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Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged
This paper discusses the historical and social origins of the bifurcation in the political institutions of China and Western Europe. An important factor, recognized in the literature, is that China centralized state institutions very early on, while ...
Natural resources and conflict: The crucial role of power mismatch and geographic asymmetries
This handbook chapter studies how natural resource wealth can in many contexts fuel armed conflict. Starting from a simple theoretical model, we stress the role of geography and power mismatch in the so called "natural resource curse". Drawing on rec...
Non-Traded Assets in Over-the-Counter Markets
Many financial assets trade in decentralized over-the-counter (OTC) markets, that is, there is no centralized marketplace and investors need to search for counterparties that are willing to trade.
Memory, Beliefs, and Economic Decisions
This project builds on the psychology of memory to study how selective retrieval affects economic decisions by shaping beliefs and preferences.
How People Use Statistics
We document two new facts about the distributions of answers in famous statistical problems: they are i) multi-modal and ii) unstable with respect to irrelevant changes in the problem. We offer a model in which, when solving a problem, people represe...
Belief Overreaction and Stock Market Puzzles
We construct an index of long term expected earnings growth for S&P500 firms and show that it has remarkable power to jointly predict future errors in these expectations and stock returns, in both the aggregate market and the cross section. The e...
Imagining the Future: Memory, Simulation and Beliefs
How do people form beliefs about novel risks, with which they have little or no experience? Motivated by survey data we collected in 2020, which showed that beliefs about Covid’s lethality depended on a range of personal experiences in unrelated doma...
Sophisticated Reasoning, Learning, and Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Imperfect Feedback
We analyze the infinite repetition with imperfect feedback of a simultaneous or sequential game, assuming that players are strategically sophisticated---but impatient---expected-utility maximizers. Sophisticated strategic reasoning in the repeated ga...