” to assess the extent to which the predictive power of  $pd_t$  for returns is due to predictable future  $LTG_t$  revisions and errors.

<sup>10</sup> The results of Table 2 hold at a 3 year horizon and when including other predictors (Appendix B, Table B.2).

<sup>11</sup> Hillenbrand and McCarthy (2022) regress the price earnings ratio on measured beliefs and on required return proxies. The  $R^2$  of the regression using measured beliefs is 77%, which increases to 84% when proxies for required returns are added. In this analysis, consistent with our results,  $LTG_t$  is the variable with largest explanatory power.

If  $LTG_t$  predicts returns, what determines its evolution? An analysis of this issue also provides useful input into the rest of our study. Table 3 reports, in column (1), the regression of the one year revision  $\Delta LTG_t$  on lagged beliefs,  $LTG_{t-1}$ , and on earnings surprises relative to cyclically adjusted earnings,  $e_t - cae_{t-5}$ . The coefficient on  $LTG_{t-1}$  provides information on the persistence of beliefs, the coefficient on  $e_t - cae_{t-5}$  on whether beliefs respond to sustained earnings growth (which is more relevant to assessing long term fundamentals than temporary growth episodes). Of course, because  $LTG_t$  may also be updated based on news about the future, we should not expect past fundamentals to account for 100% of its revisions.

Column (2) presents an additional test that  $LTG_t$  is not mechanically set to fit market prices or required returns by controlling for stock returns in the past year and for one-year ahead expected return from the CFO Survey<sup>12</sup>. In columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) we control for the dividend price ratio and the proxies for discount rates we used in Table 2. If market prices move with news about future fundamentals,  $LTG_t$  revisions will correlate with contemporaneous returns as well as with price ratios. A key aspect of this exercise is to check whether theory-based drivers of expectations, such as recent growth in fundamentals, predicts revisions even after controlling for prices.

**Table 3**  
**Determinants of  $LTG$  revisions**

We study the association between one-year changes in the forecast for growth in the long run and predictors of returns (empirical and theoretical). The dependent variable is the change in the forecast for growth in earnings in the long run  $LTG_t$  between year  $t$  and  $t-1$ ,  $\Delta LTG_t$ . The independent variables are: (a) the one-year lagged value of  $LTG_t$ , (b) log of earnings for the S&P500 in year  $t$  relative to cyclically-adjusted earnings in year  $t - 5$ ,  $e_t - cae_{t-5}$ , (c) the (log) return on the S&P500 between year  $t - 1$  and  $t$ ,  $r_{t-1}$ , (d) the forecast for the S&P500's one-year return from the Graham and Harvey survey,  $\mathbb{E}_t^O[r_{t+1}]$ , (e) the price to dividend ratio,  $pd_t$ , in column [3] (f) the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) surplus consumption ratio,  $spc_t$ , in column [4], (g) the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) consumption-wealth ratio,  $cay_t$ , in column [5] and (h) the Martin (2013) expected return on the market,  $SVIX^2$ , in column [6]. Data is monthly (quarterly) in columns [1], [3], [4] and [6] ([2] and [5]). All variables are standardized and intercepts are not shown. The sample period is 1981:12-2020:12. Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses (with 12 lags). Superscripts: <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5% level, and <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10% level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Dependent Variable: $\Delta LTG_t$					
$LTG_{t-1}$	-0.4349 <sup>a</sup>	-0.4624 <sup>a</sup>	-0.5451 <sup>a</sup>	-0.4393 <sup>a</sup>	-0.3232 <sup>a</sup>	-0.3338 <sup>b</sup>
	(0.1616)	(0.1090)	(0.1489)	(0.1429)	(0.1187)	(0.1510)

<sup>12</sup> Available at <https://www.richmondfed.org/cfosurvey>.

$e_t - cae_{t-5}$	0.3938 <sup>a</sup> (0.0827)	0.3006 <sup>a</sup> (0.0561)	0.3409 <sup>a</sup> (0.0570)	0.3274 <sup>a</sup> (0.0770)	0.3883 <sup>a</sup> (0.0889)	0.4663 <sup>a</sup> (0.1173)
$r_{t-1}$		0.0572 (0.1023)				
$E_t^O[r_{t+1}]$		0.0858 (0.0959)				
$X_t$			0.2828 <sup>a</sup> (0.0945)	0.2291 <sup>a</sup> (0.0655)	-0.0928 (0.1214)	0.1459 (0.1754)
Observations	457	76	457	457	148	193
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	31%	38%	37%	36%	31%	52%
$X_t$			$p_t - d_t$	$spc_t$	$ca y_t$	$SVIX_t^2$

In column (1), the coefficient on  $LTG_{t-1}$  is negative and smaller than one in magnitude, showing that  $LTG_t$  is quite persistent but tends to mean revert. The positive coefficient on  $e_t - cae_{t-5}$  further suggests that  $LTG_t$  is revised upward after periods of sustained earnings growth. These two forces alone account for roughly one third of the variation in  $LTG$  revisions.

None of these conclusions change materially when we control for past and expected returns, the price dividend ratio, and the required return proxies. The evidence confirms that the change in  $LTG_t$  reflects genuine belief revisions about future fundamentals. Two out of four controls are insignificant, and they mostly only marginally improve explanatory power.<sup>13</sup>

Overall, we showed that  $LTG_t$  strongly predicts future aggregate stock returns and that it offers a good proxy for market expectations of long-term fundamentals. How are beliefs, as measured by  $LTG_t$ , and returns connected? We study this question next.

### 3. Expectations and Stock Returns

Following Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1988), the log return  $r_{t+1}$  obtained by holding the stock market between  $t$  and  $t + 1$  can be approximated as:

$$r_{t+1} = \alpha p_{t+1} + (1 - \alpha)d_{t+1} - p_t + k, \quad (1)$$

<sup>13</sup> Table B.4 in Appendix B shows the results are robust to controlling for further measures of required returns, as well as for lagged 5 year returns (as a proxy for expectations of returns, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)).



where  $p_t$  is log stock price at  $t$ ,  $d_{t+1}$  is the log dividend at  $t + 1$ , while  $k > 0$  and  $\alpha \in (0,1)$  are constants. Iterating Equation (1) forward and imposing the transversality condition, we obtain:

$$p_t - d_t = \frac{k}{1 - \alpha} + \sum_{s \geq 0} \alpha^s g_{t+1+s} - \sum_{s \geq 0} \alpha^s r_{t+1+s}, \quad (2)$$

where  $g_{t+s+1} \equiv d_{t+s+1} - d_{t+s}$  is dividend growth between  $t + s$  and  $t + s + 1$ .

The average firm in the economy, which we call “the market,” has dividend growth:

$$g_{t+1} = \mu g_t + v_{t+1}, \quad (3)$$

where  $v_{t+1}$  is an i.i.d. Gaussian shock with mean zero and variance  $\sigma_v^2$  and  $\mu \in [0,1]$ . In BGLS (2020) we showed that our key results hold under a general covariance stationary process. The shock  $v_{t+1}$  captures tangible news arriving at  $t + 1$  such as earnings news, proxied for instance by the measure  $e_t - cae_{t-5}$ , but it can also capture intangible news learned at  $t$  but affecting future earnings, such as the introduction of a new technology. We write  $v_{t+1} = \tau_{t+1} + \eta_t$ , where  $\tau_{t+1}$  is tangible news,  $\eta_t$  intangible news, and the variance of  $v_{t+1}$  reflects the two components  $\sigma_v^2 = \sigma_\tau^2 + \sigma_\eta^2$ . By using expectations data we can capture both tangible and intangible news. Table 2 shows that intangible news is important: expectations data have considerable explanatory power even controlling for past fundamentals.<sup>14</sup>

In Equation (2), the variation in the current price to dividend ratio is due to expected variation in future dividend growth (captured by the  $g_{t+1+s}$  terms), required returns (captured by the  $r_{t+1+s}$  terms), or both. Rational expectations theories of return predictability rely only on the second source of variation. In these theories, expectations of fundamentals  $\mathbb{E}_t(g_{t+s+1})$  are formed by optimally using Equation (3), while rational expectations of future returns  $\mathbb{E}_t(r_{t+s+1})$  are also formed using the true model of required returns (which we do not need to specify). Under rational expectations, the realized stock return between  $t$  and  $t + 1$  is then given by:

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<sup>14</sup> We perform a systematic analysis of tangible (i.e. measured in terms of fundamentals) versus intangible news in Appendix D. We find that predictive power of past fundamentals is typically economically smaller and statistically less significant than that of measured beliefs, suggesting an important role for intangible news.

$$r_{t+1} = \mathbb{E}_t(r_{t+1}) + \sum_{s \geq 0} \alpha^s (\mathbb{E}_{t+1} - \mathbb{E}_t)(g_{t+1+s}) - \sum_{s \geq 1} \alpha^s (\mathbb{E}_{t+1} - \mathbb{E}_t)(r_{t+1+s}), \quad (4)$$

so that realized returns are driven by three components: the required return between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ ,  $\mathbb{E}_t(r_{t+1})$ , rational belief revisions about future dividends  $(\mathbb{E}_{t+1} - \mathbb{E}_t)(g_{t+1+s})$ , and rational belief revisions about future returns,  $(\mathbb{E}_{t+1} - \mathbb{E}_t)(r_{t+1+s})$ . Because rational belief revisions reflect news arriving at  $t + 1$ , they are unpredictable at time  $t$ . As a result, under rational expectations return predictability is only due to variation in  $\mathbb{E}_t(r_{t+1})$ .

In our approach to predictability, in contrast, required and hence expected returns are constant at  $r$ , but beliefs about future fundamentals are formed using a distorted operator  $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+1+s})$ , not by optimal forecasts using Equation (3). Here realized returns are given by:

$$r_{t+1} = r + \sum_{s \geq 0} \alpha^s (\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{t+1} - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t)(g_{t+1+s}). \quad (5)$$

Critically, the belief revision  $(\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{t+1} - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t)(g_{t+1+s})$  occurring at  $t + 1$  is no longer pure “news”. It is also shaped by systematic belief distortions prevailing at  $t$ . These distortions, embedded in the time  $t$  forecast  $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+1+s})$ , are the source of return predictability in our approach.<sup>15</sup>

To characterize the predictions from (5), we lay out a reduced form model of beliefs that nests the leading departures from rationality studied in macroeconomic and finance: overreaction to news, as in models of diagnostic expectations (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2018, BGLS 2019), but also as in earlier models (e.g., Barberis et al. 1998), and underreaction to news, as in models of rational or non-rational inattention (Sims 2003, Gabaix 2013, Huang and Liu 2007, Bouchaud et al. 2019). The model highlights the distinctive predictions of these theories with respect to the forecast errors and their link to return predictability.

### 3.1 Non-Rational Beliefs and their Empirical Predictions

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<sup>15</sup> For simplicity we abstract from the theoretical possibility that expectations of returns exhibit predictable revisions. While this assumption allows us to focus on the role of measured expectations of fundamentals, future work may enrich Equation (5) by adding predictable return variation (e.g., via price extrapolation).

We model departures from rationality as a time varying distortion  $\epsilon_t$  whose impact on beliefs decays with the forecast horizon according to the true persistence  $\mu$  of fundamentals:

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+s}) = \mathbb{E}_t(g_{t+s}) + \mu^{s-1}\epsilon_t, \quad (6)$$

where  $s \geq 1$  and  $\mathbb{E}_t(g_{t+s}) = \mu^{s-1}(\mu g_t + \eta_t)$  is the rational forecast based on (3).

The distortion  $\epsilon_t$  follows an AR(1) process,  $\epsilon_t = \rho\epsilon_{t-1} + u_t$ , where  $\rho \in [0,1]$  and  $u_t$  is an expectations shock. Parameter  $\rho$  captures the observed persistence in  $LTG_t$ . We impose  $\rho < \mu$  to reproduce one key fact in Table 3: the negative correlation between  $LTG_t$  revisions and lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$ , i.e.,  $cov[\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{t+1}(g_{t+s}) - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+s}), \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+s})] < 0$ . This implies that excess optimism or pessimism gradually yet systematically revert over time.

The over- vs under-reaction in beliefs is incorporated into the expectations shock  $u_t$ . We assume that  $u_t$  is proportional to news, captured by the rational belief revision at  $t$ . Formally,  $u_t = \theta(\mu\tau_t + \eta_t)$ . If  $\theta = 0$ , expectations are rational. If  $\theta > 0$ , investors overreact, exaggerating the impact of news on expectations. If  $\theta < 0$ , investors underreact, dampening the effect of news on expectations. We assume  $\theta > -1$ , which ensures that good news are not viewed as bad and vice versa. Appendix A shows that, for  $\theta > 0$ , Equation (6) is a special case of the diagnostic expectations model (Bordalo et al. 2018).<sup>16</sup>

Equations (5) and (6) yield our two empirical tests, one on the predictability of forecast errors and another on predictability of returns from predictable forecast errors. The first test detects whether beliefs over or under react ( $\theta \lessgtr 0$ ) by using the predictability of future forecast errors based on current expectations revisions.

**Proposition 1.** *Under Equation (6), the forecast error predictability regression:*

$$g_{t+s} - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+s}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+s}) - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1}(g_{t+s})] + \beta_2\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1}(g_{t+s}) + z_{t+s}, \quad (7)$$

has  $\beta_1 < 0$  if and only if beliefs overreact to news,  $\theta > 0$ .  $\theta > 0$  also implies  $\beta_2 < 0$ .

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<sup>16</sup> Our model rules out non-fundamental noise (Black 1986, DeLong et al. 1990a). It can be easily introduced in the analysis to capture an extreme form of overreaction, in which beliefs react to wholly irrelevant factors.

Consistent with Bordalo, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2020), who build on Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), a negative association  $\beta_1 < 0$  between the current forecast revision  $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+s}) - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1}(g_{t+s})$  and the future forecast error  $g_{t+s} - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+s})$  is indicative of overreaction to *current* news. After good news (i.e., a positive revision) beliefs become too optimistic, predicting future disappointment (i.e., a negative error). Under-reaction entails the opposite association. Proposition 1 additionally says that if beliefs over-react, then the lagged forecast  $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1}(g_{t+s})$  also negatively predicts forecast errors. The reason is that the belief distortion  $\epsilon_t$  is persistent, so high lagged forecasts incorporate over-reaction to past news, which also leads to systematic future disappointment.

Our second, and key, test links systematic forecast errors in earnings growth to return predictability. It is obtained using Equations (3), (5), and (6).

**Proposition 2** *The realized return at  $t+1$  is given by:*

$$r_{t+1} = r + \left( \frac{1 - \alpha\rho}{1 - \alpha\mu} \right) \mathbb{E}_t[g_{t+1} - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{t+1})] + \omega_{t+1} \quad (8)$$

where  $\omega_{t+1} = \left( \frac{1+\alpha\theta}{1-\alpha\mu} \right) \tau_{t+1} + \alpha \left( \frac{1+\theta}{1-\alpha\mu} \right) \eta_{t+1}$  is a combination of tangible and intangible news.

The realized return depends on news arriving at  $t + 1$ , captured by  $\omega_{t+1}$ , but also on the  $t + 1$  forecast error predictable using information available at  $t$ . This positive association between future returns and predictable forecast errors connects our two tests.

**Prediction 1** *LTG<sub>t</sub> overreacts,  $\theta > 0$ , if and only if forecast errors in earnings growth and future stock returns are both negatively predicted by the current LTG<sub>t</sub> revision. If  $\theta > 0$ , then lagged LTG<sub>t</sub> also negatively predicts both forecast errors and returns.*

If upward *LTG* revisions and high lagged *LTG* predict stronger disappointment of earnings growth expectations (i.e. more negative forecast errors), then beliefs overreact. In our theory, then, upward *LTG* revisions and high lagged *LTG* additionally imply a currently inflated stock market,

in turn predicting lower future stock returns. Using expectations data, we can now test for this joint predictability of forecast errors and returns.

### 3.2 Predictability of Aggregate Stock Returns

Table 4 tests Prediction 1, combining Propositions 1 and 2. Column (1) tests Equation (7) from Proposition 1: it predicts the forecast error in the five years ahead earnings growth using the one year  $LTG_t$  revision and the lagged forecast,  $LTG_{t-1}$ . Column (2) uses the same explanatory variables to predict five year ahead returns. Column (3) performs an IV strategy testing Equation (8) from Proposition 2: in the first stage we predict forecast errors using the model in Column (1), in the second stage we use the fitted forecast errors to predict returns. In Column (4) we perform a robustness test: we add the current price to dividend ratio as a regressor.

**Table 4**  
**Predictability of Forecast Errors and Returns**

This table links aggregate forecast errors and market returns. We report regressions using as dependent variable the error in forecasting five-year growth in aggregate earnings in column [1] and the discounted value of the cumulative market return between year  $t$  and  $t + 5$  in columns [2] and [3]. Five-year cumulative market returns ( $\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$ ) are computed using monthly data and run from  $t + 1/12$  through  $t + 60/12$ . We define the forecast error as the difference between (a) the annual growth in earnings per share between year  $t$  and  $t + 5$ ,  $\Delta_5 e_{t+5}/5$ , and (b) the expected long term growth in earnings,  $LTG_t$ . The independent variables are the one-year change in  $LTG_t$ ,  $\Delta LTG_t$ , the lagged forecast,  $LTG_{t-1}$ , and the predicted forecast error,  $\Delta_5 e_{t+5}/5 - LTG_t$ . We assume that earnings are reported with a with a 3-month lag (i.e. we define  $e_t$  as earnings for the calendar period  $t - 1/4$ ). We report OLS estimates in columns [1] and [2], and second-stage IV results in column [3]. The instrumental variables are  $\Delta LTG_t$  and  $LTG_{t-1}$ . Except for  $\Delta LTG_t$ , all variables are standardized. Intercepts are not shown. The sample period is 1982:12-2015:12. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses (with 60 lags). Superscripts: <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5% level, and <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10% level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\frac{\Delta_5 e_{i,t+5}}{5} - LTG_{i,t}$	$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$	$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$	$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$
$\Delta LTG_t$	-0.8407 <sup>a</sup> (0.1528)	-0.6403 <sup>a</sup> (0.0766)		
$LTG_{t-1}$	-0.2157 (0.1374)	-0.5252 <sup>a</sup> (0.0870)		
$\Delta_5 e_{t+5} / 5 - LTG_t$			0.8460 <sup>a</sup> (0.2474)	
$\Delta_5 e_{t+5} / \sqrt{5} - LTG_t$				0.3853 <sup>a</sup>

				(0.1200)
$pd_t$				-0.6377 <sup>a</sup>
				(0.1786)
Observations	397	397	397	397
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	25%	31%		48%
Montiel-Pflueger F-stat			10.97	
Instrument			$LTG_{t-1}, \Delta LTG_t$	

Column 1 shows that beliefs overreact,  $\theta > 0$ . Upward  $LTG_t$  revisions predict future disappointment, suggesting that beliefs become too optimistic when good news arrives. This confirms, at the level of the S&P 500 index, the belief overreaction documented by BGLS (2019) at the level of stock portfolios. Here we find overreaction at the consensus level (remember we are using the median  $LTG$  forecast). This is a strong result: analysts' overreaction here overwhelms information frictions. The latter can in fact produce consensus underreaction even if individual forecasters overreact (Woodford 2003, BGMS 2020). Also in line with overreaction, a higher lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$  is associated with a lower forecast error. This association is not significant at conventional levels, but our other results show statistical significance for  $LTG_{t-1}$ .<sup>17</sup>

Column (2) connects belief overreaction to return predictability. Upward  $LTG_t$  revisions and higher lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$  predict sharply lower future stock returns. This finding is consistent with our mechanism. Overreaction to current news causes excessive upward  $LTG_t$  revisions, high  $\epsilon_t$ , and hence an excessive stock market boom at  $t$ . This is followed by belief disappointment, a downward price correction and hence low returns  $r_{t+1}$ . Higher lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$  also predicts low future returns for the same reason.

Column (3) links predictable forecast errors to future returns. Consistent with Equation (8), periods of excess pessimism in which future forecast errors are systematically high (growth is above expectations) are on average followed by high stock returns. Conversely, periods of

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<sup>17</sup> One may worry that measurement error in  $LTG_t$  may create a spurious negative correlation between forecast errors and  $\Delta LTG_t$ . However, i) forecast errors are predictable from  $LTG$  revisions instrumented by past growth in fundamentals (Table B.6 in Appendix B), and ii) revisions of  $LTG_t$  negatively predict returns, consistent with overreaction (Table 4 column 2). Table B.5 shows the results in Table 4 follow through at the 3 year horizon.

excess optimism in which future forecast errors are systematically low (growth is below expectations) are on average followed by low returns. Column (4) shows that, as in Table 2, this holds even after controlling for the price dividend ratio, confirming that the link between forecast errors and returns is unlikely to be due the reverse engineering  $LTG$  from stock prices. In this exercise,  $LTG_t$  proxies for beliefs at a specific horizon, while  $p_t - d_t$  captures beliefs at other horizons (which may be affected by independent factors), and required return variation.

Quantitatively, the effects are sizable. In column (2) a one standard deviation higher revision  $\Delta LTG_t$  (equal to 0.62) is associated with a roughly 0.4 of a standard deviation lower future return, and a one standard deviation higher lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$  (equal to 1) is associated with a roughly 0.5 of a standard deviation lower future return. These effects imply reductions in 5-year log returns of 0.13 and 0.17, respectively. Since the average monthly log return is 0.007, this corresponds to losing 19 to 25 months' worth of returns over five years.

The explanatory power of expectations is also high in terms of  $R^2$ : the model in column (2) accounts for 31% of return variation at a five year horizon. The explanatory power of expectations is much higher than that of past fundamentals. Our measure of earnings growth in the past five years,  $e_t - cae_{t-5}$ , negatively predicts returns but with an  $R^2$  of only 13%.

Do beliefs about long term growth help account for the predictive power of the price dividend ratio? We can address this question using the exact relationship between returns and news in Equations (4) and (5). Under rational expectations, when Equation (4) holds,  $p_t - d_t$  predicts future returns by acting as an inverse measure of the required return  $\mathbb{E}_t(r_{t+1})$ . In this case,  $p_t - d_t$  is orthogonal to proxies for the news affecting  $r_{t+1}$ . Under belief over-reaction and constant required returns, in contrast, returns are described by Equation (5). Now high  $p_t - d_t$  signals excess optimism, so it predicts low returns by predicting systematically disappointing future “news”, as measured by systematic expectations revisions  $(\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{t+k} - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t)(g_{t+1+s}) < 0$ . A key implication follows: under rational expectations, the explanatory power of  $p_t - d_t$  is

unaffected if future returns  $r_{t+1}$  are purified from expectation revisions at  $t + 1$ . Under belief over-reaction, in contrast, the explanatory power of  $p_t - d_t$  is reduced, because part of the expectation revisions in  $t + 1$  capture systematic reversal of overreaction at  $t$ .

We test this implication using a two stage test. In the first stage, we regress realized returns  $r_{t+k}$  at the one, three, and five years horizons,  $k = 1,3,5$ , on the  $LTG_t$  news occurring at the same horizon. We proxy news by the one year  $LTG$  revisions and by the  $LTG$  forecast errors occurring between  $t + 1$  and  $t + k$ . The return residuals  $\tilde{r}_{t+k}$  from this regression purify the return  $r_{t+k}$  from variation due to future  $LTG$  news. In the second stage, we use  $p_t - d_t$  to predict residuals  $\tilde{r}_{t+k}$ . Under rationality, the coefficient on  $p_t - d_t$  should not change when predicting raw returns or residuals. Under overreaction, the coefficient's magnitude should be smaller in the latter case.

Table 5 reports the results of this exercise. For brevity, we report only the second stage result (the first stage is in Appendix B, Table B.7 and shows, intuitively, that better news entail higher returns). Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the coefficient from regressing raw returns  $r_{t+k}$  on  $p_t - d_t$ . Columns (2), (4) and (6) report the coefficient for residualized returns  $\tilde{r}_{t+k}$ .

**Table 5**

This table examines why the price-dividend ratio ( $p_t - d_t$ ) predicts stock market returns. We proceed in two steps. In the first step, we regress realized returns  $r_{t+k}$  at the one, three, and five years horizons ( $k = 1,3,5$ ) on one-year revisions in long term growth in earnings occurring between  $t + 1$  and  $t + k$  (i.e.  $\Delta LTG_{t+1}$  through  $\Delta LTG_{t+k}$ ) and long-term forecast errors occurring between  $t + 1$  and time  $t + k$  (i.e.  $e_{t+1} - LTG_{t-4}$  through  $\Delta_5 e_{t+k} - LTG_{t+k-5}$ ), presented in Table B.7. We generate return residuals  $\tilde{r}_{t+k}$  from these first-stage regression. In the second step, we use  $p_t - d_t$  to predict  $r_{t+k}$  in columns [1], [3], and [5] and  $\tilde{r}_{t+k}$  in columns [2], [4], and [6]. Except for  $\Delta LTG_t$ , all variables are standardized. Intercepts are not shown. The sample period is 1985:12-2015:12. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses (with 12 lags in columns [1]-[2], 36 lags in column [3]-[4], and 60 lags in columns [5]-[6]). Superscripts: <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5% level, and <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10% level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$r_{t+1}$		$\sum_{j=1}^3 \alpha^{j-1} r_{t+j}$		$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{t+j}$	
	raw	residual	raw	residual	raw	residual
$p_t - d_t$	-0.3742 <sup>b</sup> (0.1481)	-0.3017 <sup>a</sup> (0.0959)	-0.6219 <sup>a</sup> (0.2018)	-0.2537 <sup>a</sup> (0.0903)	-0.8204 <sup>a</sup> (0.2125)	-0.1670 <sup>c</sup> (0.0982)
Obs	361	361	361	361	361	361
R <sup>2</sup>	10%	10%	28%	13%	48%	10%
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	10%	9%	27%	13%	48%	10%



Overreaction in the expectations of long term growth, reflected in systematic *LTG* revisions and forecast errors, accounts for a large chunk of price dividend ratio's predictive power at medium to long term horizons. At the one year horizon, *LTG* matters little in the sense that the estimated coefficient in column (1) is indistinguishable from that in column (2). At the 3 and 5 years horizons, in contrast, the effect is dramatic: after removing returns that are due to *LTG* news, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for  $p_t - d_t$  drops by a factor of 2.5 at the three years horizon and more than 5 at a five year horizon.<sup>18</sup> This evidence suggests that the bulk of the price dividend ratio's predictive power is due to its ability to capture non-rational beliefs, in particular systematic reversals of overreaction, as proxied by *LTG* news.

### 3.3 Predictability of Firm Level Stock Returns

The results in Table 4 might be influenced by a few outlier episodes, such as the internet bubble. One way to address this concern is to test Prediction 1 at the firm level, since this allows us to control for time dummies, purging the effects of common shocks (including shocks to required returns). We can also include firm fixed effects, which control for constant differences in average returns across firms.

Table 6 performs this firm level exercise, controlling for year dummies and firm fixed effects. Column (1) predicts forecast errors for a firm's five years ahead earnings growth using the one year changes in a firm's forecast  $\Delta LTG_{i,t}$  and the lagged forecast  $LTG_{i,t-1}$ . Column (2) uses the same regressors to predict the firm's stock returns over the next five years. Column (3) uses the errors fitted in column (1) as instruments to predict returns.<sup>19</sup> In line with Table 4, in

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<sup>18</sup> Results are similar if we proxy for *LTG* news using only revisions, not errors (Appendix B, Table B.8). The  $R^2$  of 48% in column (5) is equal to that of Column (4) in Table 4, which also uses a forecast error predictor. This is a coincidence, because the two regressions are estimated in different samples (i.e., the sample period for Table 5 starts on December of 1985, rather than December of 1982 for Table 4, because that's when we can first compute  $e_{t+1} - LTG_{t-4}$ ). Using the same sample of Table 4 reduces the  $R^2$  in column 5 to 44.9%.

<sup>19</sup> Following BGLS (2019), here we consider all domestic common stocks in the IBES Unadjusted US Summary Statistics file, which includes stocks listed on major U.S. stock exchanges (i.e., NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) except for closed-end funds and REITs. From the IBES Detail History Tape file we obtain analyst earnings forecasts.

column (4) we control for the firm's price dividend ratio (restricting to the observations where dividends are paid), and in column (5) we control for the price earnings ratio (using observations with positive earnings). To assess the role of the episodes in our data with the greatest returns, in column (6) we exclude the years 1998-2002 and 2007-2009.

**Table 6**  
**Firm-Level Results**

We present firm-level regressions for all US firms in the IBES sample. We define firm-level forecast errors as the difference between (a) the growth in firm  $i$ 's earnings per share between year  $t$  and  $t + 5$ ,  $\Delta_5 e_{i,t+5}/5$ , and (b) the expected long term growth in firm  $i$ 's earnings,  $LTG_{i,t}$ . In column [1] we perform an OLS regression of the error in forecasting the five-year earnings growth on: (a) the one year revision of the forecast for a firm's long-term earnings growth,  $\Delta LTG_{i,t}$  and (b) the lagged forecast  $LTG_{i,t-1}$ . In column [2] we perform an OLS regression of discounted the cumulative (log) return for firm  $i$  between year  $t$  and  $t+5$ ,  $\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$  on the same two independent variables. In column [3] we perform an IV regression of stock returns,  $\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$ , on the forecast errors fitted in column [1]. In column [4] we perform an OLS regression of five-year returns,  $\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$ , repeating the regression on the forecast errors fitted in column [1] controlling for the price dividend ratio in column [4] (for observations with positive dividends) and the price earnings ratio in column [5] (for observations with positive earnings). In column [6], we return to the benchmark specification in column [3] but exclude from the sample the years 1998-2002 and 2007-2009. Except  $\Delta LTG_{i,t}$ , all variables are standardized. Regressions include time- and firm-fixed effects, which we do not report. Except in column [6], the sample period is 1982:12-2015:12. We report Driscoll–Kraay standard errors with autocorrelation of up to 60 lags. Superscripts: <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5% level, and <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10% level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$\frac{\Delta_5 e_{i,t+5}}{5}$ – $LTG_{i,t}$	$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$	$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$	$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$	$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$	$\sum_{j=1}^5 \alpha^{j-1} r_{i,t+j}$
$\Delta LTG_{i,t}$	-0.3286 <sup>a</sup> (0.0246)	-0.1774 <sup>a</sup> (0.0409)				
$LTG_{i,t-1}$	-0.3638 <sup>a</sup> (0.0252)	-0.2162 <sup>a</sup> (0.0446)				
$\Delta_5 e_{i,t+5} / \sqrt{5} - LTG_t$			0.5757 <sup>a</sup> (0.0923)	0.3688 <sup>a</sup> (0.0581)	0.4869 <sup>a</sup> (0.1057)	0.4702 <sup>a</sup> (0.0922)
$pd_{i,t}$				-0.4498 <sup>a</sup> (0.1113)		
$pe_{i,t}$					-0.2962 <sup>a</sup> (0.0676)	
Observations	371,525	371,525	371,525	259,727	371,525	268,156
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	4%	1%		3%	3%	
KP F-stat	.	.	107.3	.	.	182.6
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Instrument	.	.	$LTG_{i,t-1}$ , $\Delta LTG_{i,t}$			$LTG_{i,t-1}$ , $\Delta LTG_{i,t}$

Column (1) again shows strong evidence of overreaction. Upward firm level  $LTG_{it}$  revisions predict future disappointment (negative forecast errors), and the same does a high lagged forecast  $LTG_{i,t-1}$ , in line with the aggregate results. Column (2) confirms, at the firm level, the result on return predictability: higher firm level forecast revisions  $\Delta LTG_{i,t}$  and lagged forecast  $LTG_{i,t-1}$  are associated with sharply lower returns. The  $R^2$  in column (2) is lower than that for the aggregate market, perhaps because there are many sources of idiosyncratic and unpredictable variation in firm level returns. Still, coefficient magnitudes are sizable: a one standard deviation higher forecast revision (equal to 0.53) or of lagged forecast (equal to 1) are followed by a 0.09 (respectively 0.22) of a standard deviation lower return at the firm level.

Column (3) confirms the direct link between predictable disappointment and predictable returns: periods in which beliefs about a firm are over-pessimistic (over-optimistic), in the sense that they are systematically followed by earnings growth predictably above (below) expectations, are also periods in which the firm's stock return is higher (lower). Columns (4) and (5) show that the results are robust to controlling for the price dividend ratio (for the observations that pay dividends) and for the price earnings ratio, providing further evidence that  $LTG$  is not inferred from prices. In Column (6) we exclude the years of the internet bubble and the financial crisis: our results are not driven by the episodes with largest returns in the data.<sup>20</sup>

In sum, measured expectations display strong overreaction to news and boom-bust stock price dynamics: good news lead to excessive optimism, which is associated with an inflated stock price and a future price reversal when over-optimism is disappointed. The same mechanism operates for both the aggregate market and individual firms, indicating its generality.

#### **4. Return Predictability in the Cross Section**

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<sup>20</sup> In Appendix B we extend the results of Table 6 by predicting returns at a 3 year horizon (Table B.9), as well as by instrumenting revisions using fundamental growth (Table B.10).

Decades of asset pricing research have unveiled puzzling differences in average returns across stocks grouped based on observed characteristics such as the book to market ratio, profitability, etc. Such predictability is systematic. For instance, high book to market stocks tend to do poorly together, compared to low book to market stocks, and likewise for other characteristics (Fama and French 1993). Some scholars view such cross sectional return predictability as reflecting differential exposure to systematic risk factors (Fama and French 1993, Cochrane 2011). Other scholars argue instead that it reflects systematic psychological factors (DeLong et al. 1990, Lakonishok et al. 1994, Kozak, Nagel and Santosh 2018).

Expectations data allow to empirically assess this debate. We just showed that expectations about *aggregate* long term earnings growth,  $LTG_t$ , capture systematic overreaction in market beliefs. Can such systematic overreaction also shed light on the comovement of returns in the cross section? In Section 4.1 we address this question by focusing on the cross-sectional return spread between high and low  $LTG$  firms (La Porta 1996). Section 4.2 broadens the analysis to consider the returns of Fama-French (1993) factors.

#### **4.1 $LTG$ and time variation in the $LTG$ Spread**

La Porta (1996) showed that firms in the top  $LTG$  decile have predictably lower stock returns than firms in the bottom  $LTG$  decile. BGLS (2019) show that a model in which beliefs about a firm's long-term earnings growth overreact can account for this finding. Here we ask a new question: do the returns of stocks in the top (bottom)  $LTG$  decile comove with aggregate  $LTG_t$ , causing systematic variation in the  $LTG$  cross sectional spread? Addressing this question is a key first step to understanding whether systematic belief biases shape cross sectional mispricing.

To make progress, in Table 7 we regress the five year log return of portfolios of stocks sorted based on  $LTG$  on our proxies for aggregate over-optimism, namely the forecast revision  $\Delta LTG_t$  and the lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$ . We also add the contemporaneous market return, which captures the CAPM co-movement based on the fundamental risk exposure. Column (1) reports

the regression results for the low *LTG* portfolio (*LLTG*), defined as the bottom decile of stocks based on their median *LTG*. Column (2) presents the same regression for the high *LTG* portfolio (*HLTG*) defined as the top decile of stocks based on their median *LTG*. Column (3) estimates the same model for the return on the low minus high *LTG* portfolio. We call this portfolio “Pessimism minus Optimism” *LTG*, or *PMO*, adopting the Fama-French convention of forming a portfolio whose long arm is the group of firms earning a higher average return, *LLTG* in our case. Columns (4) through (7) add to column (3) regressions the three conventional proxies for discount rates.

**Table 7**  
**Market Return and *LTG* portfolio returns**

We predict the return for portfolios formed by the forecast for long-term growth in earnings for firm  $i$ ,  $LTG_{i,t}$  using expectations about earnings growth for the market. On each month between December 1982 and December 2015, we form decile portfolios based on  $LTG_{i,t}$  and report regression results for the five-year cumulative (log) returns on: (a) the lowest decile (*LLTG*) in column [1], (b) the highest decile (*HLTG*) in column [2], and (c) the difference between the two ( $PMO = LLTG - HLTG$ ) in columns [3]-[7]. The independent variables are: (a) the one year forecast revision for long term growth in aggregate earnings,  $\Delta LTG_t$ , (b) the one-year lagged forecast,  $LTG_{t-1}$ , (c) the (log) five-year return of CRSP’s value-weighted index between  $t$  and  $t + 5$ ,  $\ln(Mkt_{t,t+5})$ , and: (d) the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) surplus consumption ratio,  $spc_t$ , in column [4], (d) the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) consumption-wealth ratio,  $cay_t$ , in column [5], (e) the Martin (2013) expected return on the market  $SVIX^2$  in column [6], and (f) the price dividend ratio,  $pd_t$ , in column [7]. Except for  $\Delta LTG_t$ , variables are standardized. Intercepts are not shown. The sample period is 1982:12-2015:12. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses (with 60 lags). Superscripts: <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5% level, and <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10% level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Dependent Variable: (Log) Five-year Return						
	LLTG	HLTG	PMO	PMO	PMO	PMO	PMO
$\Delta LTG_t$	0.2335 <sup>c</sup> (0.1411)	-0.7946 <sup>a</sup> (0.1780)	0.9878 <sup>a</sup> (0.1991)	0.9207 <sup>a</sup> (0.1894)	0.9119 <sup>a</sup> (0.2050)	1.0709 <sup>a</sup> (0.2927)	1.0545 <sup>a</sup> (0.2100)
$LTG_{t-1}$	0.3445 <sup>c</sup> (0.1838)	-0.4515 <sup>a</sup> (0.0844)	0.6408 <sup>a</sup> (0.1459)	0.5990 <sup>a</sup> (0.1354)	0.5767 <sup>a</sup> (0.1403)	0.5150 <sup>a</sup> (0.1152)	0.7299 <sup>a</sup> (0.1067)
$\ln(Mkt_{t,t+5})$	0.8461 <sup>a</sup> (0.1039)	0.5177 <sup>a</sup> (0.0961)	-0.2691 <sup>a</sup> (0.0974)	-0.2451 <sup>b</sup> (0.0959)	-0.3241 <sup>a</sup> (0.1230)	-0.2396 (0.1954)	-0.4176 <sup>a</sup> (0.1002)
$X_t$				0.1875 (0.1346)	0.1937 (0.1292)	0.0370 (0.1620)	-0.3027 <sup>a</sup> (0.1090)
Observations	397	397	397	397	133	193	397
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	78%	84%	69%	71%	71%	73%	75%
$X_t$				$spc_t$	$cay_t$	$SVIX_t^2$	$p_t - d_t$

There is a strong systematic variation in the *LTG* spread. *HLTG* stocks appear to do worse in bad times than *LLTG* stocks (the *PMO* return loads negatively on the market).<sup>21</sup> Thus, the *LTG* spread cannot be explained by the fact that *LLTG* stocks are riskier in the standard CAPM sense. A more promising avenue is to look at the  $LTG_t$  proxies: *HLTG* stocks are more exposed to waves of aggregate optimism compared to *LLTG* stocks. In columns (1) and (2), good news about long term earnings growth, reflected in high  $LTG_t$  revisions, is followed by higher returns for *LLTG* stocks and by lower returns for *HLTG* stocks. The same holds when the lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$  is high. Thus, in column (3), the *PMO* spread is higher after periods of aggregate optimism, due to the good performance of *LLTG* stocks, the long arm of the portfolio, and the poor performance of *HLTG* stocks, the short arm of the portfolio.

Differential co-movement with aggregate optimism sheds new light on the origins of the *LTG* spread. The model in column (3) accounts for 69% of the time variation in the *LTG* spread, compared to only 38% of the market return alone. Measures of discount rates play no role in explaining the data (see columns (4), (5) and (6)). Furthermore, the magnitude of the *PMO* spread explained by aggregate expectations is very significant: relative to a long term average of 5.5% per year, the spread increases to 23.5% per year as  $LTG_{t-1}$  goes from its average of 12.2% to 15.5% (a two standard deviations increase). This suggests that the average aggregate *LTG* captures some level of over-optimism, corresponding to the over-valuation of the *HLTG* firms.<sup>22</sup>

To study how aggregate optimism can create cross sectional co-movement, we introduce firm heterogeneity in our model. For simplicity, we abstract from intangible news by setting  $\eta_t = 0$ , but this is not critical (see footnote 24). Each firm  $i$  exhibits AR(1) dividend growth:

$$g_{i,t+1} = \mu g_{i,t} + v_{i,t}, \quad (9)$$

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<sup>21</sup> The market loading of the *PMO* portfolio is not the difference between the *LLTG* loading in column (1) and the *HLTG* loading in column (2) because the variables are standardized, and *LLTG* has lower variance than *HLTG*.

<sup>22</sup> The results of Table 7 hold when controlling for the contemporaneous price dividend ratio (Appendix C, Table C.1) and at a 3 year horizon (Table C.2, Panel A). BGLS (2019) show that the average (value weighted) *PMO* at 1-year horizon is 6.4%, similar to 5.5% in Table 7. We use value weighted portfolios due to our focus on the S&P500 index.

As in Equation (6), expected growth at horizon  $s \geq 1$  for firm  $i$  is believed to be:

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t(g_{i,t+s}) = \mathbb{E}_t(g_{i,t+s}) + \mu^{s-1}\epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (10)$$

The firm specific belief distortion continues to follow an AR(1) process  $\epsilon_{i,t} = \rho\epsilon_{i,t-1} + u_{i,t}$  with persistence  $\rho \in [0,1]$ , where  $u_{i,t}$  is a firm level expectations shock.

As in standard cross-sectional asset pricing, firm level and aggregate shocks are connected. The firm level fundamental shock is the product  $v_{i,t} = v_i * v_t$  of the aggregate fundamental shock  $v_t$  and a parameter  $v_i > 0$  capturing the firm's exposure to it. This is the standard CAPM exposure to fundamental risk, which varies across firms. Similarly, the firm level expectations shock  $u_{i,t}$  can be written as the aggregate expectation shock  $u_t$  times a firm specific exposure to it. Think of it as a firm specific degree of belief overreaction  $\theta_i$ , so that  $u_{i,t} = \theta_i * v_t$ . This key new aspect creates differential exposure of firms to aggregate optimism and pessimism.<sup>23</sup> The firm level belief distortion is then proportional to the aggregate one,  $\epsilon_{i,t} = (\theta_i/\theta)\epsilon_t$ .

A firm may be more exposed to aggregate optimism because it belongs to the “hot” sectors of the moment, or because it is similar enough to firms in such sectors (as in Bordalo et al 2021). For instance, optimism about the aggregate market may be due to the rapid growth of some high-tech firms. Such optimism may contaminate other high-tech firms due to higher fundamentals (high  $v_i$ ), but also due to mere similarity, which increases  $\theta_i$  for given  $v_i$ . The distinction between these two effects is key for understanding returns.

The realized return for firm  $i$  at  $t + 1$  is isomorphic to Equation (1). Using Equations (9) and (10) we can show (see Appendix A) that the realized return for firm  $i$  is given by:

$$r_{i,t+1} - r_i = \left(\frac{v_i + \alpha\theta_i}{1 + \alpha\theta}\right)(r_{t+1} - r) - \left(\frac{1 - \alpha\rho}{1 - \alpha}\right)\left(\frac{\theta_i - \theta v_i}{\theta + \alpha\theta^2}\right)\epsilon_t, \quad (11)$$

---

<sup>23</sup> The assumption that firms' fundamentals and beliefs perfectly comove with the market makes the model tractable. As we show in Appendix A, this assumption is not necessary. Enriching the model with idiosyncratic fundamental shocks would yield the additional implication that the *LTG* spread reflects also the overreaction of *HLTG* firms to good firm-level fundamental news, as in BGLS (2019), not only the average degree of maker over-optimism  $\epsilon_t$ .

where  $\theta$  is market overreaction,  $r_i$  is the firm-specific required return, while  $(r_{t+1} - r)$  is the realized market return in excess of the required one.<sup>24</sup> The firm's realized return depends on the excess market return  $(r_{t+1} - r)$  and on past excess optimism  $\epsilon_t$  according to firm specific coefficients. If a firm's exposure to aggregate optimism is only shaped by its exposure to market fundamentals,  $\theta_i = \theta v_i$ , the model boils down to the CAPM. The return of firm  $i$  loads with coefficient  $v_i$  on the market return, which is the only source of comovement. Even though the aggregate market displays excess volatility and return predictability, the cross section is correctly priced in terms of market exposure. Thus, the case  $\theta_i = \theta v_i$  cannot explain Table 7.

If instead firms overreact more or less than warranted by their exposure to fundamentals,  $\theta_i \neq \theta v_i$ , the CAPM breaks down. Now the realized market return captures the firm's reaction to current aggregate shocks, while aggregate excess optimism  $\epsilon_t$  captures the firm's relative overreaction to past shocks. Firms that overreact more than the average,  $\theta_i - \theta v_i > 0$ , exhibit a stronger comovement with the market, due to stronger overreaction to current news  $v_{t+1}$ . Critically, they are also more inflated during periods of high aggregate optimism  $\epsilon_t$ . Thus, they exhibit a stronger reversals in the future, in beliefs and in returns. The reverse holds for firms that overreact less than the average firm,  $\theta_i - \theta v_i < 0$ .<sup>25</sup>

We can examine whether this mechanism is at play by considering forecast errors. In our model the belief distortion for firm  $i$  (which is inversely related to the forecast error) is given by:

$$\epsilon_{i,t} = \left(\frac{\theta_i}{\theta}\right) \epsilon_t. \quad (12)$$

Excess optimism  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  about firm  $i$  at time  $t$  is proportional to aggregate excess optimism  $\epsilon_t$ , with a proportionality coefficient that increases in the extent  $\theta_i$  to which beliefs about firm  $i$  overreact compared to beliefs about the market  $\theta$ .

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<sup>24</sup> Appendix A shows that under our assumptions, if investors have mean variance preferences and are naïve about  $\epsilon_t$ , the required return  $r_i$  can be endogenized and is determined as in the CAPM:  $r_i = r_f + v_i(r - r_f)$ .

<sup>25</sup> The presence of intangible news simply adds to Equation (11) a third factor capturing contemporaneous aggregate intangible news  $\eta_{t+1}$ . For simplicity, we omit this factor.



Denote by  $(v_H, \theta_H)$  the exposure to fundamental risk and to belief overreaction of high *LTG* firms and by  $(v_L, \theta_L)$  the exposures of low *LTG* ones. We obtain the following result.

**Prediction 2** *The beliefs about LLTG firms overreact to aggregate news less than those of HLTG firms,  $\theta_L < \theta_H$ , if and only if forecast errors in earnings growth for the PMO portfolio are positively predicted by the current revision  $\Delta LTG_t$  and the lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$ . If  $\theta_L < \theta_H$  and in addition the two portfolios are similarly exposed to fundamental risk,  $v_L \approx v_H$ , the same *LTG* proxies predict a higher *PMO* spread.*

This prediction allows to assess whether high *LTG* firms overreact more than low *LTG* ones,  $\theta_L < \theta_H$ , by testing whether high *LTG* firms disappoint more than low *LTG* ones after periods of aggregate optimism. If so, then, Prediction 2 also offers a way to explain the result of Table 7: the *PMO* spread widens after periods of high aggregate optimism. As in the case of time series predictability, overreaction characterizes the joint behavior of returns and errors.

Table 8 studies forecast errors. Column (1) regresses the forecast errors for five years ahead earnings growth for the *LLTG* portfolio on the current forecast revision  $\Delta LTG_t$  and lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$ . Column (2) does the same for forecast errors in the *HLTG* portfolio, and column (3) for the *PMO* portfolio.

**Table 8**  
**Forecast Errors of *LTG* Portfolios**

This table predicts forecast errors for portfolios formed on the basis of expected long-term growth in earnings for firm  $i$ ,  $LTG_{i,t}$  using beliefs about aggregate earnings growth. On each month between December 1982 and December 2015, we form decile portfolios based on  $LTG_{i,t}$  and report regressions for the forecast errors in predicting earnings growth between  $t$  and  $t + 5$  of the following three portfolios: (a) the lowest decile (*LLTG*) in column [1], (b) the highest decile (*HLTG*) in column [2], and (c) the difference between the two ( $PMO = LLTG - HLTG$ ) in column [3]. We define portfolio errors as the mean forecast error of the firms in the relevant *LTG* portfolio, i.e. the time  $t$  average difference between: (1) the annual growth in firm  $i$ 's earnings per share between year  $t$  and  $t + 5$ ,  $\Delta_5 e_{i,t+5}/5$ , and (2) the expected long term growth in firm  $i$ 's earnings,  $LTG_{i,t}$ . The independent variables are: (a) the one year forecast revision for aggregate earnings,  $\Delta LTG_t$ , and (b) the lagged one-year forecast,  $LTG_{t-1}$ . Except  $\Delta LTG_t$ , variables are standardized. Intercepts are not shown. The sample period is 1982:12-2015:12. We adjust standard errors for serial correlation using the Newey-West correction (with 60 lags). Superscripts: <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5% level, and <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10% level.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable: Five-Year Forecast Error		
LLTG	HLTG	PMO

$\Delta LTG_t$	-0.1997 (0.1608)	-0.7937 <sup>a</sup> (0.1791)	0.7367 <sup>a</sup> (0.1451)
$LTG_{t-1}$	-0.0302 (0.1894)	-0.7374 <sup>a</sup> (0.0691)	0.7549 <sup>a</sup> (0.1145)
Observations	397	397	397
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	1%	56%	57%

The results indeed point to stronger overreaction to aggregate news for *HLTG* than for *LLTG* firms,  $\theta_H > \theta_L$ . Higher aggregate forecast revisions  $\Delta LTG_t$  directionally predict belief disappointment in the *LLTG* portfolio (column 1), but even stronger disappointment in the *HLTG* portfolio (column 2). Likewise, higher lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$  predicts disappointment for the *HLTG* portfolio, but not for the *LLTG* one. Due to these patterns, the *PMO LTG* portfolio exhibits systematically positive earnings growth surprises after periods of aggregate optimism, captured by the positive coefficients in column (3). These positive surprises reflect lower disappointment in the long arm of the portfolio, *LLTG*, compared to the short arm, *HLTG*.<sup>26</sup>

We can connect Tables 7 and 8 using our model. The positive predictability of *PMO* forecast errors in Table 7 points to excess pessimism about *LLTG* firms compared to *HLTG* ones in good times,  $(\theta_H - \theta_L) > 0$ . The positive predictability of *PMO* returns in Table 7 suggests that in the same good times *LLTG* firms are undervalued compared to *HLTG* ones,  $(\theta_H - \theta_L) > \theta(v_H - v_L)$ . The two conditions are met if the fundamental exposure of *HLTG* is not much larger than that of *LLTG* firms. In fact, the two conditions are identical if these firms are similarly exposed,  $(v_H - v_L) \approx 0$ . In this case, Tables 7 and 8 are two sides of the same coin.

Note also that in Table 7 the return of the *PMO* portfolio loads negatively on the market factor. Equation (11) accounts for this fact provided  $\alpha(\theta_H - \theta_L) > (v_L - v_H)$ . Similar fundamental exposure by high and low *LTG* firms,  $(v_H - v_L) \approx 0$ , guarantees this result as well.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> In Table 8 we focus on predictability at the 5 year horizon to match Table 7. The results are robust to shorter horizons (Appendix C, Table C.2 panel B). BGLS (2019) document that average forecast errors of portfolios with high v low *LTG* at the one year horizon are positive. The results are also robust to the prediction of value-weighted, as opposed to equal weighted, forecast errors (Table C.3).

<sup>27</sup> When  $v_H - v_L \approx 0$ , not only our model reconciles Tables 7 and 8, but the *PMO* spread is entirely due to overreaction. In this case, the contemporaneous market return in Table 6 captures the excess overreaction of *HLTG*

Here we do not try to measure the exposures of *HLTG* and of *LLTG* firms to fundamental risk, but the message is clear: Differential overreaction of firms to aggregate news offers a parsimonious account of co-movement of forecast errors and returns in the cross section, even absent any differential exposure to aggregate risk. This approach is able to account for the *PMO* spread, and once again underscores the importance of using beliefs as predictors of returns.

#### 4.2 *LTG* and the Fama-French risk factors

In a series of influential papers Fama and French (1993, 2015) show that, over and beyond the standard market factor, cross sectional spreads and return co-movement are to a large extent explained by other return factors constructed using firm characteristics such as book to market, size, profitability, and investment. The efficient markets explanation for these findings is that these factors reflect sources of risk to which firms are differentially exposed. Attempts to directly measure these risks have however proved elusive, leading some researchers to argue that these factors can at least in part capture relative under-valuation of stocks in the long arm of the factor-return portfolio due to systematic belief biases (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994). Our previous analysis of the *LTG* spread suggests that aggregate expectations  $LTG_t$  can be regarded as a proxy for such systematic biases. This raises the question of whether this proxy, in line with the logic of Equation (11), can shed light on the Fama-French factors.

We conclude by showing that this connection may be promising. Table 9 below regresses the five-year returns (Panel A) and forecast errors (Panel B) of the Fama-French (2015) factor portfolios, including book to market (HML), profitability (RMW), investment (CMA), and size (SMB) on our measures of aggregate excess-optimism: the aggregate  $LTG_t$  revision and lagged forecast  $LTG_{t-1}$ . For returns, we also use the contemporaneous market return as a control.

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stocks to contemporaneous news, whereas the beginning of period *LTG* proxies capture the excess overreaction of the same firms to past news. Compared to *LLTG* firms, contemporaneous overreaction drives up the return of *HLTG* firms, while disappointment of past overreaction drives it down.

**Table 9****Predictability of factor returns and forecast errors**

This table links beliefs about growth in earnings to Fama-French factor returns (Panel A) and forecast errors (Panel B). The dependent variables in Panel A are the compounded (log) return between year  $t$  and  $t + 5$  of the following 4 factors: (a) high-minus-low book-to market (HML) in column [1], (b) robust-minus-weak profitability factor (RMW) in column [2], (c) conservative-minus-aggressive investment (CMA) in column [3], and (d) small-minus-big factor (SMB) in column [4]. The dependent variables in Panel B are the forecast errors in predicting the growth in earnings between  $t$  and  $t+5$  for the: (1) HML, (2) RMW, (3) CMA, and (4) SMB portfolios. We define portfolio errors as the mean forecast error of the firms in the relevant  $LTG$  portfolio, i.e. the time  $t$  average difference between: (1) the annual growth in firm  $i$ 's earnings per share between year  $t$  and  $t + 5$ ,  $\Delta_5 e_{i,t+5}/5$ , and (2) the expected long term growth in firm  $i$ 's earnings,  $LTG_{i,t}$ . In Panel A, the independent variables are: (a) the one-year revision in aggregate earnings growth forecast,  $\Delta LTG_t$ , (b) the one-year lagged forecast,  $LTG_{t-1}$ , (c) the (log) five-year return of CRSP's value-weighted index between  $t$  and  $t + 5$ ,  $\ln(Mkt_{t,t+5})$ . In Panel B, the independent variables are  $\Delta LTG_t$  and  $LTG_{t-1}$ . Except  $\Delta LTG_t$ , variables are standardized. Intercepts are not shown. The sample period is 1982:12-2015:12. We adjust standard errors for serial correlation using the Newey-West correction (with 60 lags). Superscripts: <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5% level, and <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10% level.

**Panel A: Returns and forecasts about growth**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Dependent Variable: Five-year (log) Return of			
	HML	RMW	CMA	SMB
$\Delta LTG_t$	0.9650 <sup>a</sup> (0.1410)	0.3642 <sup>b</sup> (0.1819)	0.9260 <sup>a</sup> (0.2579)	0.3074 (0.1914)
$LTG_{t-1}$	0.9025 <sup>a</sup> (0.1197)	0.2115 (0.1892)	0.6732 <sup>a</sup> (0.1377)	0.5340 <sup>a</sup> (0.0962)
$\ln(Mkt_{t,t+5})$	0.4189 <sup>a</sup> (0.1462)	-0.3736 <sup>b</sup> (0.1745)	0.0344 (0.1681)	-0.4179 <sup>a</sup> (0.1037)
Observations	397	397	397	397
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	62%	30%	52%	59%

**Panel B: Forecast errors and forecasts about growth**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Dependent Variable: Five-year Forecast Error			
	HML	RMW	CMA	SMB
$\Delta LTG_t$	0.2283 <sup>b</sup> (0.1144)	0.5046 <sup>b</sup> (0.2049)	0.4345 <sup>b</sup> (0.1948)	-0.4695 <sup>a</sup> (0.1663)
$LTG_{t-1}$	0.3320 <sup>a</sup> (0.0926)	0.3279 <sup>a</sup> (0.0992)	0.2985 <sup>b</sup> (0.1494)	-0.2408 <sup>c</sup> (0.1289)
Observations	397	397	397	397
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	16%	6%	14%	10%

The coefficients on the  $LTG$  proxies in the return regression are all positive, suggesting that part of the cross-sectional return differentials may indeed reflect undervaluation of the long

arm of the portfolio during times of aggregate optimism (compared to the short arm). The explanatory power of  $LTG$  is high: using the market factor alone accounts for only 0.35% of the  $HML\ BM$  return, 25% of the  $RMW$  return, 13% of the  $CMA$  return, and 40% of the  $SMB$  return (see Table C.6 in Appendix C). Aggregate optimism helps explain cross sectional co-movement.<sup>28</sup>

In line with the analysis of the  $PMO$  spread, we next ask whether co-movement is due to weaker belief overreaction for stocks in the long arm of the portfolio compared to those in the short arm. To address this question in Panel B we study forecast error predictability. Consider the  $HML\ BM$  portfolio in column (1). Higher aggregate optimism predicts positive surprises (less belief disappointment) in long term earnings growth for high book to market stocks compared to low book to market ones. This points to weaker overreaction for high  $BM$  stocks compared to low  $BM$  ones,  $\theta_{HBM} < \theta_{LBM}$ . The undervaluation of high  $BM$  stocks during periods of aggregate optimism in Panel A can thus reflect their weaker over-reaction. The mechanisms for the  $PMO\ LTG$  and  $HML\ BM$  return spreads are similar.

The same message holds for the  $RMW$  and  $CMA$  factors: columns (2) and (3) in panel B show that, after times of aggregate optimism, firms that are highly profitable and invest conservatively exhibit less belief disappointment than firms that are less profitable and invest aggressively, respectively. This is also consistent with the fact that, during the same times, profitable or conservative firms are relatively undervalued, as captured by columns (2) and (3) in Panel A. In terms of Proposition 2 and Equation (11), the weaker overreaction of the portfolios' long arms (Panel B) and their relative undervaluation (Panel A) can be jointly explained if the short arm of the portfolio is not much more exposed to fundamental risk than the long arm, as in the case of the  $PMO\ LTG$  spread.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> The predictive power of  $LTG_t$  in Panel A is robust to a shorter, 3 year horizon (Appendix C, Table C.4) as well as to including proxies for required returns. In particular, in the spirit of Lettau and Ludvigson's (2001) we can include in the regression cay alone and cay interacted with the contemporaneous market return (Table C.5). This causes the  $LTG$  revision to become insignificant in the  $RMW$  regression, but modestly improves the regression  $R^2$ , which becomes 70% for  $HML$ , 35% for  $RMW$  (for which cay is itself insignificant), 66% for  $CMA$ , and 66% for  $SMB$ .

<sup>29</sup> According to (11), the non-negative loadings on the market factor for  $HML\ BM$  and  $CMA$  in Panel A additionally require a sufficiently stronger exposure to fundamentals of the long arm of the portfolio compared to the short arm.

The findings for the *SMB* factor are not as clear. In Panel B, small firms experience sharper belief disappointment than big firms, suggesting  $\theta_S > \theta_B$ , and yet they appear to be undervalued compared to big firms during times of excess optimism (column (4), Panel A). There is no direct connection between return and forecast error predictability for the size factor. Equation (11) is consistent with the results in Table 9 if small firms are sufficiently more exposed to fundamental risk than large firms  $v_S > v_L$ . Small firms may then be undervalued in good times because they display small overreaction compared to their market exposure  $\theta_S - \theta v_S < \theta_L - \theta v_L$ , and yet disappoint after good times because they display larger absolute overreaction  $\theta_S > \theta_L$ .<sup>30</sup> The *SMB* factor is not easily accommodated by our model.

Overall, our results bring together return predictability for the aggregate stock market and in the cross section in terms of a common mechanism of overreacting expectations. High aggregate *LTG* captures overvaluation of stocks, in the aggregate but particularly stocks with low book to market, low profitability, and aggressive investing, which overreact more to aggregate conditions. Such overvaluation leads to lower subsequent returns, both for the market and for firms with those characteristics. Over-optimism acts similarly to lower risk aversion, if the short arms of the factors were indeed riskier along the lines of Fama French (1993).<sup>31</sup> But the expectations approach goes farther: it explains that over-optimism arises in response to news, that forecast errors about factors are systematically predictable from aggregate optimism, and that those predictable errors in turn help explain factor returns.

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<sup>30</sup> Specifically, one needs that  $0 < (\theta_S - \theta_B) < \max[\theta(v_S - v_B), (v_B - v_S)/\alpha]$ .

<sup>31</sup> There is little evidence this is the case in terms of market beta and volatility, either for *HML* (LaPorta et al 1997) or for *PMO* (BGLS 2019). In Appendix C, we show that high beta stocks are also more exposed to aggregate overreaction, which helps explain their underperformance (Table C.7). However, recent work has shown that the standard risk factors load on stocks whose cashflows are relatively more concentrated in the short term, and for which long term growth expectations are also lower (Weber 2018, Gormsen and Lazarus 2021). Gormsen and Lazarus (2021) propose aversion to short term cash flow variation as a risk-based explanation for these factors' average returns. The fact that returns on the factors are (partially) linked to errors in long term growth forecasts, which are in turn predictable from fundamental aggregate shocks helps explain the negative correlation between market returns and factor returns documented in Gormsen (2021), under the unifying mechanism of overreacting expectations. We leave it to future work to evaluate in a systematic way the ability of overreacting beliefs to account for conventional cross sectional return anomalies.

## 5. Conclusion

Measured over-reaction in expectations of long-term fundamentals emerges as a credible mechanism behind leading aggregate and cross-sectional stock market puzzles, even assuming that required returns are constant in the time series and in the cross section, and no price extrapolation. Good news cause investors to become too optimistic about long term fundamentals of the average firm or of particular firms. This inflates both the market and individual firm valuations, leading to predictably low future returns, in absolute terms or compared to other firms, as earnings expectations are disappointed. The mechanism is empirically confirmed by the joint predictability of returns and forecast errors, in both the aggregate market and in the cross section.

A skeptic may argue that measured long term expectations surreptitiously incorporate variation in discount rates. We consider this possibility, but do not find support for it. In particular, beliefs about long term growth have remarkable predictive power for aggregate returns even when we control for leading proxies for required returns and for the price dividend ratio. At the firm level, these beliefs predict a firm's future return even after introducing time fixed effects, which controls for common shocks to required returns. Finally, revisions in measured beliefs are in good part driven by earnings news, and not by past stock returns or expected stock returns. These results further strengthen our overreacting expectations interpretation of the evidence.

Cochrane (2001) writes about the possibility that price movements may reflect irrational exuberance (Shiller 2000): "Perhaps, but is it just a coincidence that this exuberance comes at the top of an unprecedented economic expansion, a time when the average investor is surely feeling less risk averse than ever, and willing to hold stocks despite historically low risk premia?" Our analysis shows that this fact is not a coincidence, but obtains for a different reason: at the top of an unprecedented expansion the average investor is *more optimistic*, rather than less risk averse. This possibility is also confirmed by growing evidence from survey expectations of managers, professional forecasters, and individual investors (Bordalo et al. 2022). The data suggest that belief overreaction holds significant promise for explaining many macro-financial puzzles.

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