Working papers results

How to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on different combinations of external (formal and informal) enforcement institutions and intrinsic motivation. Some societies rely more on informal enforcement and moral obligations within their constituting groups. Others rely more on formal enforcement and general moral obligations towards society at large. How do culture and institutions interact in generating different evolutionary trajectories of societal organizations? Do contemporary attitudes, institutions and behavior reflect distinct pre-modern trajectories?

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor.

This paper uses German micro data and a quasi-natural experiment to provide new evidence on the empirical importance of precautionary savings. Our quasi-natural experiment draws on a sharp increase in uncertainty (as reported in a survey of German citizens) observed in the run-up to the 1998 general election. Our estimates are obtained from a diff-in-diff estimator and thus overcome the identification problem that often aects measures of precautionary savings. We find that household saving increases significantly following the increase in uncertainty about the future path of income, suggesting a significant precautionary savings motive. We also analyze households'response in terms of labor market choices: we find evidence of a labor supply response by workers who can use the margin offered by part-time employment. While independent of the reasons why uncertainty increased in the run-up to the election, our results are suggestive of the economic effects of "wars of attrition", i.e. situations in which reforms are delayed because political parties are unable to agree on how the burden of a reform should be shared between various groups in society. Delays in adopting a reform, or the possibilty that a reform, after it has been adopted by one government might be revoked by another, raise uncertainty and induce households to save more: consumption may fall and the economy might slow down for no other reason than political uncertainty.

University tuition typically remains constant throughout years of enrollment while delayed degree completion is an increasing problem for many academic institutions around the world. Theory suggests that if continuation tuition were raised the probability of late graduation would be reduced. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design on data from Bocconi University in Italy, we show that an increase of 1,000 euro in continuation tuition reduces the probability of late graduation by 9.9 percentage points with respect to a benchmark average probability of 80%. We conclude suggesting that an upward sloping tuition profile would be desirable when effort is sub-optimally supplied, for instance in the presence of public subsidies to education, congestion externalities and/or peer effects.

We study whether cultural attitudes towards gender, the young, and leisure are significant determinants of the evolution over time of the employment rates of women and of the young, and of hours worked in OECD countries. Beyond controlling for a larger menu of policies, institutions and structural characteristics of the economy than has been done so far, our analysis improves upon existing studies of the role of "culture" for labor market outcomes by dealing explicitly with the endogeneity of attitudes, policies and institutions, and by allowing for the persistent nature of labor market outcomes. When we do all this we find that culture still matters for women employment rates and for hours worked. However, policies and other institutional or structural characteristics are also important. Attitudes towards youth independence, however, do not appear to be important in explaining the employment rate of the young. In the case of women employment rates, the policy variable that is significant along with attitudes, is the OECD index of employment protection legislation. For hours worked the policy variables that play a role, along with attitudes, are the tax wedge and unemployment benefits. The quantitative impact of these policy variables is such that changes in policies have at least the potential to undo the eect of variations in cultural traits on labor market outcomes.

We use a transparent statistical methodology for data-driven case studies-synthetic control methods-to investigate the impact of economic liberalization episodes on the pattern of real per capita GDP in a worldwide sample of countries. Economic liberalizations are measured by a widely used indicator that captures the scope of the market in the economy, mainly in terms of openness to international trade. The applied methodology compares the post- liberalization growth of treated (open) economies with the growth of a convex combination of similar but untreated (closed) economies, controlling for time-varying unobservables. We find that opening up the economy had a positive effect in most regions that we can analyze in our framework, but we note that more recent liberalizations (after 1990), mainly in Africa, had no significant impact on growth, indicating an early bird gain from globalization.

This paper studies the case where a game is played in a particular context. The context influences what beliefs players hold. As such, it may affect forward induction reasoning: If players rule out specific beliefs, they may not be able to rationalize observed behavior. The effects are not obvious. Context-laden forward induction may allow outcomes precluded by context-free forward induction. At the formal level, forward induction and contextual reasoning are defined within an epistemic structure. In particular, we represent contextual forward induction reasoning as rationality and common strong belief of rationality"(RCSBR) within an arbitrary type structure. (The concept is due to Battigalli-Siniscalchi [6, 2002].) We ask: What strategies are consistent with RCSBR (across all type structures)? We show that the RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call Extensive Form Best Response Sets (EFBRS's). We go on to study the EFBRS concept in games of interest.

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We use the time series of shifts in U.S. taxes constructed by Romer and Romer to estimate tax multipliers. Differently from the single-equation approach adopted by Romer and Romer, our estimation strategy (a Var that includes output, government spending and revenues, inflation and the nominal interest rate) does not rely upon the assumption that tax shocks are orthogonal to each other as well as to lagged values of other macro variables. Our estimated multiplier is much smaller: one, rather than three at a three-year horizon. When we split the sample in two sub-samples (before and after 1980) we find, before 1980, a multiplier whose size is never greater than one, after 1980 a multiplier not significantly different from zero. Following the findings in Bohn (1998), we also experiment with a model that includes debt and the non-linear government budget constraint. We find that, while in general not very important, the non-linearity that arises from the budget constraint makes a difference after 1980, when the response offiscal variables to the level of the debt becomes stronger.

We analyze optimal policy design when firms' research activity may lead to socially harmful innovations. Public intervention, affecting the expected profitability of innovation, may both thwart the incentives to undertake research (average deterrence) and guide the use to which innovation is put (marginal deterrence). We show that public intervention should become increasingly stringent as the probability of social harm increases, switching First from laissez-faire to a penalty regime, then to a lenient authorization regime, and finally to a strict one. In contrast, absent innovative activity, regulation should rely only on authorizations, and laissez-faire is never optimal. Therefore, in innovative industries regulation should be softer.

We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.