Working papers results
We provide a unified state-space modelling framework that encom-
passes different existing discrete-time yield curve models. within such
framework we analyze the impact on forecasting performance of two
crucial modelling choices, i.e. the imposition of no-arbitrage restric-
tions and the size of the information set used to extract factors. Using
US yield curve data, we find that: a. macro factors are very useful in
forecasting at medium/long forecasting horizon; b. financial factors
are useful in short run forecasting; c. no-arbitrage models are effec-
tive in shrinking the dimensionality of the parameter space and, when
supplemented with additional macro information, are very effective in
forecasting; d. within no-arbitrage models, assuming time-varying risk
price is more favorable than assuming constant risk price for medium
horizon-maturity forecast when yield factors dominate the informa-
tion set, and for short horizon and long maturity forecast when macro
factors dominate the information set; e. however, given the complex-
ity and the highly non-linear parameterization of no-arbitrage models,
it is very difficult to exploit within this type of models the additional
information offered by large macroeconomic datasets.
a common weakness: taxes, government spending and interest rates
are assumed to respond to various macroeconomic variables but not
to the level of the public debt; moreover the impact of fiscal shocks
on the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio are not tracked. We ana-
lyze the effects of fiscal shocks allowing for a direct response of taxes,
government spending and the cost of debt service to the level of the
public debt. We show that omitting such a feedback can result in
incorrect estimates of the dynamic effects of fiscal shocks. In par-
ticular the absence of an effect of fiscal shocks on long-term interest
rates-a frequent finding in research based on VAR's that omit a debt
feedback-can be explained by their mis-specification, especially over
samples in which the debt dynamics appears to be unstable. Using
data for the U.S. economy and the identification assumption proposed
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) we reconsider the effects of fiscal
policy shocks correcting for these shortcomings.
U.K. Compared to the closed economy, the presence of an exchange rate channel for
monetary policy not only produces new trade-offs for monetary policy, but it also
introduces an additional source of specification errors. We find that exchange rate
shocks are an important contributor to volatility in the model, and that the exchange
rate equation is particularly vulnerable to model misspecification, along with the
equation for domestic inflation. However, when policy is set with discretion, the
cost of insuring against model misspecification appears reasonably small.
systems will have to be retrenched. In particular, retirement age will have to be largely
increased. Yet, is this policy measure feasible in OECD countries? Since the answer
belongs mainly to the realm of politics, I evaluate the political feasibility of postponing
retirement under aging in France, Italy, the UK, and the US. Simulations for the year
2050 steady state demographic, economic and political scenario suggest that retirement
age will be postponed in all countries, while the social security contribution rate will
rise in all countries, but Italy. The political support for increasing the retirement age
stems mainly from the negative income effect induced by aging, which reduces the
profitability of the existing social security system, and thus the individuals net social
security wealth.
action or seek a profitable innovation that may enhance or reduce welfare. The legislator
sets fines calibrated to the harmfulness of unlawful actions. The range of fines defines norm
flexibility. Expected sanctions guide firms' choices among unlawful actions (marginal deter-
rence) and/or stunt their initiative altogether (average deterrence). With loyal enforcers,
maximum norm flexibility is optimal, so as to exploit both marginal and average deterrence.
With corrupt enforcers, instead, the legislator should prefer more rigid norms that prevent
bribery and misreporting, at the cost of reducing marginal deterrence and stunting private
initiative. The greater is potential corruption, the more rigid the optimal norms.
als, which we call generalized fractionalization index, that uses information on similarities
among individuals. We show that the generalized index is a natural extension of the
widely used ethno-linguistic fractionalization index and is alsosimple tocompute. The
paper offers some empirical illustrations on how the new index can be operationalized and
what difference it makes as compared to standard indices. These applications pertain to
the pattern of diversity in the United States across states. Journal of Economic Literature
fiscal policy by considering the Italian case. Empirical analysis has been so
far rather inconclusive on this important topic. We abscribe such evidence
to three problems: identification, regime-switching and maturity effects. All
these aspects are particularly relevant to the Italian case.
We propose a parsimonious model with three factors to
represent the whole yield curve, and we consider yield
differentials between Italian and German Government bonds.
To take into account the possibility of regime-switching, we explicitly include
a hidden two-state Markov chain that represents market expectations. The
model is estimated using Bayesian econometric techniques. We find that government
debt and its evolution significantly influence the yield of government
bonds, that such effects are maturity dependent and regime-dependent. Hence
when investigating the effect of fiscal policy on the term-structure it is of crucial
importance to allow for multiple regimes in the estimation.
Kewords: Fiscal Policy, Term Structure, regime switching, Bayesian estimation
utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic
environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly - using
hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies
implicitly - using preference structures, the analogue of type spaces la
Harsanyi - and it is shown that the two approaches are equivalent.
Preference structures can be seen as those sets of hierarchies arising when certain
restrictions on preferences, along with the players' common certainty of
the restrictions, are imposed. Preferences are a priori assumed to satisfy only
very mild properties (reflexivity, transitivity, and monotone continuity).
Thus, the results provide a framework for the analysis of behavior in games
under essentially any axiomatic structure. An explicit characterization is
given for Savage's axioms, and it is shown that a hierarchy of relatively
simple preference relations uniquely identifies the decision maker's
utilities and beliefs of all orders. Connections with the literature on beliefs
hierarchies and correlated equilibria are discussed.
Kewords: Subjective probability, Preference hierarchies, Type spaces, Beliefs
hierarchies, Common belief, Expected utility, Incomplete information,
Correlated equilibria
on sellers' investment. We show that a retailer extracts a larger
surplus from the negotiation with an upstream manufacturer the
more it is essential to the creation of total surplus. In turn, this
depends on the rivalry between retailers in the bargaining process.
Rivalry increases when the retail market is more fragmented, when
the retailers are less differentiated and when decreasing returns to
scale in production are larger. The allocation of total surplus affects
also the incentives of producers to invest in product quality, an instance
of the hold up problem. This not only makes both the supplier and
consumers worse off, but it may harm also the retailers.
Kewords: Retailers' power, Hold-up, Supplier's under-investment
Our paper seeks to answer this question by providing evidence on the
age-productivity and age-earnings profiles for a sample of plants in three
manufacturing industries (forest, industrial machinery and electronics) in
Finland. Our main result is that exposure to rapid technological and managerial
changes does make a difference for plant productivity, less so for wages. In
electronics, the Finnish industry undergoing a major technological and
managerial shock in the 1990s, the response of productivity to age-related
variables is first sizably positive and then becomes sizably negative as one
looks at plants with higher average seniority and experience. This declining
part of the curve is not there either for the forest industry or for industrial
machinery. It is not there either for wages in electronics. These conclusions
survive when a host of other plausible productivity determinants (notably,
education and plant vintage) are included in the analysis. We conclude that
workforce aging may be a burden for firms in high-tech industries and less so in
other industries.