

Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in a Trust Game

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Online Appendix C

In this appendix we provide:

- **Raw experimental data**, together with **answers to the debriefing questions** about B -subjects' interpretation of their filled-in questionnaire:

(a) "Explain the meaning of the values you entered in the Hypothetical Payback Scheme,"

(b) "Did you enter these values according to a specific feeling?"

For treatments QD and $QnoD$, we also report answers to question:

(c) "Explain the meaning of the values you entered in the Final Hypothetical Payback Scheme. Are these values different from those you entered in the Hypothetical Payback Scheme in Phase 2?" from the final questionnaire.

- **Non-linear least square estimates** of parameters G , R , and p for each of the 160 B -subjects in the experiment, and the standard deviation associated with each estimated parameter.¹ G , R and p are respectively the guilt parameter, the reciprocity parameter, and the ex-post feeling-mitigation parameter in the modified maximization problem (3) in Online Appendix B.1.² Estimates and standard deviations are presented in scientific notation, e.g. $3.04E-01 = 0.304$. Notice that estimated parameter \hat{p} does not play any role in the categorization of psychological types (G , R) of Table 4. The reason is that parameter p has been introduced in the maximization problem (3) of Online Appendix B.1 to take into account the possible confound of ex-post feeling mitigation, which matters in the analysis of the hypothetical payback and in the estimation of G

¹ The best-fit response function $\xi(\alpha; \hat{G}, \hat{R}, \hat{p})$ of a given B -subject minimizes the sum of the squared deviations of the theoretical payback function from the payback pattern for the 11 rows of the filled-in questionnaire. Given that the maximization problem (3) in Online Appendix B.1 is non-linear in one of the unknown parameters, G , we use non-linear least square estimation, with bounds given by $0 \leq G, R \leq 1000$ and $0 \leq p \leq 1$. To account for the small size of the sample, standard deviations are given by a (non-parametric) bootstrap estimation of size 10,000.

² Across all 160 B -subjects, we find that 125 have $\hat{p} > 0$, with no significant treatment difference in the distribution of the estimated parameter of ex-post feeling mitigation (Kruskal-Wallis test, P -value = 0.790).

and R for each B -subject, but not in the analysis of the Trust Minigame. Indeed, we checked that \hat{p} is independent of B -subjects' behavior in each Trust Minigame played during the experiment, and of A -subjects' behavior in the Trust Minigame of phase 3 of QD (i.e., under disclosure). The main goal of this estimation is to describe each B -subject by his estimated psychological type (\hat{G}, \hat{R}) .

- **Psychological type** (classification of B -subjects according to the payback pattern in Table 4), Complete-Information predictions (Pareto-superior equilibrium in Figure 1b) and Incomplete-information predictions (FI-dominance regions in Figure 1a) according to the estimated parameter values of G and R .
- **Figure C.1**—Actual vs. complete-information predicted equilibrium behavior (strategy pairs) in phase 3 of $NoQ-QnoD$ —, for comparison with Figure 3b of the paper—Actual vs. complete-information predicted equilibrium behavior (strategy pairs) in phase 3 of QD .
- **Figure C.2**—Actual vs. incomplete-information predicted behavior of B -subjects in phase 1 of $NoQ-QnoD$ —, for comparison with the left panel of Figure 5 of the paper—Actual vs. incomplete-information predicted behavior of B -subjects in phase 3 of $NoQ-QnoD$.
- **Figure C.3**— A 's and B 's choices and beliefs in phase 1 of QD vs. $NoQ-QnoD$, disentangled by B 's type—, for comparison with Figures 6 and 7.
- **Table C.1**—Frequencies of strategy profiles for *all* the complete-information predictable pairs, comparing phase 3 of QD with the incomplete-information phases 1 of QD and 3 of $NoQ-QnoD$.

Experimental data,³ answer to debriefing questions,⁴ estimates and predictions⁵ are presented according to the following sequence:

- Treatment NoQ : Sessions 1, 2, 3, 4;
- Treatment $QnoD$: Sessions 1, 2, 3, 4;
- Treatment QD : Sessions 1, 2, 3, 4;
- Treatment QD : Sessions 5, 6, 7, 8.

Figures C.1, C.2, and C.3 (penultimate page) and Table C.1 (last page of the appendix) follow.

³ We implemented a stranger-matching design: A -subjects and B -subjects are randomly re-matched so as to have different pairs in phase 1 and in phase 3. However, with the goal of providing a clean check of within-treatment differences, pairs' choices and guesses in phase 1 of each treatment are presented according to the random matching of phase 3.

⁴ The identification numbers of B -subjects whose payback pattern is not qualitatively captured by the five predicted shapes of Proposition 1 (a total of 22/160) are highlighted in yellow.

⁵ The colour code within columns “Complete-Information equilibrium predictions” and “Incomplete-Information predictions” is the same as in, respectively, Figure 1b and Figure 1a of the paper. “Intermediate Region” within the column “Incomplete-Information predictions” refers to the white region $(S \cup T)^c$ in Figure 1a of the paper.

No Questionnaire (obs. 1-40): Experimental data.

Session	Pair	Phase 1: <i>A</i> -subjects		Phase 1: <i>B</i> -subjects			Phase 3: <i>A</i> -subjects		Phase 3: <i>B</i> -subjects			Final Questionnaire: <i>B</i> -subjects										
		Choice	1st ord. Belief	Choice	2nd ord. Belief	1st ord. Belief	Choice	1st ord. Belief	Choice	2nd ord. Belief	1st ord. Belief	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
NoQ-1	1	Dissolve	20	Share	30	Continue	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00
	2	Dissolve	100	Take	0	Dissolve	Dissolve	50	Take	0	Dissolve	2.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	3	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	Continue	40	Take	60	Continue	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	4	Dissolve	10	Share	30	Dissolve	Dissolve	0	Take	40	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	5	Dissolve	10	Share	20	Dissolve	Dissolve	0	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	1.00	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.90	2.00
	6	Continue	70	Take	0	Dissolve	Dissolve	30	Take	70	Continue	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
	7	Continue	20	Take	20	Dissolve	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
	8	Continue	10	Take	50	Dissolve	Continue	80	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.90	2.00
	9	Dissolve	0	Share	30	Dissolve	Dissolve	0	Take	20	Dissolve	2.00	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.75	2.00
	10	Continue	0	Take	40	Continue	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NoQ-2	11	Dissolve	20	Take	0	Dissolve	Dissolve	20	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.50
	12	Dissolve	0	Take	10	Dissolve	Dissolve	0	Take	20	Continue	0.00	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	0.75	0.50	0.00
	13	Dissolve	0	Take	70	Continue	Dissolve	10	Take	100	Dissolve	4.00	3.50	3.00	2.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.00
	14	Dissolve	20	Take	0	Dissolve	Continue	60	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.80	2.00
	15	Dissolve	20	Take	0	Dissolve	Dissolve	20	Take	20	Continue	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.75
	16	Continue	70	Take	20	Continue	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00
	17	Dissolve	20	Take	20	Continue	Dissolve	0	Share	30	Continue	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.80	2.00
	18	Dissolve	30	Take	30	Continue	Continue	30	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	19	Dissolve	10	Take	100	Continue	Dissolve	0	Take	50	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	20	Continue	80	Take	20	Dissolve	Dissolve	10	Take	30	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00
NoQ-3	21	Continue	60	Take	60	Continue	Dissolve	40	Take	40	Continue	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.30	0.50	0.70	0.80	1.00	1.50	2.00
	22	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	23	Dissolve	40	Share	60	Continue	Dissolve	10	Share	50	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.00
	24	Continue	60	Share	50	Continue	Continue	70	Take	40	Continue	3.00	2.50	2.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.50	3.00
	25	Dissolve	40	Take	60	Continue	Dissolve	20	Take	70	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
	26	Dissolve	30	Share	60	Dissolve	Dissolve	20	Share	60	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
	27	Continue	60	Take	0	Dissolve	Dissolve	50	Take	0	Dissolve	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00
	28	Continue	70	Take	0	Dissolve	Continue	70	Take	100	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
	29	Continue	50	Take	40	Continue	Continue	60	Take	60	Dissolve	0.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.00
	30	Dissolve	40	Share	40	Continue	Dissolve	20	Share	70	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NoQ-4	31	Dissolve	40	Share	30	Continue	Dissolve	30	Share	40	Continue	1.20	1.30	1.50	1.70	2.00	0.75	2.00	1.90	1.00	0.30	0.10
	32	Dissolve	80	Share	70	Continue	Dissolve	80	Take	60	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	2.00
	33	Dissolve	20	Take	0	Dissolve	Dissolve	30	Take	0	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.50	2.00	2.50	3.00
	34	Dissolve	30	Take	10	Continue	Dissolve	10	Take	10	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
	35	Dissolve	0	Take	60	Dissolve	Dissolve	0	Take	70	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
	36	Continue	60	Take	0	Dissolve	Continue	70	Take	0	Dissolve	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	37	Dissolve	0	Take	10	Dissolve	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	2.00
	38	Dissolve	20	Take	30	Dissolve	Dissolve	20	Share	60	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
	39	Continue	80	Share	50	Continue	Dissolve	70	Take	70	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	2.00	2.00
	40	Dissolve	20	Take	20	Dissolve	Dissolve	40	Take	20	Dissolve	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00

Subject 1 - Guilt prevails

- a) The higher A's guess is, the more I'm willing to give him/her a share of my profits because I appreciate his/her decision to collude.
- b) It depends on the probability, because he/she trusted my collusion.

Subject 2 - Reciprocity prevails

- a) For probabilities close to 0%, it means that A chose CONTINUE thinking strongly that my choice was TAKE, therefore, not trusting a possibility of sharing the amount. I want to reward him/her for that. For all other probabilities, I do not consider it worthwhile to pay back anything I earned.
- b)

Subject 3 - Reciprocity prevails

- a) I have entered 0 euros in the probability boxes ranging from 100% to 40% because, in my opinion, it is an absurd, excessively optimistic guess that does not take into account the willingness of the B individuals to obtain the maximum payoff possible. I entered 0.50 euros in the other cases, because, since A was convinced that the majority of Bs would have chosen TAKE, he/she was brave to choose CONTINUE. I entered 1 euro in the 0% box because A made me a gift knowing that all Bs would have chosen TAKE.
- b)

Subject 4 - Reciprocity prevails

- a) If A was sure of my choice when he/she chose CONTINUE, then he/she did not take any risk. I would give him/her a refund only if he/she was not sure of my choice. I would give him/her a bit more if he/she was more inclined to believe that I would have chosen TAKE (0.50 euro for 30%, 0 euro for 70%).
- b)

Subject 5 - Guilt prevails

- a) A's choice is risky: choosing CONTINUE without being sure that I'd choose SHARE entails a risk for him/her. I reward him/her with 1 euro. This choice also involves me assuming responsibilities, which increase as the probability increases. I give him/her back more the more he/she believes in me.
- b)

Subject 6 - Balanced

- a) I decide to give back 2 euros to A regardless of the percentage, since I'm sure A would have chosen CONTINUE.
- b)

Subject 7 - Guilt prevails

- a) I would give back 0 for low percentages. From a certain percentage on, knowing the choice of A, I would have made a different choice for reasons of solidarity, correctness.
- b)

Subject 8 - Guilt Prevails

- a) I have assigned an increasing repayment as a function of A's guess that my choice was SHARE.
- b)

Subject 9 - Guilt prevails for high α

- a) I want to give A back at least 1 euro. I give him/her back 2 if he/she had complete trust in me, but also if he/she risked choosing CONTINUE believing that no B would have chosen SHARE.
- b) I feel guilty if I choose TAKE knowing that A was sure I would have chosen SHARE or that he/she was sure I would have chosen TAKE.

Subject 10 - Selfish

- a) Having won all 4 euros, I would not be willing to give anything back, since it is the other player who chose CONTINUE, knowing that he/she could also lose. I could have lost but I accepted and risked, so I would not give anything back, regardless of A's guess.
- b)

Subject 11 – Guilt Prevails

- a) I entered the values based on the trust A gave me assuming I would choose SHARE.
- b)

Subject 12 – Balanced

- a) Anyone who trusts at 0% or 100% reasons unrealistically so I give nothing back. As a maximum repayment I gave 2 euros, half of the sum, because it seems fair to me, and I see no reason to give more. I entered the rest of the values in relation to how realistic player A's guess was.
- b)

Subject 13 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) If player A chose CONTINUE, being sure that I would choose TAKE, he/she made me a great gift. His/Her kindness should then be reimbursed with all the euros of our couple. If, on the other hand, he/she was sure I would choose SHARE, then he/she acted for himself/herself, to go from 1 euro to 2 euros with certainty: why should I give him/her something back?
- b) I pay A back in his/her own coin.

Subject 14 – Guilt prevails

- a) A deserves to receive back the 2 euros he/she expected to receive by choosing CONTINUE, discounted by the percentage of probability he/she thought I would have chosen SHARE.
- b) As the probability of SHARE increases, my embarrassment for choosing TAKE increases.

Subject 15 – Guilt prevails

- a) Purely casual.
- b)

Subject 16 – Guilt Prevails

- a) If A thought B would have never chosen SHARE, he/she would never have chosen CONTINUE. On the contrary, if he/she was sure of B's choice to SHARE then he/she deserves 1 euro out of my 4 because he/she was sure of that, trusting me.
- b)

Subject 17 – Guilt prevails

- a) I expect to refund player A based on the percentage at which he/she would think of me as a SHARER. I then entered 0 euros at 0 percent because he/she did not trust me.
- b) Very high.

Subject 18 – Balanced motivations

- a) A is entitled to my refund only if he/she was uncertain about my behavior when choosing (probability close to 50%).
- b)

Subject 19 – Selfish

- a) I entered the value 0 for all the percentages in the “scheme” because, as it is a game, my ultimate goal was to win as much as possible. This motivation is not tied in any way to an economic end, meaning that even in the absence of remuneration, I would have done the same thing.
- b)

Subject 20 – Guilt prevails

- a) I measure A's trust starting from 40% -50%. Below this threshold, he/she did not trust me. I give him/her 2 of the 4 euros only if he/she had complete trust in me.
- b)

Subject 21 – Guilt prevails

- a) I think player A deserves to have some money back every time he/she hoped I would have chosen SHARE.
- b) Feeling of guilt: it increases with my partner A's guess on the probability that I would have chosen SHARE.

Subject 22 – Selfish

- a) Regardless of any value, what is chosen remains the best choice without giving “a second chance”.
- b)

Subject 23 – Guilt prevails

- a) If A thought that more than half of the B players would have chosen SHARE, then he/she has the right to be reimbursed for his/her expectations having been disappointed.
- b) A's guess increases my guilt for choosing TAKE.

Subject 24 – Guilt prevails for high α

- a) By choosing CONTINUE A added 2 euros to our couple's endowment. If he/she did it with the certainty that I would have chosen SHARE or with the certainty that I would have chosen TAKE, then I would give him/her back 3 euros (the one he/she lost, plus the two he/she generated by choosing CONTINUE.) If he/she was almost certain of each of these choices, I would give him/her 2.50 euros back. I'd only give him/her back the 2 euros that he/she generated for less extreme probabilities, but still far from 50%.
- b) As A's guess varies, my perception of his/her motivation changes.

Subject 25 – Guilt prevails

- a) My partner trusted me, but made a risky choice: I give him/her back a maximum of 1 euro. I would give it back in full only if he/she believed I was more inclined to choose SHARE rather than TAKE.
- b)

Subject 26 – Guilt prevails

- a) I'll give A back the 2 euros if he/she thought that at least 6 Bs out of 10 would have chosen SHARE, so more than 50% probability I would have done so.
- b)

Subject 27 – Guilt prevails for high α

- a) I feel guilty, and I pay him/her back 2 euros if he/she chose CONTINUE, convinced that he/she would have doubled his/her payoff. I would only refund his/her euro if he/she chose CONTINUE with the certainty that I would have taken all four euros. No refund in all other cases.
- b)

Subject 28 – Guilt Prevails

- a) I think A deserves half of my reward only if he/she was confident of my share, trusting me completely, so he/she would have allowed both of us to earn the same figure with certainty. I would still give him/her a quarter of my reward if he/she was almost certain of my collaboration.
- b)

Subject 29 – Guilt Prevails

- a) I decided to include increasing values based on A's guess, so as to give him/her back at least 1 euro to repay him/her for thinking that my choice was SHARE.
- b)

Subject 30 – Selfish

- a) If A had thought I would have chosen SHARE with probability 0% he/she would be “crazy”. It is obvious that I would have earned the 4 euros. In all other cases, even though there was a chance to share the 4 euros, I would try to maximize my profits, keeping all 4 euros.
- b)

Subject 31 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) I don't like people who don't have a clear idea about the behavior of others, and discharge the responsibility of their actions by saying they were uncertain about what others would do. This is the case where A's guess is 50%. At 40% and 60%, on the other hand, A showed some propensity, and therefore in both cases I pay him/her back 2 euros. I reimburse less for more extreme guesses, which I find illogical.
- b) My feeling depends on my partner A's guess in a conflicting way. I don't think he/she can be sure of my behavior, but neither that he/she doesn't have any idea about me.

Subject 32 – Guilt prevails

- a) I would return to A the 2 euros that I took if he/she was sure that I would have shared the 4 euros, I would return less and less money up until the case where he/she had complete uncertainty between SHARE and TAKE (50 and 50), I wouldn't return anything in all the other cases.
- b) I feel I have disregarded player A's expectations about me, if these are high enough.

Subject 33 – Guilt prevails

- a) I would not have chosen TAKE if I knew that player A believed I would have chosen SHARE with more than 50% probability. To compensate for this action I do not feel mine, I would pay back 3 euros in the case of a SHARE guess at 100%, and less and less up to 50%.
- b)

Subject 34 – Guilt prevails

- a) In my opinion, betrayal is such only if someone who trusts you can identify you as the object of their trust. That's why I don't feel guilty about betraying A by choosing TAKE if he/she is not sure I'm among the Bs who choose SHARE when he/she chooses CONTINUE (very low guesses). But if his/her SHARE guess is very high, then I'll give him/her something back: all 2 euros if he/she was certain I would have chosen SHARE (100%), only 1 euro if he/she was almost certain (80% or 90%).
- b)

Subject 35 – Guilt prevails

- a) I think that A's choice to continue is meaningless, unless A believed that all (or nearly all) Bs (and therefore I) would have chosen SHARE. In this case, and only in this case, I would reward him/her by returning the euro he/she lost.
- b)

Subject 36 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) From the payoff matrix, it emerges that B would most likely choose the move TAKE. The CONTINUE choice for A was, however, risky. I don't give anything back if A has run this risk covering himself/herself even partially (at least 20% probability). I'll give something back if he/she took this risk entirely, believing that I was the B who would have chosen SHARE.
- b)

Subject 37 – Guilt prevails

- a) I decide to give 0.5 euro (so A earns a minimum and can always say I gave him/her some of my money). If A trusts me (100%) I'll give more (2 euros). If he/she has no trust (0%), I'll give him/her nothing back.
- b) The more A trusts me, the more I trust A: he/she deserves 2 euros.

Subject 38 – Guilt prevails

- a) By choosing TAKE, I disappointed my partner if he/she thought I would have chosen SHARE. But if he/she had a low guess on my choice of sharing, I don't share and I don't give him/her anything back.
- b) Guilt, but only above 50%.

Subject 39 – Guilt prevails

- a) A's guess is to be rewarded if A trusted my non-opportunistic behavior (likely to be higher than that of tossing a coin).
- b)

Subject 40 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) In my scheme, I chose to reward generosity and punish A's cunning: if A chose CONTINUE, convinced that I would share, then he/she was not so generous with me. On the other hand, he/she was generous if he/she chose CONTINUE convinced that I would have chosen TAKE. In this case, I reward him/her by equally sharing the 4 euros, returning 2.
- b)

No Questionnaire (obs. 1-40): Estimations and Predictions.

Session	Pair	Guilt		Reciprocity		Ex-post feeling mitigation		Psychological type (Table 4)	Complete-information equilibrium predictions (Figure 1b)		Incomplete-information predictions (Figure 1a)
		Estimate	Standard deviation	Estimate	Standard deviation	Estimate	Standard deviation	B-subjects	A-subjects	B-subjects	B-subjects
NoQ-1	1	3.04E-01	1.09E+02	4.02E-14	6.95E-02	9.97E-01	3.11E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	2	0.00E+00	9.40E-03	1.85E-01	3.35E-02	2.37E-05	2.22E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	3	2.98E-02	1.98E-02	1.41E-01	2.66E-02	2.29E-01	3.67E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	4	5.78E-02	6.33E-02	6.47E-02	2.40E-02	1.00E+00	2.61E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	5	4.47E-01	1.68E+02	0.00E+00	5.30E-02	8.32E-01	2.83E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	6	1.33E-01	8.13E-03	1.33E-01	8.13E-03	1.00E+00	2.71E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	7	1.00E+03	3.92E+02	9.99E-13	1.35E-02	1.37E-01	1.81E-01	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	8	4.12E-01	1.59E+02	1.80E-14	7.08E-02	8.92E-01	2.37E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	9	5.87E-01	8.33E+01	1.93E-01	2.28E-02	2.26E-01	1.53E-01	Guilt prevails for high α	Unclassified		Unclassified
	10	0.00E+00	4.33E-02	0.00E+00	3.00E-02	0.00E+00	4.20E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
NoQ-2	11	1.00E+03	4.07E+02	1.32E-13	2.87E-12	1.16E-02	2.41E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	12	9.53E-02	8.47E+01	9.53E-02	3.28E-02	7.35E-01	2.49E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	13	0.00E+00	4.47E+01	3.31E-01	2.37E-02	0.00E+00	3.69E-02	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Intermediate Region
	14	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	3.03E-10	6.90E-09	2.57E-04	1.23E-05	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	15	3.08E-01	1.12E-01	0.00E+00	5.61E-02	3.94E-13	4.18E-01	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	16	4.49E-01	5.15E-02	2.94E-15	5.32E-04	0.00E+00	7.24E-02	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	17	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	1.92E-09	7.97E-09	2.57E-04	1.24E-05	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	18	1.09E-01	5.08E-01	1.09E-01	2.83E-02	2.87E-01	2.90E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	19	0.00E+00	4.52E-02	0.00E+00	3.24E-02	0.00E+00	4.11E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	20	2.87E+00	1.05E+02	0.00E+00	1.67E-12	2.97E-16	6.72E-04	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
NoQ-3	21	1.19E+00	3.77E-01	0.00E+00	1.72E-02	1.17E-14	2.08E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Intermediate Region
	22	0.00E+00	4.72E-02	0.00E+00	3.24E-02	0.00E+00	4.19E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	23	4.27E+00	3.19E+02	0.00E+00	1.58E-12	3.98E-16	5.84E-03	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	24	1.00E+03	4.34E+02	2.46E-01	2.77E-02	3.31E-16	7.22E-02	Guilt prevails for high α	Continue	Share	Share
	25	1.87E-01	2.81E-01	6.98E-03	1.62E-02	1.00E+00	2.69E-01	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	26	8.94E+00	4.75E+02	0.00E+00	4.21E-03	1.23E-15	4.52E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	27	3.67E-01	2.54E-01	0.00E+00	7.46E-02	7.34E-15	2.16E-01	Guilt prevails for high α	Unclassified		Unclassified
	28	5.61E-01	1.94E-01	0.00E+00	5.20E-03	7.34E-16	1.13E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	29	3.51E-01	1.65E+02	7.63E-03	5.15E-02	1.00E+00	2.89E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	30	0.00E+00	4.46E-02	0.00E+00	3.24E-02	0.00E+00	4.15E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
NoQ-4	31	2.55E-02	4.47E+01	1.24E-01	2.42E-02	1.00E+00	2.38E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	32	1.19E+00	3.40E-01	0.00E+00	1.89E-13	3.96E-15	2.08E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Intermediate Region
	33	1.00E+03	4.93E+02	0.00E+00	1.20E-12	0.00E+00	4.32E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	34	5.61E-01	2.00E-01	0.00E+00	7.90E-03	3.29E-15	1.06E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	35	3.65E-01	1.22E-01	0.00E+00	1.35E-02	7.09E-15	2.08E-01	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	36	1.20E-16	1.79E-02	1.66E-01	4.74E-02	1.65E-02	3.26E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	37	1.52E+00	1.59E+00	1.32E-01	5.67E-02	2.84E-02	1.66E-01	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	38	6.68E+00	4.03E+02	6.13E-15	2.08E-02	0.00E+00	1.57E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	39	2.19E+00	3.34E+01	0.00E+00	3.19E-14	5.50E-16	1.11E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	40	0.00E+00	3.16E+01	1.58E-01	3.40E-02	5.93E-01	3.17E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take

[Estimates and standard deviations in scientific notation: 3.04E-01 = 0.304]

Questionnaire *no Disclosure* (obs. 41-80): Experimental data.

Session	Pair	Phase 1: <i>A</i> -subjects		Phase 1: <i>B</i> -subjects			Phase 2 Questionnaire: <i>B</i> -subjects										Phase 3: <i>A</i> -subjects		Phase 3: <i>B</i> -subjects			
		Choice	1st ord. Belief	Choice	2nd ord. Belief	1st ord. Belief	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	Choice	1st ord. Belief	Choice	2nd ord. Belief	1st ord. Belief
<i>QnoD-1</i>	41	Dissolve	10	Share	100	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	2.00	Dissolve	0	Take	30	Continue
	42	Continue	40	Take	20	Continue	0.00	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	Continue	40	Take	0	Dissolve
	43	Dissolve	10	Share	40	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve
	44	Continue	100	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	Continue	20	Take	10	Dissolve
	45	Dissolve	10	Share	70	Continue	0.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	0.00	Dissolve	40	Take	60	Continue
	46	Dissolve	20	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	20	Take	0	Dissolve
	47	Dissolve	0	Take	60	Dissolve	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.80	2.00	Dissolve	20	Take	10	Dissolve
	48	Continue	80	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00	Dissolve	0	Take	40	Dissolve
	49	Continue	60	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	30	Take	40	Dissolve
	50	Dissolve	0	Take	30	Dissolve	2.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Continue	60	Take	50	Continue
<i>QnoD-2</i>	51	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.75	2.00	Dissolve	0	Share	90	Continue
	52	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve
	53	Dissolve	20	Share	60	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.75	1.00	Dissolve	40	Take	0	Dissolve
	54	Dissolve	10	Take	30	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	30	Take	40	Continue
	55	Continue	70	Share	30	Dissolve	0.00	0.50	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	4.00	Dissolve	0	Share	10	Dissolve
	56	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	2.00	1.40	1.30	1.20	1.10	0.00	Dissolve	20	Take	60	Dissolve
	57	Dissolve	0	Share	60	Continue	2.00	1.80	1.60	1.50	1.40	1.00	0.80	0.60	0.40	0.20	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	50	Dissolve
	58	Dissolve	0	Take	40	Dissolve	0.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	Dissolve	0	Take	100	Continue
	59	Dissolve	0	Take	20	Dissolve	2.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.50	Dissolve	0	Share	50	Continue
	60	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	1.20	1.50	2.50	2.00	1.50	1.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	10	Take	50	Continue
<i>QnoD-3</i>	61	Dissolve	30	Take	30	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	Dissolve	40	Take	100	Continue
	62	Dissolve	20	Share	70	Continue	0.00	1.75	0.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	0.50	0.15	0.00	Dissolve	10	Share	70	Dissolve
	63	Dissolve	40	Share	40	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.75	2.00	Dissolve	30	Take	30	Dissolve
	64	Dissolve	0	Take	10	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	40	Take	10	Dissolve
	65	Dissolve	20	Take	60	Continue	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve
	66	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Continue	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.60	Dissolve	40	Take	0	Dissolve
	67	Continue	90	Share	40	Continue	0.00	0.10	0.40	0.70	0.80	1.00	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.90	2.00	Dissolve	10	Share	40	Dissolve
	68	Continue	60	Take	90	Continue	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.17	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.68	0.78	0.90	Continue	100	Take	0	Dissolve
	69	Dissolve	30	Share	20	Continue	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	50	Take	20	Continue
	70	Continue	90	Take	80	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	70	Take	20	Dissolve
<i>QnoD-4</i>	71	Dissolve	30	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	30	Take	30	Dissolve
	72	Continue	60	Take	0	Dissolve	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	Continue	90	Take	0	Dissolve
	73	Dissolve	30	Share	50	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	Dissolve	20	Take	30	Continue
	74	Continue	80	Take	30	Dissolve	0.00	3.50	3.50	2.50	2.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	20	Dissolve
	75	Dissolve	20	Take	30	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Share	40	Continue
	76	Dissolve	40	Share	70	Continue	0.00	0.10	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.50	1.75	2.00	Continue	70	Share	100	Continue
	77	Dissolve	30	Take	60	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	Dissolve	30	Take	40	Dissolve
	78	Dissolve	20	Take	0	Dissolve	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	30	Take	0	Dissolve
	79	Continue	60	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	Dissolve	30	Share	10	Dissolve
	80	Dissolve	40	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Continue	60	Take	0	Dissolve

Subject 41 – Guilt prevails

- a) I rewarded A's trust in me. It is a game for 2 players so if A chose to CONTINUE, A gave both the chance to earn more money.
- b)
- c) My behavior does not change, I continue to reward trust.

Subject 42 – Guilt prevails

- a) I guess my partner A was disappointed if he/she chose CONTINUE thinking that I would choose SHARE. For this reason, I reward him/her with an increasing reimbursement according to his/her SHARE guess.
- b)
- c) The same values as the first hypothetical payback scheme.

Subject 43 – Guilt Prevails

- a) To a player A convinced that I would have chosen SHARE with more than 50% probability, I would give all the money back. Otherwise, in the absence of trust, I would keep everything.
- b)
- c) I think the same way.

Subject 44 – Guilt prevails

- a) If A believed in me when he/she chose CONTINUE, then I give him/her back the euro he/she lost, mistakenly trusting my collaboration.
- b)
- c) The feeling has not changed, the scheme is the same as the previous one.

Subject 45 – Guilt prevails

- a) The more A trusted me when he/she chose to continue, the more money I return. But if he/she was sure I would have chosen SHARE, then I will not return anything to him/her: in this case he/she chose CONTINUE to increase his/her payoff with certainty, and not because he/she trusted me.
- b) The money I return to him/her increases with A's SHARE guess. But at 100% I don't feel any regret at having taken all the money.
- c) The same as the scheme I turned in earlier.

Subject 46 – Selfish

- a) My goal is to maximize my profits. I see no reason to share my win with A.
- b)
- c) My goal has not changed.

Subject 47 – Guilt prevails

- a) Simply, each value is equal to $1 \cdot p$, where p is the probability.
- b) I implicitly decided to reward good faith. If A had chosen CONTINUE with the certainty of my sharing, then he/she acted in good faith and deserves high figures. No to the consolation prize, if he/she chose CONTINUE with the certainty that I would have chosen TAKE. Intermediate values are assigned linearly.
- c) As before: value = $1 \cdot p$, where p is the probability.

Subject 48 – Guilt prevails

- a) A didn't even think that I would have chosen SHARE: he/she doesn't deserve anything. A counted on the fact that I would have chosen SHARE: he/she deserves it.
- b)
- c) Thinking about it, maybe a refund of 2 euros at 100% is too high. This time I indicated a refund of 1 euro for all probabilities from 50% up.

Subject 49 – Selfish

- a) I entered all 0s, because I chose not to share anything with A.
- b)
- c)

Subject 50 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) I return something to player A only if, when he/she chose CONTINUE he/she was sure I would choose TAKE, making this choice in my interest. I return 2 euros in the case of total certainty, and 1 euro in case of slight uncertainty (90%).
- b) My refund is positive only for very high probabilities.
- c) I changed the payback scheme a bit from the previous one, giving a payback of 1.5 euros for both 90% and 100%: I do not think there is a big difference between these two probabilities.

Subject 51 – Guilt prevails

- a) Starting from a certain probability, I feel A's trust in me, and I want to reward it.
- b) The higher the probability of SHARE, the higher the trust in me.
- c) The refund doesn't change.

Subject 52 – Selfish

- a) I acted to maximize my profits.
- b)
- c)

Subject 53 – Guilt Prevails

- a) If A had been sure that my choice was TAKE then he/she would have chosen STOP, and not CONTINUE, to avoid earning 0. However, if he/she were sure of my choice SHARE, he/she deserves 1 euro because he/she would have wanted to collaborate.
- b)
- c)

Subject 54 – Selfish

- a) In every box I entered 0 euros because I have no desire to give something back to A. I know it is not a very altruistic position but that's what I think.
- b)
- c)

Subject 55 – Guilt prevails

- a) By choosing CONTINUE, A trusted me and counted on me, for this reason I decided to reward him/her.
- b) I reward him/her more if the probability is higher.
- c) As in phase 2.

Subject 56 – Balanced motivations

- a) I entered 0 euros at probabilities of 0% and 100% because I think the convergence of extreme thought in both directions is very difficult. I give 2 euros at 50% because he/she showed to be risk-prone in a balanced manner.
- b)
- c)

Subject 57 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) Starting from the percentage of 100% to 60%, A could have still earned 2 euros. At 50% of A's guess, he/she would have had 50% chance of earning (1 euro). Decreasing the percentages of A my hypothetical repayment increased. This is because the percentage that my choice was SHARE decreases, while the values of A from 60% to 100% decreased by 0.20 because his/her chances of gain increased.
- b)
- c)

Subject 58 – Guilt prevails

- a)
- b) I pay back only if the A's guess of the probability of SHARE is positive.
- c) Nothing has changed.

Subject 59 – Guilt prevails for high α

- a) By choosing CONTINUE, A showed trust in me in a difficult situation for him/her (actually, my role allows me to be in a position of advantage in the couple). So I always refund at least half of the 3 euros that he/she added to my payoff by choosing CONTINUE.
- b) My payback is greater if A was not uncertain about what I would do, that is, if he/she was sure enough that I would betray him/her or cooperate with him.
- c)

Subject 60 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) My partner A was kind to me if he/she chose CONTINUE being uncertain about my chance to choose SHARE. At 50% I return half of the 4 euros. I give him/her 50 cents more for a slightly lower chance. The other reimbursements are lower, because the probabilities are too far from 50%.
- b)
- c) I changed the payback scheme. I thought about it better. I think it's more logical to return more money to A if he/she chose CONTINUE believing that I would have chosen SHARE with probability 0% or 10%. He/she was much kinder in this case.

Subject 61 – Guilt prevails

- a) Under 50% I'm not willing to give up part of the gain because A, being sure that my choice fell on TAKE, he/she made a mistake. Above 50% I am willing to give up 1 euro because there is still a gain of more than 2 euros which represents the SHARE choice and I reward his/her collaboration (I add 50 cents in case he/she was sure I had chosen SHARE).
- b)
- c)

Subject 62 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) The amount of the reimbursement I would give back to A is in relation to how realistic A's guess was of the probability that I would choose SHARE (I don't think 0% is possible and not even very high probabilities). Moreover, the maximum payback is less than 2 euros, and is higher if A took a higher risk (lower probabilities).
- b)
- c) Same values as in the initial scheme.

Subject 63 – Guilt prevails

- a) I give back at least 1 euro to player A who has decided to continue, if his/her guess is high enough to show trust in me.
- b) I feel guilty only in the case of player A's high guesses for me.
- c) Same feeling, same hypothetical payback scheme.

Subject 64 – Selfish

- a) In no case would I be willing to deprive myself of part of my gain.
- b)
- c)

Subject 65 – Guilt prevails for high α

- a) A chose, bravely, to continue, bringing 2 euros more to our couple. I compensate his/her disappointment by always giving him/her back 1 euro. I give him/her 1 euro more if he/she was crazy enough to choose CONTINUE, not at all hoping that I would collaborate. I return 3 euros more (i.e., everything I've taken) if he/she chose CONTINUE.
- b)
- c)

Subject 66 – Guilt Prevails

- a) I hypothesized a maximum return amount of 1.60 euros and I wanted to return a decreasing sum in line with the decrease of A's estimate.
- b)
- c) Identical to the previous scheme.

Subject 67 – Guilt Prevails

- a) If A were convinced that my choice was to take, he/she would never have chosen CONTINUE. The more trust he/she had in my choice being SHARE the more I think he/she deserves a refund.
- b)
- c)

Subject 68 – Guilt prevails

- a) The more my partner A thought I would have chosen SHARE when he/she chose CONTINUE, the more I feel guilty for having stolen all his/her money. However, since he/she only lost the starting euro, under no circumstances will I return more than 1 euro.
- b) I do not return anything for 0%. He/she recuperates the maximum for 100%.
- c) Same situation.

Subject 69 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) B has nothing to lose by choosing TAKE, indeed he/she has everything to gain, therefore, unless some person in the role B doesn't have this intuition, all Bs should choose TAKE, as such an intuition is elementary. Similarly, all As, who are supposed to have this intuition, should have guesses at 0% about the possibility that B could choose SHARE. Assuming that some As did not enter 0% exactly because they didn't have the intuition, I think in any case a value of 50% could not have been entered, having no valid reason to guess such a high percentage on the possibility that B would chose SHARE. So, As who chose CONTINUE did it by taking a high risk, and they should be remunerated for this.
- b)
- c) I confirm the same values as before. Even not having the intention that all Bs had to choose TAKE because they have everything to gain, I don't think there are As that could have guessed 50% values about the possibility that B would have chosen SHARE, simply because there was no reason to do so.

Subject 70 – Selfish

- a) A has taken a risk by choosing CONTINUE while the most logical choice for B is TAKE. Since A has risked uselessly, regardless of the given guess, I don't return anything.
- b)
- c)

Subject 71 – Selfish

- a) I would not be willing to give anything back to A because it is clear that in any case I would have chosen TAKE.
- b)
- c) For the same reason that I decided not to give anything back before.

Subject 72 – Balanced

- a) I share the 4 euros evenly with A (choice I would have made had I not been imposed “TAKE”).
- b)
- c)

Subject 73 – Guilt prevails

- a) The hypothetical reimbursement should start at 50%, be higher for higher probabilities of SHARE, and be maximum (but not more than half) for a probability equal to 100%.
- b)
- c) Same numbers. I do not change.

Subject 74 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) If he/she chose CONTINUE believing that no one would choose SHARE, he/she made an irrational choice, and I do not pay anything back. If he/she did it thinking that I was among the few Bs that would have chosen SHARE, I will refund almost everything.
- b) If his/her guess of the probability of SHARE increases and therefore his/her expected earnings increase, I lower my reimbursement.
- c) The payback scheme is the same.

Subject 75 – Selfish

- a) A made his/her choice, I made mine. It would not make sense to remove money, it would be like taking away the risk factor from the game beyond all reasoning about efficiency.
- b)
- c) We gambled, he/she lost, no payback.

Subject 76 – Guilt Prevails

- a) I guess A was disappointed about losing all his/her money because of me. I reward him/her by giving him/her back up to half of our couple's total money. My reimbursement is proportional to his/her guess of the probability that I would have shared.
- b)
- c) I do not change.

Subject 77 – Guilt prevails

- a) If A chose CONTINUE without being sure of my cooperation, he/she cannot complain. I am willing to give him/her something back only for guesses of my collaboration of at least 80%.
- b) I give him/her back half of the four euros for a 100% guess, less for a slightly lower guess.
- c) After playing the game a second time, and choosing TAKE, I realized that in the end I would not return anything to A if I was asked, not even for his/her very high guesses of my collaboration, which didn't happen.

Subject 78 – Reciprocity Prevails

- a) I chose the reimbursement only at 0% -10% because this means that maybe he/she trusted my choice was SHARE even if the others had chosen differently.
- b)
- c)

Subject 79 – Guilt prevails

- a) For a probability of 0%, given that A didn't think I would have chosen SHARE, he/she did not expect anything back. He/She deserves 2 euros if he/she was a sure I would have chosen SHARE.
- b)
- c)

Subject 80 – Selfish

- a) I am not willing to return any sum to A. If he/she has made a rational choice he/she will have his/her pay-off. By choosing CONTINUE he/she made the least rational choice, assuming my benevolence towards him/her. Participants in the game point to the maximum pay-off so no benevolence is contemplated. If he/she assumed my benevolence, he/she made an irrational choice and I see no reason to return any sum.
- b)
- c) I again chose not to return any sum to A. The reasons are the same as in phase 2.

Questionnaire *no* Disclosure (obs. 41-80): Estimations and Predictions.

Session	Pair	Guilt		Reciprocity		Ex-post feeling mitigation		Psychological type (Table 4)	Complete-information equilibrium predictions (Figure 1b)		Incomplete-information predictions (Figure 1a)
		Estimate	Standard deviation	Estimate	Standard deviation	Estimate	Standard deviation	B-subjects	A-subjects	B-subjects	B-subjects
QnoD-1	41	1.18E+00	3.42E-01	1.16E-16	1.02E-02	1.36E-15	5.62E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Intermediate Region
	42	2.25E-01	9.96E-02	9.73E-03	7.08E-02	1.00E+00	3.72E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	43	1.00E+03	5.45E+01	1.20E-12	2.38E-01	5.91E-01	2.13E-01	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	44	6.84E-01	1.93E-01	0.00E+00	1.38E-03	3.69E-13	2.49E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	45	1.50E-01	2.32E+02	7.30E-02	5.01E-02	1.00E+00	2.86E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	46	0.00E+00	4.53E-02	0.00E+00	3.10E-02	0.00E+00	4.09E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	47	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	2.48E-09	7.68E-09	2.57E-04	1.27E-05	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	48	2.14E+00	3.16E+01	0.00E+00	2.87E-03	2.00E-16	3.08E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	49	0.00E+00	4.53E-02	0.00E+00	3.17E-02	0.00E+00	4.17E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	50	0.00E+00	1.88E-02	1.56E-01	5.13E-02	2.07E-01	2.48E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
QnoD-2	51	2.72E+00	8.90E-01	2.61E-16	6.60E-15	0.00E+00	1.47E-14	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	52	0.00E+00	4.54E-02	0.00E+00	3.15E-02	0.00E+00	4.18E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	53	3.47E-01	1.02E-01	0.00E+00	1.38E-02	1.38E-13	1.86E-01	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	54	0.00E+00	4.52E-02	0.00E+00	3.32E-02	0.00E+00	4.12E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	55	1.00E+03	2.31E+02	4.99E-13	3.64E-02	2.00E-01	7.66E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	56	1.06E-01	7.72E+01	1.06E-01	3.61E-02	7.34E-01	2.26E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	57	1.09E-15	1.66E-02	1.31E-01	2.26E-02	9.62E-01	2.49E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	58	3.09E-01	1.37E+02	6.73E-02	5.65E-02	1.00E+00	2.21E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	59	1.00E+03	4.86E+02	2.29E-01	1.17E-02	1.67E-01	6.89E-02	Guilt prevails for high α	Continue	Share	Share
	60	4.60E-02	1.29E+02	9.81E-02	5.42E-02	1.00E+00	2.78E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
QnoD-3	61	9.91E-01	2.94E-01	1.53E-15	1.30E-02	4.12E-15	2.29E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	62	3.84E-02	1.13E+02	1.10E-01	4.18E-02	1.00E+00	2.67E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	63	1.92E+00	1.17E+00	0.00E+00	1.71E-13	1.63E-16	2.62E-03	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	64	0.00E+00	4.35E-02	0.00E+00	3.22E-02	0.00E+00	4.15E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	65	1.00E+03	4.85E+02	1.97E-01	3.50E-02	1.47E-02	2.21E-01	Guilt prevails for high α	Unclassified		Unclassified
	66	4.01E-01	1.47E-01	1.02E-16	1.77E-02	5.49E-01	1.33E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	67	1.00E+03	2.41E+02	1.38E-11	1.03E-02	4.57E-02	3.56E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	68	3.32E-01	7.93E-02	1.17E-01	4.27E-02	2.27E-10	4.03E-01	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	69	0.00E+00	3.61E-03	2.40E-01	5.20E-02	9.12E-02	3.19E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Unclassified
	70	0.00E+00	4.77E-02	0.00E+00	3.24E-02	0.00E+00	4.13E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
QnoD-4	71	0.00E+00	4.60E-02	0.00E+00	3.31E-02	0.00E+00	4.15E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	72	1.33E-01	7.60E-03	1.33E-01	7.60E-03	1.00E+00	2.65E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	73	1.16E+00	5.16E-01	1.07E-15	1.04E-02	0.00E+00	1.83E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	74	0.00E+00	9.18E+01	1.57E-01	1.04E-01	9.84E-01	4.39E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Unclassified
	75	0.00E+00	4.86E-02	0.00E+00	3.16E-02	0.00E+00	4.16E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	76	2.06E+00	8.60E-01	0.00E+00	1.56E-02	1.53E-15	9.54E-11	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	77	5.61E-01	2.07E-01	0.00E+00	7.39E-03	2.14E-15	1.09E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	78	0.00E+00	1.69E-02	1.66E-01	4.36E-02	3.12E-02	3.11E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	79	3.67E-01	2.33E-01	0.00E+00	7.25E-02	2.49E-14	4.08E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	80	0.00E+00	4.68E-02	0.00E+00	3.14E-02	0.00E+00	4.15E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take

[Estimates and standard deviations in scientific notation: 3.04E-01 = 0.304]

Questionnaire Disclosure (obs. 81-120): Experimental data.

Session	Pair	Phase 1: <i>A</i> -subjects		Phase 1: <i>B</i> -subjects			Phase 2 Questionnaire: <i>B</i> -subjects										Phase 3: <i>A</i> -subjects		Phase 3: <i>B</i> -subjects			
		Choice	1st ord. Belief	Choice	2nd ord. Belief	1st ord. Belief	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	Choice	1st ord. Belief	Choice	2nd ord. Belief	1st ord. Belief
<i>QD-1</i>	81	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.50	Continue	70	Take	40	Continue
	82	Continue	40	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	20	Dissolve
	83	Continue	80	Take	30	Dissolve	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.80	2.00	Continue	50	Take	0	Dissolve
	84	Dissolve	40	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.80	2.00	Dissolve	70	Take	20	Dissolve
	85	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.50	1.00	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	Continue	50	Share	60	Continue
	86	Continue	30	Take	80	Dissolve	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.90	2.00	Continue	40	Share	30	Continue
	87	Continue	60	Take	60	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	Dissolve	40	Take	90	Dissolve
	88	Dissolve	10	Take	30	Continue	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve
	89	Dissolve	30	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.25	0.50	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25	2.50	2.50	Continue	50	Take	30	Continue
	90	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.40	0.20	0.20	0.20	Dissolve	40	Take	70	Continue
<i>QD-2</i>	91	Dissolve	10	Take	40	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	10	Take	20	Continue
	92	Continue	0	Take	30	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve
	93	Dissolve	0	Take	30	Dissolve	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.80	2.00	Continue	0	Share	100	Continue
	94	Continue	30	Share	70	Continue	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.75	2.00	2.50	3.00	Dissolve	0	Take	50	Continue
	95	Dissolve	30	Share	50	Continue	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	Continue	30	Share	80	Continue
	96	Dissolve	20	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	Dissolve	0	Take	20	Continue
	97	Dissolve	0	Take	10	Dissolve	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	10	Take	100	Continue
	98	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	1.75	1.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	10	Take	40	Continue
	99	Continue	40	Share	60	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.75	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.25	1.50	2.00	Continue	100	Take	30	Continue
	100	Continue	80	Take	80	Continue	3.00	2.50	2.25	1.80	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	4.00	Dissolve	0	Take	100	Dissolve
<i>QD-3</i>	101	Dissolve	30	Take	0	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.80	0.90	1.20	1.40	1.50	1.80	2.00	2.50	Continue	70	Share	90	Continue
	102	Dissolve	0	Share	100	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	Dissolve	0	Take	10	Continue
	103	Continue	60	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	1.00	0.50	0.00	Dissolve	10	Take	40	Continue
	104	Continue	90	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.50	0.80	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	Continue	40	Share	80	Continue
	105	Dissolve	10	Take	40	Dissolve	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	4.00	1.00	0.80	0.60	0.40	0.20	Dissolve	10	Take	90	Continue
	106	Dissolve	30	Take	10	Dissolve	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	Continue	60	Take	0	Dissolve
	107	Continue	20	Take	10	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.75	1.00	2.00	Continue	20	Take	10	Continue
	108	Dissolve	30	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	Dissolve	20	Take	60	Continue
	109	Dissolve	20	Share	60	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve
	110	Dissolve	0	Take	20	Continue	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	Continue	10	Share	40	Continue
<i>QD-4</i>	111	Dissolve	10	Take	10	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.90	Continue	60	Take	60	Continue
	112	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	10	Take	40	Continue
	113	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.50	2.50	Continue	60	Share	80	Continue
	114	Continue	60	Take	20	Continue	2.00	1.00	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve
	115	Dissolve	20	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	2.00	Dissolve	50	Share	80	Continue
	116	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve
	117	Dissolve	20	Share	60	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	Continue	70	Share	90	Continue
	118	Continue	70	Take	60	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Dissolve
	119	Dissolve	0	Take	30	Dissolve	4.00	3.00	2.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.50	3.00	Dissolve	30	Take	50	Continue
	120	Dissolve	10	Share	50	Continue	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.80	2.00	Continue	70	Share	100	Continue

Subject 81 – Guilt prevails

- a) The greater the probability that A gave his choice to share, the greater was my propensity to return money.
- b)
- c)

Subject 82 – Selfish

- a) I simply acted to maximize my profit.
- b)
- c) I still acted to maximize my profit.

Subject 83 – Guilt Prevails

- a) The values that I entered in the hypothetical payback scheme are the expected gains of A, that is, the maximum gain (2 euros) multiplied by the percentage of people A thought would choose SHARE, i.e. the probability that my partner B would choose SHARE and that A would earn 2 euros.
- b)
- c) Also in this second case, the payback is equivalent to the expected earnings value.

Subject 84 – Guilt Prevails

- a) I entered low reimbursement values based on the probability given by A regarding my choice to SHARE. If A had not expected that my choice would have been SHARE, it means that he/she did not count on earning low amounts, so my reimbursement was low. As the estimate of A increased regarding my probability of choosing SHARE, I increased the reimbursement.
- b) What I have described before and that was the basis of my reimbursement choice.
- c)

Subject 85 – Guilt prevails

- a) A greater reimbursement corresponds to the trust he/she had in me.
- b)
- c)

Subject 86 – Guilt prevails

- a) I always give 1 euro (so that A receives something) plus a growing bonus (up to another euro) the more A trusts me.
- b)
- c) I entered the same values as in the previous table: my feelings have not changed.

Subject 87 – Guilt prevails

- a) The trust that A has placed in me must be repaid, but up to a maximum of 2 euros, that is, the balanced situation.
- b)
- c)

Subject 88 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) I would not return anything except if A had thought, with 0% probability, that I had chosen SHARE.
- b) My feeling depends on the fact that A was aware of the situation, yet he/she decided to choose CONTINUE.
- c)

Subject 89 – Guilt prevails

- a) I decided to give part of my prize depending on how high the probability with which A had thought that my choice would have been SHARE was.
- b)
- c)

Subject 90 – Guilt Prevails

- a) I have included moderate values because I am not interested in returning A a particular amount. The values that I have entered depend on what, in my opinion, the probability with which A thought I had chosen share is, and the consistency between what A thought and what I thought.
- b)
- c) I simply don't want to return anything to A, the difference between before and now is practically null, but now I don't just consider A.

Questionnaire *Disclosure* (obs. 91-100): *B*-subjects' answers to the debriefing questions

Subject 91 – Selfish

- a) Because we have both decided other things being equal and therefore the result seems legitimate, such that I am not pushed to return anything.
- b)
- c) Same as before.

Subject 92 – Selfish

- a) I don't return anything, I only think about my payoff.
- b)
- c) [Changes answers]

Subject 93 – Guilt prevails

- a) I entered a growing reimbursement in line with the increase in the probability he/she guessed.
- b)
- c) Same payback scheme.

Subject 94 – Guilt prevails

- a) I gave A a hypothetical payback to reward any trust that he/she may have placed in me.
- b)
- c)

Subject 95 – Guilt prevails

- a) I decided to return half of the prize to player A if he/she believed strongly (from 70% to 100%) that my choice was to SHARE the payment with him. As the probability decreases, I thought it was appropriate to also reduce the amount of the payback.
- b)
- c)

Subject 96 – Guilt prevails

- a) The values returned are the reward for the trust of A in a collaboration, albeit tacit, that pushed him/her to play the risky action trusting in the generosity of B in playing the fairer action, instead of the dominant one.
- b)
- c)

Subject 97 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) If A had in mind that I would have chosen SHARE with a probability of at least 50%, then I think he/she chose CONTINUE more for himself/herself than for me. I share the 4 euros with him/her even if he/she chose CONTINUE thinking that TAKE was more likely.
- b)
- c)

Subject 98 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) I wouldn't want to return any euros to A, since choosing CONTINUE he/she tried to be smart and to earn more money had I chosen SHARE. Unfortunately for A, I had some more advantageous choices. He/she would have to settle for the euro he/she would have earned by choosing STOP, but he/she was greedy. So why shouldn't I be greedy as well? I would return something (but still less than 2 euros) if he/she chose CONTINUE being sure (or almost) that I would have chosen TAKE.
- b)
- c)

Subject 99 – Guilt prevails

- a) If A entered less than 50% it means that he/she did not trust B, so he/she doesn't deserve any reimbursement, if not minimum. If he/she had entered more than 50% it could be that he/she trusted B, so he/she deserves an increasing reimbursement based on the guessed percentage.
- b)
- c)

Subject 100 – Guilt prevails for high α

- a) I entered higher values, for a lower percentage of B that chooses share because it seems logical to me that the trend has been TAKE. With 0% I have associated 3 euros and gradually I have been decreasing the amount with increasing values. To those who have guessed that 100% of the B people have chosen SHARE, I have decided to allocate 4 euros because the risk of making a mistake is considerably higher.
- b) I thought it was fair to reward players A who chose a low percentage of Bs who choose SHARE because I share the logical reasoning. I have also awarded 4 euros to those who have entered a 100% guess for the very high risk of making mistakes.
- c) I chose to allocate 3 euros to A that estimated 0% SHARE and then less and less because I shared the choice.

Subject 101 – Guilt prevails

- a) The more A thought that I would have shared with him/her, the more I want to share with him/her.
- b) Empathy
- c)

Subject 102 – Guilt prevails

- a) If A trusted me at least 30%, then I'll give him/her 50 cents. And if he/she trusted me at least more than 50%, then I share with him/her the 4 euros (2 euros each).
- b) Mutual trust
- c)

Subject 103 – Guilt prevails

- a) I would return to A increasing sums in his/her perception that B players would have chosen SHARE. But if A had been sure that the choice of all Bs was SHARE, I wouldn't have returned anything because A had no expectations towards me.
- b)
- c)

Subject 104 – Guilt prevails

- a) I share 50-50 if A gave me 100% trust and I disregarded this trust. In the opposite case (0%), I give 0 euros. And adjust for the other values (I share 50-50 also for 80% -90%).
- b) Trust is important for me. That's why I was thinking about this feeling towards me.
- c)

Subject 105 – Balanced motivations

- a) If A chose CONTINUE being completely uncertain between TAKE and SHARE, then he/she was brave: he/she acted in total uncertainty, so I gave him/her back all four euros. For all other guesses, I return less, symmetrically as much as A's guess was far from 50%.
- b)
- c)

Subject 106 – Balanced

- a) I entered these values as I think A's choice would have been CONTINUE and to encourage him/her to do this I offer him/her 2 euros knowing that in any case I would lose nothing.
- b)
- c)

Subject 107 – Guilt prevails

- a) For high probabilities, A was expecting something from me. It is difficult to disappoint someone in this case.
- b) Feeling guilty
- c)

Subject 108 – Guilt prevails

- a) I built this payback scheme with the idea of getting the maximum profit between me and A anyway: I prefer in any case to keep most of my earnings.
- b) There is a direct relationship between these two factors: if A thinks that I am a person who likes to share, I appreciate this feeling; the greater the probability that he/she thinks that, the more I would share with him/her.
- c)

Subject 109 – Selfish

- a) It is an irrational choice for A to choose CONTINUE because for B the best choice is always TAKE. If A thought that B chose SHARE with 0% probability he/she would have to choose STOP. If A thought that B chose SHARE with a high probability, he/she didn't consider that for B it was always better to choose TAKE.
- b)
- c)

Subject 110 – Balanced

- a) I am B, in section 1 I indicated so: A thinks that only 10% of Bs will choose share; I think that A will choose stop, this means that I have assumed that A doesn't trust B. I feel I am a DEBTOR towards A because if I had not played with A I would not have won anything, also it is better to be happy together than for one to be happy and the other unhappy. So I forget the initial reasoning and I share the 4 euros with A.
- b)
- c)

Questionnaire *Disclosure* (obs. 111-120): *B*-subjects' answers to the debriefing questions

Subject 111 – Guilt prevails

- a) Up to 50%, 0 euros because the other player is aware of the game and foresees (or at least takes into consideration) the nefarious event. For higher percentages, I would return more or less in proportion to the betrayed trust. Never up to less than 2 euros because it is always a betting game.
- b)
- c) I would write the same.

Subject 112 – Balanced motivations

- a) From 0% to 30% the lack of trust is not rewarded; from 80% to 100% too much confidence is a symptom of “ingenuity-stupidity”?
- b)
- c)

Subject 113 – Guilt prevails

- a) The values that I decide to give back to A are increasing (equal between 60% and 70%) because I think A has risked more according to his/her choice and depending on the belief in the SHARE percentages chosen by Bs.
- b) Because he/she risked depending on the belief of the various percentages of the SHARE choice. So even though B's choice to TAKE was optimal for B in both situations, A was convinced that he/she chose SHARE. The growing conviction deserves to be remunerated.
- c)

Subject 114 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) For 0%, I return 2: I wanted to thank him/her for his/her gift. For 10%, I return 1: I wanted to reward his/her risk proneness. For 20%, I return 0.80: same as above, but the risk was less (or at least that was what A was thinking). For 30%–100%, I return 0: I simply wanted to keep the money. Player A was too optimistic, maybe next time he/she will make a more realistic forecast...
- b)
- c) I had not lied.

Subject 115 – Guilt Prevails

- a) I decided to return an increasing amount in line with the trust that A attributed to me about my willingness to share rather than take.
- b) The more A attributed to me an intention to cooperate, choosing to SHARE rather than TAKE, the more I am willing to return some of my money.
- c) I choose to return larger sums based on the trust attributed to me by A.

Subject 116 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) I entered 0 in the 0% box because if he/she had expected everyone to choose TAKE it would have made no sense to put CONTINUE. I entered 2 in the other boxes with low probability because in this way I repay A for having run the risk of making me earn 4 euros (and nothing for him/her). This risk decreases as the probability of SHARE increases.
- b)
- c) [Changes answers]

Subject 117 – Guilt prevails

- a) Up to 50% is too low a certainty to be able to choose CONTINUE, so player A played badly and doesn't deserve a payback. As the percentage of trust increases, I am willing to give a growing payback.
- b)
- c)

Subject 118 – Selfish

- a) I don't know Player A, I have no reason to share with him/her.
- b)
- c)

Subject 119 – Guilt prevails for high α

- a) I pay back 4 euros to those who chose CONTINUE with 0% probability of sharing because the choice is completely contradictory and I want to reward the audacity, for this I pay back values even in the cases of 10% and 20%. While the sums for the percentages 90% and 100% are a reward for trusting one's neighbor.
- b)
- c) No, I would not change the table.

Subject 120 – Guilt prevails

- a) If A had thought that my choice was SHARE, then I would have given him/her half my winnings, to make my good faith understood. For lower guesses, I would have given him/her lower and lower sums.
- b)
- c)

Questionnaire Disclosure (obs. 81-120): Estimations and Predictions.

Session	Pair	Guilt		Reciprocity		Ex-post feeling mitigation		Psychological type (Table 4)	Complete-information equilibrium predictions (Figure 1b)		Incomplete-information predictions (Figure 1a)
		Estimate	Standard deviation	Estimate	Standard deviation	Estimate	Standard deviation	B-subjects	A-subjects	B-subjects	B-subjects
QD-1	81	1.00E+03	3.53E+02	1.16E-13	3.42E-02	2.30E-02	2.95E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	82	0.00E+00	4.39E-02	0.00E+00	3.08E-02	0.00E+00	4.14E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	83	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	8.13E-09	2.57E-04	1.26E-05	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	84	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	7.53E-09	2.57E-04	1.23E-05	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	85	1.00E+03	2.22E+02	6.09E-13	3.75E-12	9.12E-02	6.70E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	86	4.21E-01	3.16E-02	1.26E-01	1.33E-02	4.89E-01	3.96E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Intermediate Region
	87	1.00E+03	4.90E+02	3.93E-12	1.61E-02	2.54E-04	7.20E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	88	0.00E+00	2.72E-02	1.84E-01	8.67E-02	7.42E-04	3.80E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	89	1.00E+03	3.16E+01	6.84E-14	2.88E-12	2.05E-01	3.59E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	90	7.38E-02	3.00E-02	5.04E-02	9.94E-03	1.00E+00	2.35E-01	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
QD-2	91	0.00E+00	4.64E-02	0.00E+00	3.20E-02	0.00E+00	4.19E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	92	0.00E+00	4.47E-02	0.00E+00	3.21E-02	0.00E+00	4.12E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	93	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	6.74E-09	7.45E-09	2.57E-04	1.26E-05	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	94	1.00E+03	3.43E+02	4.50E-13	2.81E-02	5.71E-02	5.49E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	95	3.20E+00	4.89E+02	0.00E+00	3.28E-02	2.71E-01	2.48E-01	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	96	4.01E-01	3.04E-01	7.70E-14	4.47E-02	5.44E-01	2.21E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	97	0.00E+00	4.22E-03	2.42E-01	2.27E-02	1.29E-03	1.57E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Unclassified
	98	0.00E+00	1.95E-02	1.58E-01	5.42E-02	2.02E-01	2.82E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	99	2.28E+00	6.71E-01	0.00E+00	1.45E-02	4.61E-15	4.38E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	100	1.00E+03	4.99E+02	2.79E-01	3.02E-02	1.48E-15	1.71E-01	Guilt prevails for high α	Unclassified		Unclassified
QD-3	101	1.00E+03	5.34E+01	8.30E-12	1.73E-02	7.30E-02	2.43E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	102	1.00E+03	2.30E+02	1.30E-12	1.93E-03	9.12E-02	8.86E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	103	9.51E-02	1.41E-01	4.05E-02	1.89E-02	1.00E+00	3.18E-01	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	104	2.76E+00	4.58E+02	0.00E+00	6.57E-02	2.03E-01	1.15E-01	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	105	1.23E-01	1.13E+02	1.23E-01	4.58E-02	4.71E-01	2.64E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	106	1.33E-01	8.21E-03	1.33E-01	8.21E-03	1.00E+00	2.57E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	107	5.32E-01	1.85E-01	0.00E+00	7.49E-03	4.98E-15	1.08E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	108	2.75E-01	2.28E-01	1.32E-14	7.26E-02	8.14E-01	3.45E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	109	0.00E+00	4.72E-02	0.00E+00	3.26E-02	0.00E+00	4.13E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	110	1.33E-01	9.23E-03	1.33E-01	9.23E-03	1.00E+00	2.42E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
QD-4	111	8.76E-01	2.46E-01	0.00E+00	1.02E-05	5.43E-15	2.48E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Intermediate Region
	112	6.78E-02	7.06E+01	6.78E-02	3.23E-02	9.33E-01	2.87E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	113	1.00E+03	4.05E+02	1.31E-12	1.81E-12	2.30E-02	4.11E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	114	0.00E+00	9.89E-03	1.84E-01	3.24E-02	4.87E-09	2.12E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	115	6.98E+00	4.69E+02	0.00E+00	1.32E-02	9.93E-02	8.26E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	116	1.02E-02	5.47E+01	1.27E-01	4.78E-02	1.00E+00	2.82E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	117	6.93E-01	9.92E-02	1.52E-15	2.83E-03	0.00E+00	3.92E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Intermediate Region
	118	0.00E+00	4.58E-02	0.00E+00	3.14E-02	0.00E+00	4.08E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	119	2.51E+00	4.94E+02	2.38E-01	5.09E-02	6.65E-15	6.13E-02	Guilt prevails for high α	Unclassified		Unclassified
	120	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	7.81E-09	7.59E-09	2.57E-04	1.27E-05	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share

[Estimates and standard deviations in scientific notation: 3.04E-01 = 0.304]

Questionnaire Disclosure (obs. 121-160): Experimental data.

Session	Pair	Phase 1: <i>A</i> -subjects		Phase 1: <i>B</i> -subjects			Phase 2 Questionnaire: <i>B</i> -subjects										Phase 3: <i>A</i> -subjects		Phase 3: <i>B</i> -subjects			
		Choice	1st ord. Belief	Choice	2nd ord. Belief	1st ord. Belief	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	Choice	1st ord. Belief	Choice	2nd ord. Belief	1st ord. Belief
<i>QD-5</i>	121	Continue	40	Share	30	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	Continue	50	Share	50	Continue
	122	Dissolve	40	Take	10	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.50	2.00	Continue	60	Take	20	Dissolve
	123	Dissolve	30	Take	40	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.40	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.80	1.97	2.10	Continue	50	Share	70	Continue
	124	Continue	60	Take	10	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	Dissolve	40	Take	0	Dissolve
	125	Dissolve	40	Share	20	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	Dissolve	40	Share	70	Continue
	126	Dissolve	10	Take	40	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Continue	70	Take	40	Dissolve
	127	Dissolve	20	Share	40	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	20	Take	70	Dissolve
	128	Dissolve	40	Take	40	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	Continue	90	Share	60	Continue
	129	Continue	30	Share	40	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Continue	60	Take	30	Dissolve
	130	Continue	30	Share	80	Continue	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.80	2.00	Continue	80	Share	90	Continue
<i>QD-6</i>	131	Dissolve	40	Share	70	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	20	Take	20	Dissolve
	132	Dissolve	20	Share	40	Continue	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	1.00	1.50	2.00	Dissolve	60	Take	20	Continue
	133	Continue	10	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Continue	0	Take	10	Dissolve
	134	Dissolve	0	Share	40	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.80	1.00	1.50	1.80	2.00	2.50	2.70	3.00	Continue	50	Share	60	Dissolve
	135	Dissolve	20	Take	0	Dissolve	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	Dissolve	30	Take	0	Dissolve
	136	Continue	30	Take	30	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.10	0.50	Dissolve	70	Share	10	Dissolve
	137	Continue	50	Take	0	Dissolve	4.00	3.75	3.50	3.00	2.50	2.00	1.75	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.00	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve
	138	Dissolve	30	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.15	1.50	Continue	60	Share	60	Continue
	139	Dissolve	20	Take	30	Dissolve	0.00	0.20	0.40	0.60	0.80	1.00	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.80	2.00	Dissolve	20	Share	60	Continue
	140	Dissolve	20	Take	60	Dissolve	0.00	0.10	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	Dissolve	10	Take	10	Dissolve
<i>QD-7</i>	141	Dissolve	40	Take	30	Dissolve	1.00	0.30	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.05	1.00	Continue	60	Take	10	Dissolve
	142	Dissolve	30	Take	60	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	10	Share	40	Dissolve
	143	Continue	30	Share	80	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.50	1.00	1.50	2.00	3.00	Dissolve	50	Share	90	Continue
	144	Continue	60	Take	0	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.50	0.70	1.00	1.20	1.50	1.80	0.00	Continue	60	Take	90	Continue
	145	Dissolve	0	Share	20	Dissolve	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	Dissolve	0	Take	30	Dissolve
	146	Continue	20	Share	30	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	Continue	40	Take	10	Dissolve
	147	Dissolve	30	Take	20	Continue	0.00	0.10	0.50	0.60	0.65	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.75	1.75	2.00	Continue	50	Share	90	Continue
	148	Dissolve	0	Take	0	Continue	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve
	149	Dissolve	10	Take	80	Dissolve	1.00	0.90	0.80	0.70	0.60	0.50	0.40	0.30	0.20	0.10	0.00	Dissolve	10	Share	0	Dissolve
	150	Continue	60	Take	10	Continue	0.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.50	0.50	1.00	Dissolve	10	Take	20	Dissolve
<i>QD-8</i>	151	Continue	70	Take	20	Dissolve	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	60	Share	10	Dissolve
	152	Dissolve	20	Take	10	Dissolve	1.50	1.00	0.80	0.60	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Dissolve	0	Take	20	Dissolve
	153	Dissolve	10	Take	0	Dissolve	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	Dissolve	40	Share	0	Dissolve
	154	Dissolve	20	Share	30	Continue	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	Dissolve	40	Take	30	Continue
	155	Dissolve	20	Share	20	Continue	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.50	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	Dissolve	10	Take	10	Dissolve
	156	Continue	70	Take	40	Continue	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.00	0.80	0.50	0.50	Continue	60	Take	40	Dissolve
	157	Continue	70	Take	0	Dissolve	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	Continue	30	Take	0	Dissolve
	158	Continue	10	Share	70	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	Continue	60	Take	30	Continue
	159	Dissolve	0	Share	30	Continue	0.00	0.40	0.80	1.20	1.60	2.00	2.40	2.60	3.20	3.60	4.00	Continue	40	Share	60	Continue
	160	Dissolve	30	Take	30	Continue	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	2.00	Dissolve	40	Take	20	Dissolve

Questionnaire *Disclosure* (obs. 121-130): *B*-subjects' answers to the debriefing questions

Subject 121 – Guilt prevails

- a) I would give 0 euro back to A in the case of 0%, 10%, 20% because I think it is naïve to have chosen CONTINUE thinking that no one would have chosen SHARE. As the percentage increases, the rationality of A grows, and I feel obliged to pay him/her an increasing amount, due to my respect for his/her trust and his/her rationality.
- b) If my partner chose CONTINUE thinking that no one would choose SHARE, then he/she was stupid. The more he/she had rational expectations and predicted that most Bs would choose SHARE, the more my payment grows.
- c) I confirmed all the previous values.

Subject 122 – Guilt prevails

- a) I rewarded with a reimbursement, values that had positively influenced my decision to share. Those who had a guess close to 50% also received a reimbursement but of a lesser size. Anyone I was negative about received no refund.
- b)
- c) I gave the same refunds that I chose to give in section 2 because I didn't change my mind.

Subject 123 – Guilt prevails

- a) The reimbursements increase in relation to the trust placed in me.
- b)
- c)

Subject 124 – Guilt prevails

- a) If my partner thought there was more than 50% chance I would have chosen SHARE, I would like to give him/her back a little bit.
- b) I feel that I have cheated on my partner and so I would like to share my income with him/her, but only for high probabilities, and with limited reimbursement.
- c)

Subject 125 – Guilt prevails

- a) I rewarded with 2 euros collaborations from A with almost total trust. I decreased the sum to 1 euro for trust of 40% -60%, I decreased it to 0.5 euros for trust of 20% -30%. I didn't reward the absence of trust.
- b)
- c)

Subject 126 – Selfish

- a) Everyone takes responsibility for their choices and must try to maximize their profits with the information at their disposal.
- b)
- c)

Subject 127 – Selfish

- a) I think I do not have to repay anything because Player A, having chosen CONTINUE, has taken the risk of not winning anything.
- b)
- c) I do not intend to proceed with the reimbursement because, having chosen CONTINUE, the player took on the risk of not winning anything.

Subject 128 – Guilt prevails

- a) I tried to apply a rational thought, dividing my 4 euros proportionately according to 3 reimbursement categories: from 0% to 20% = 0 euros, from 30% to 70% = 1 euro, from 80% to 100% = 2 euros.
- b) Equity, economy of sharing.
- c)

Subject 129 – Balanced motivations

- a) If A had considered very probable or even certain that my choice was SHARE he/she could not have made a better choice, as a trust premium was not necessary. On the contrary, if he/she was certain that my choice was TAKE, he/she played badly and did not deserve a reward. For the central percentages, maybe he/she deserves a reward for trying to make us achieve the best result (in the sense of Pareto).
- b)
- c) I would give the same values.

Subject 130 – Guilt prevails

- a) I decided to reward A with 2 euros proportionally based on the percentage with which A himself /herself thought I would have chosen SHARE.
- b)
- c)

Questionnaire *Disclosure* (obs. 131-140): *B*-subjects' answers to the debriefing questions

Subject 131 – Selfish

- a) The law of the jungle always applies. In this case the role of *B* is predominant on *A* because only he/she has the possibility to keep the gain obtained all for himself/herself. That's why, regardless of the percentages according to which *A* considered that a player *B* chose *SHARE*, I would always give 0 to my partner *A*.
- b)
- c)

Subject 132 – Guilt prevails

- a) I reward Player *A* based on the trust he/she has placed in me. In the best case (100%) I return half of the 4 euros I have earned. On the other hand, if his/her trust in me is low, I keep most of the 4 euros for myself, and even more the lower his/her trust is.
- b) Yes, my feeling depends on *A*'s guess of the probability that I would have chosen *SHARE*: ranging from a minimum of 0 euros (for 0%) to a maximum of 2 euros (for 100%).
- c)

Subject 133 – Selfish

- a) I chose not to return anything because, for any expectation of *A*, I would never have shared.
- b)
- c)

Subject 134 – Guilt prevails

- a) If *A* was sure I would have chosen *SHARE*, then I only keep the euro I would have received if he/she had chosen *STOP*, and I deliver the remaining 3 euros. I lower my refund if *A* was less sure of my intention.
- b) My feeling is proportional to how much *A* trusted me when he/she chose *CONTINUE*.
- c) Maybe 3 euros are too much in the case of 100%... Compared to the previous table, I have moderated all reimbursements so as to get up to 2 euros, leaving it still increasing in probability.

Subject 135 – Balanced motivations

- a) *A*'s choice improves my result (if *A* is rational) and his/hers. That's why I always give him/her 1 euro.
- b)
- c)

Subject 136 – Guilt prevails

- a) We learn from our mistakes. If you have analyzed the situation correctly, you should have chosen *STOP*. I give you up to 0.5 euros if you really believed in me, so for complete trust you would lose only 0.5 euros in exchange for a lesson in life.
- b) I can feel pity for him/her if he/she really believed in me.
- c) I don't change my mind: I give money back only for 50% and higher probabilities.

Subject 137 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) In the guess made by *A* I judge the player's personality, motivation and values. Since I could keep all 4 euros for myself I look at the refund as a way to reward the fact that *A* had chosen *CONTINUE* to allow me to receive 4 euros. So the amount of the prize represents the judgment I give to that person as being kind to me.
- b)
- c)

Subject 138 – Guilt prevails

- a) I think if I chose *TAKE*, then I do not want to divide into 2-2 the 4 euros I got, otherwise I would have chosen *SHARE*. That's why I have indicated as a maximum refund less than 2 euros (1.50 euros for 100%).
- b) For me, if player *A* thinks there are less than half of the *B* players who choose *SHARE*, he/she has no reason to choose *CONTINUE*. Instead he/she should choose *STOP*. That's why he/she does not deserve any euro back in this case.
- c)

Subject 139 – Guilt prevails

- a) The higher the trust *A* had in *B*, the more the sum returned came close to the sum *B* would have received if he/she had decided to share instead of take.
- b)
- c) If I had to rewrite the table I would leave it the same as before.

Subject 140 – Guilt prevails

- a) *A* trusted me and I betrayed him/her, so I feel remorse. For a 100% *SHARE* guess, I gave him/her back the euro he/she risked.
- b) I feel more remorse if my partner *A* indicated higher guesses.
- c)

Subject 141 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) Player A, at the time he/she chose CONTINUE, put the euro he/she had at risk. If he/she was convinced that I would have chosen TAKE, then he/she put it at risk to give me a gift of 4 euros, so I give it back to him/her. Maybe I should return it to him/her even if he/she was convinced that I would choose SHARE, since he/she completely trusted me...
- b)
- c) I repeat what I wrote before.

Subject 142 – Selfish

- a) I don't return anything to A for the fact that I chose TAKE. I only give him/her a small prize if him/her expectation on Bs was reasonable.
- b)
- c)

Subject 143 – Guilt prevails

- a) Under 50% I'm not willing to give anything because A did not trust us Bs. Increasing the probability, I'm willing to give more. Let's say that at 100% I would give 3 euros but only because, having chosen TAKE it is an amount that I will never give! (It is not 100% otherwise I would be a part of the group of those who chose SHARE). If A had made a 90% guess, I am willing to share 50% with him/her, but still thinking that a 90% guess is difficult.
- b)
- c) I modified the table slightly, returning a little bit even for low probabilities (I think plausible) and leaving everything as before from 50% up.

Subject 144 – Guilt prevails

- a) I am willing to return an increasing amount as A's guess of the probability of SHARE increases. But if A was sure of my intention to SHARE, then he/she took advantage of my good heart and doesn't deserve any reimbursement.
- b) My feeling depends positively on the estimate of A, but only for an estimate of less than 100%.
- c)

Subject 145 – Balanced motivations

- a) Player A, choosing CONTINUE, has made a risky choice. But I think he/she did it in his/her interest too. That's why I give him/her back only half of the euro that he/she lost by trusting me wrongly. My return is independent of his/her expectation of my behavior: he/she risked, lost, I refund a portion of what he/she lost.
- b)
- c) I confirm what I have indicated in Section 1.

Subject 146 – Guilt prevails

- a) Those who did not trust me (probability at 0% or 10%) will have nothing back. Whoever trusted me (100% or 90% chance) recovers the 2 euros I took from him/her. For all the other values of the probability that according to A I would have chosen SHARE, I differ according to the probability, increasing by 0.50 each time the probability rises by 20%, up to a maximum reimbursement of 2.
- b)
- c) I am convinced of the scheme I provided the first time.

Subject 147 – Guilt prevails

- a) I decided to share the 4 euros I won. If player A expected that I would choose SHARE 100% I would give him/her 50% of my income, ie 2 euros. And this sum would decrease with the decrease of his/her expectations that I would have chosen SHARE.
- b) It is not about being self-centered on, but about being generous.
- c)

Subject 148 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) If he/she chose CONTINUE for percentages of Share between 0% and 20%, he/she is a good person and therefore should be rewarded.
- b) If this person gave me a gift, then I'm willing to share a part of my income with him/her.
- c)

Subject 149 – Reciprocity Prevails

- a) I decided to assign 1 euro to A if the latter had thought that my choice was SHARE with a probability of 0%. It is a form of charity because if A was sure of my choice (TAKE), why did he/she play CONTINUE? I graded the refund figures based on probabilities. But the striking case must be punished with a form of purifying almsgiving.
- b) Pity.
- c) They are identical to the percentages in Section 2.

Subject 150 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) For 0% I do not return anything, since A was irrational if he/she chose CONTINUE knowing that none of Bs would have chosen TAKE. For 10%, I return 1.50 euros, because maybe A thought that only one out of the 10 Bs that would have chosen SHARE... was me. I give him/her back 1 euro if he/she was sure I would have chosen SHARE: in the latter case he/she chose CONTINUE both for me and for himself/herself (2 euros instead of 1), so I only return the euro he/she has invested in our partnership.
- b)
- c)

Questionnaire *Disclosure* (obs. 151-160): *B*-subjects' answers to the debriefing questions

Subject 151 – Selfish

- a) A made his/her choice, I made mine ...
- b)
- c)

Subject 152 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) The values that I have inserted depend on the fact that if player A chose CONTINUE believing that I would have chosen SHARE with a probability of at least 50%, he/she did not show a polite attitude towards me: he/she must have done it because in the uncertainty he/she believes that I will have 2 euros, and not that I will get 4 euros.
- b) I paired positive and increasing values to low probabilities.
- c) I increased the reimbursement by 0,50 in the case of 0%, and decreased to 0,50 those at 20% and 30%.

Subject 153 – Guilt prevails for high α

- a) At the choice of A (0%) I chose to return 1 euro because I would have definitely chosen TAKE. At the choice of A (100%) I chose to return 2 euros because he/she would have been sure that I would have chosen SHARE.
- b)
- c) I choose to give 1 euro only at choice A (0%) simply because I chose TAKE.

Subject 154 – Balanced

- a) I am willing to give 1 euro to reward his/her cooperation.
- b)
- c) I stick to my idea.

Subject 155 – Guilt prevails

- a) I share my share based on the prediction ability of the counterparty and the estimate I made in Section 1 (close to 50%). I would also give 1 euro for extreme estimates, equal to 0% or 100%.
- b)
- c) Some values would change, but only slightly. A has tried to maximize his/her advantage given a certain risk aversion. I would however keep the table.

Subject 156 – Reciprocity prevails

- a) If A chose CONTINUE rather than STOP he/she was kind to me. In my opinion, in all probabilities, I have to give him/her something back. If he/she chose CONTINUE even if he/she knew that it was more likely that I would choose TAKE, then we share the 4 euros in equal parts.
- b) I return a 4 euro fee decreasing according to his/her guess that I would have chosen SHARE.
- c) I confirm what I entered before.

Subject 157 - Balanced motivations

- a) If A trusts me I am willing to make him/her earn 50% more than he/she could earn by finishing the session.
- b)
- c)

Subject 158 – Guilt prevails

- a) I give nothing to those A players who thought my chance to SHARE was lower than 40%. Instead, I give at least 1.50 euros to all the others. More precisely: no more than 1.50 euros for those who thought that the probability was between 40% and 50%; 25 cents more to those who thought that the probability was higher than 50%, but still under 80%; 2 euros to those who thought I would choose SHARE definitely or almost.
- b) The more the probability rises that A believed in me, the more I feel guilty for having betrayed. And then I return more, maximum up to half of what I have taken.
- c)

Subject 159 – Guilt prevails

- a) A, having seen B's payoffs, realistically should have assumed that Player B would have chosen TAKE. But since the game is simultaneous, I choose to give all my winnings to those who put 100% because they knew how to break the orthodoxy of the game. And I choose to give less and less to those who were less orthodox, relying on the fact that B would never choose SHARE.
- b)
- c) Same answers.

Subject 160 – Guilt Prevails

- a) I entered the values to be returned by rewarding the trust that A had given me (in%) by choosing CONTINUE. If this were 100% then A would be worthy of receiving 2 euros. If A gave me less trust, then he/she would not have deserved to share the winnings (although in this case I do not understand why he/she chose CONTINUE and not STOP).
- b)
- c) I do not change.

Questionnaire Disclosure (obs. 121-160): Estimations and Predictions.

Session	Pair	Guilt		Reciprocity		Ex-post feeling mitigation		Psychological type (Table 4)	Complete-information equilibrium predictions (Figure 1b)		Incomplete-information predictions (Figure 1a)
		Estimate	Standard deviation	Estimate	Standard deviation	Estimate	Standard deviation	B-subjects	A-subjects	B-subjects	B-subjects
QD-5	121	1.00E+03	4.90E+02	0.00E+00	4.47E-02	2.55E-04	9.47E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	122	1.76E+00	7.88E-01	0.00E+00	9.49E-03	1.37E-15	1.27E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	123	4.76E+01	4.80E+02	0.00E+00	3.27E-12	3.77E-15	8.70E-03	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	124	6.55E-02	4.39E-02	5.22E-02	2.25E-02	1.00E+00	3.41E-01	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	125	1.00E+03	4.81E+02	1.82E-12	5.22E-02	2.56E-04	3.94E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	126	0.00E+00	4.52E-02	0.00E+00	3.24E-02	0.00E+00	4.13E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	127	0.00E+00	4.39E-02	0.00E+00	3.20E-02	0.00E+00	4.10E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	128	1.00E+03	4.91E+02	1.65E-11	4.77E-02	2.55E-04	8.87E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	129	7.30E-02	1.68E+02	7.30E-02	3.89E-02	9.78E-01	2.80E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	130	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	3.73E-09	7.15E-09	2.57E-04	1.25E-05	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
QD-6	131	0.00E+00	4.72E-02	0.00E+00	3.19E-02	0.00E+00	4.15E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	132	9.02E-01	3.12E-01	0.00E+00	2.34E-02	1.51E-14	3.42E-09	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Intermediate Region
	133	0.00E+00	4.61E-02	0.00E+00	3.18E-02	0.00E+00	4.15E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	134	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	1.15E-12	1.30E-12	2.19E-01	5.80E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	135	1.24E-01	2.43E-02	1.24E-01	2.43E-02	5.11E-01	2.63E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	136	2.63E-01	7.18E-02	1.83E-16	2.79E-02	1.18E-13	3.29E-01	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	137	0.00E+00	1.22E+02	3.89E-01	1.57E-02	0.00E+00	4.73E-03	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Intermediate Region
	138	6.41E-01	8.85E-02	1.84E-15	2.11E-04	0.00E+00	4.86E-03	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Intermediate Region
	139	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	7.94E-09	8.34E-09	2.57E-04	1.28E-05	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	140	3.65E-01	1.97E-03	1.32E-01	5.93E-04	6.48E-11	3.01E-09	Guilt prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
QD-7	141	1.65E-16	1.34E-01	1.41E-01	6.96E-02	2.26E-01	2.94E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	142	0.00E+00	4.56E-02	0.00E+00	3.72E-02	0.00E+00	4.15E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	143	2.16E+00	3.41E+02	2.11E-15	3.51E-03	0.00E+00	2.85E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Unclassified
	144	2.30E-01	9.21E-01	3.89E-14	2.00E-02	7.98E-01	4.56E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	145	1.24E-01	3.09E-02	1.24E-01	3.09E-02	2.68E-01	3.66E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	146	1.30E+01	4.03E+02	0.00E+00	4.01E-02	7.00E-15	1.47E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	147	4.48E+01	4.61E+02	0.00E+00	5.43E-02	1.60E-14	3.00E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	148	0.00E+00	1.04E-02	1.69E-01	3.58E-02	1.01E-01	3.22E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	149	5.24E-02	1.02E-02	1.28E-01	1.43E-02	4.54E-01	1.10E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	150	1.18E-01	1.20E-01	1.27E-01	6.19E-02	2.61E-01	3.43E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
QD-8	151	0.00E+00	4.41E-02	0.00E+00	3.12E-02	0.00E+00	4.12E-01	Selfish	Dissolve	Take	Take
	152	1.38E-16	2.06E-02	1.31E-01	2.84E-02	5.48E-01	3.26E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	153	3.67E-01	3.16E+01	0.00E+00	7.50E-02	2.09E-14	2.32E-01	Guilt prevails for high α	Unclassified		Unclassified
	154	1.24E-01	2.41E-02	1.24E-01	2.41E-02	5.10E-01	2.69E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	155	2.67E-01	5.47E+01	1.52E-01	6.34E-02	2.77E-15	3.93E-01	Guilt prevails	Unclassified		Unclassified
	156	2.88E-16	1.06E-02	1.44E-01	1.86E-02	9.94E-01	2.25E-01	Reciprocity prevails	Dissolve	Take	Take
	157	1.24E-01	1.55E-02	1.24E-01	1.55E-02	7.73E-01	1.70E-01	Balanced	Dissolve	Take	Take
	158	1.00E+03	3.40E+02	6.33E-13	7.04E-03	6.84E-02	9.32E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	159	1.00E+03	0.00E+00	9.59E-15	1.18E-12	4.91E-01	9.50E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Share
	160	7.81E-01	2.21E-01	1.01E-16	1.17E-02	0.00E+00	9.90E-02	Guilt prevails	Continue	Share	Intermediate Region

[Estimates and standard deviations in scientific notation: 3.04E-01 = 0.304]




Figure C.1 Actual vs. complete-information predicted equilibrium behavior (strategy pairs) in phase 3 of *NoQ-QnoD* (for comparison with **Figure 3b** of the paper)





Figure C.2 Actual vs. incomplete-information predicted behavior of *B*-subjects in phase 1 of *NoQ-QnoD* (for comparison with the left panel of **Figure 5** of the paper)

Treatments *QD* vs. *NoQ-QnoD*, phase 1: **choices**



Treatments *QD* vs. *NoQ-QnoD*, phase 1: **beliefs**




Figure C.3 *A*'s and *B*'s choices and beliefs in phase 1 of *QD* vs. *NoQ-QnoD*, disentangled by *B*'s type (for comparison with **Figure 6** and **Figure 7**).

		<i>Take</i>	<i>Share</i>		
Phase 1	<i>Diss</i>	47%	18%	65%	
	<i>Cont</i>	24%	11%	35%	
		71%	29%		
		<i>Take</i>	<i>Share</i>		
Phase 3	<i>Diss</i>	43%	11%	54%	<i>Diss</i>
	<i>Cont</i>	21%	25%	46%	<i>Cont</i>
		64%	36%	79%	21%
		<i>QD</i>		<i>NoQ-QnoD</i>	

Table C.1 Frequencies of observed strategy profiles, disentangled by phase-treatment combination.

Note. Table C.1 reports the frequencies of strategy profiles for *all* the complete-information predictable pairs, comparing phase 3 of *QD* with the incomplete-information phases 1 of *QD* and 3 of *NoQ-QnoD*. In line with the complete-information predictions, in phase 3 of *QD* there is a significant correlation ($\rho = 0.35$, P -value = 0.002) between *Continue* (resp. *Dissolve*) and *Share* (resp. *Take*); a significant correlation ($\rho = 0.33$, P -value = 0.005) is also found between the elicited values of the first-order beliefs of *A*-subjects and of the unconditional second-order beliefs of *B*-subjects. In both phase 1 of *QD* and phase 3 of *NoQ-QnoD*, as expected in a random-matching setting, the choices of *A* and *B* are independent ($\rho = -0.02$ on pooled data, P -value = 0.775) and the same holds for their beliefs ($\rho = 0.02$ on pooled data, P -value = 0.819). In other words, under disclosure there is a polarization of choices and beliefs along an “axis of trust,” that is—referring to the phase 3-*QD* matrix—, a higher concentration of pairs on the main diagonal (low trust in the top-left box, high trust in the bottom-right box) compared to the product of the marginals. In line with our theoretical predictions (Section 3.3), this polarization is not present without disclosure. We interpret this result as follows: The correlation found between *Continue* (resp., *Dissolve*) and *Share* (resp., *Take*) and between the elicited values of the first-order beliefs of *A*-subjects and of the unconditional second-order beliefs of *B*-subjects in phase 3 of *QD* is due to the disclosure of *B*’s psychological type to *A*. When *A* receives the filled-in questionnaire of a high-guilt (resp., low-guilt) type, she tends to believe that *B* would choose *Share* (resp., *Take*), hence she tends to choose *Continue* (resp., *Dissolve*). Knowing this, a disclosed high-guilt (resp., low-guilt) type tends to choose *Share* (resp., *Take*).