Informal Mini-Workshop on Economics of Persuasion
via Roentgen 1, seminar room 5-e4-sr04
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14:00-14:40
Adrien Vigier (Oxford)
Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion with Public News, with Jacopo Bizzotto and Jesper Rudiger
14:40–15:20
Takuro Yamashita (Toulouse)
Optimal Public Information Disclosure by Mechanism Designer
15:20-16:00
Kym Pram (European University Institute)
Hard Evidence and Welfare
16:00-16:30
Coffee Break
16:30-17:10
Pavel Zryumov (Wharton)
Persuading the Principal to Wait, with Dmitry Orlov and Andrzej Skrzypacz
17:10-17:50
Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi)
The Organization of Persuasion: Wald Deconstructed, with Emeric Henry