Working papers results

2008 - n° 344 18/11/2008
This paper investigates whether or not the adoption of the Euro has
facilitated the introduction of structural reforms, defined as deregulation
in the product markets and liberalization and deregulation in the labor
markets. After reviewing the theoretical arguments that may link the
adoption of the Euro and structural reforms, we investigate the empirical
evidence. We find that the adoption of the Euro has been associated with
an acceleration of the pace of structural reforms in the product market.
The adoption of the Euro does not seem to have accelerated labor market
reforms in the "primary labor market;" however, the run up to the Euro
adoption seems to have been accompanied by wage moderation. We also
investigate issues concerning the sequencing of goods and labor market
reforms.

Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna and Vincenzo Galasso
Keywords: Euro, structural reforms, deregulation, European labor markets
2008 - n° 343 07/10/2008
Why do people have kids in developed societies? We propose an empirical test of
two alternative theories - children as consumption vs. investment good. We use
as a natural experiment the Italian pension reforms of the 90s that introduced a clear
discontinuity in the treatment across workers. This policy experiment is particularly
well suited, since the consumption motive predicts lower future pensions to reduce
fertility, while the old-age security to increase it. Our empirical analysis identifies
a clear and robust positive effect of less generous future pensions on post-reform
fertility. These findings are consistent with old-age security even for contemporary
fertility.

Francesco C. Billari and Vincenzo Galasso
Keywords: old-age security, public pension systems, fertility, altruism
2008 - n° 342 16/09/2008
In a stochastic two-period OLG model, featuring an aggregate shock to the economy,
ex-ante optimality requires intergenerational risk sharing. We compare the level
of time-consistent intergenerational risk sharing chosen by a social planner and by office
seeking politicians. In the political setting, the transfer of resources across generations
- a PAYG pension system - is determined as a Markov equilibrium of a probabilistic
voting game. Negative shocks represented by low realized returns on the risky asset
induce politicians to compensate the old through a PAYG system. Unless the young are
crucial to win the election, this political system generates more intergenerational risk
sharing than the (time consistent) social optimum. In particular, these transfers are
more persistent and less responsive to the realization of the shock than optimal. This is
because politicians anticipate their current transfers to the elderly to be compensated
through offsetting transfers by future politicians, and thus have an incentive to overspend.
Perhaps surprisingly, aging increases the socially optimal transfer but makes
politicians less likely to overspend, by making it more costly for future politicians to
compensate the current young.

Marcello DAmato and Vincenzo Galasso
Keywords: Pension Systems, Markov equilibria, social optimum
2008 - n° 341 29/08/2008

We develop and estimate a medium scale macroeconomic model that allows for unemployment
and staggered nominal wage contracting. In contrast to most existing quantitative models,
employment adjustment is on the extensive margain and the employment of existing workers is
efficient. Wage rigidity, however, affects the hiring of new workers. The former is introduced
via the staggered Nash bargaing setup of Gertler and Trigari (2006). A robust finding is that
the model with wage rigidity provides a better description of the data than does a flexible wage
version. Overall, the model fits the data roughly as well as existing quantitative macroeconomic
models, such as Smets and Wouters (2007) or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). More
work is necessary, however, to ensure a robust identification of the key labor market parameters.

Mark Gertler, Luca Sala and Antonella Trigari
2008 - n° 340 01/07/2008
We use an interactive epistemology framework to provide a systematic analysis of some solu- tion concepts for games with asymmetric information. We characterize solution concepts using expressible epistemic assumptions, represented as events in the canonical space generated by primitive uncertainty about the payoff relevant state, payoff irrelevant information, and actions. In most of the paper we adopt an interim perspective, which is appropriate to analyze genuine incomplete information. We relate Delta-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003) to interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2007) and to rationalizability in the interim strategic form. We also consider the ex ante perspective, which is appropriate to ana- lyze asymmetric information about an initial chance move. We prove the equivalence between interim correlated rationalizability and an ex ante notion of correlated rationalizability.

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Alfredo Di Tillio, Edoardo Grillo and Antonio Penta
Keywords: asymmetric information, type spaces, Bayesian games, rationalizability
2008 - n° 339 04/04/2008
We study the relation between the off-shoring of intermediates and services
and productivity growth in the Italian manufacturing industries in 1995-2003.
Our results indicate that the off-shoring of intermediates within the same
industry (narrow off-shoring) is beneficial for productivity growth, while
the off-shoring of services is not. We also find that the way in which off-
shoring is measured may matter considerably. The positive relation between off-
shoring of intermediates and productivity growth is there with our direct
measures based on input-output data but disappears when either a broad measure
or the Feenstra-Hanson off-shoring measure employed in other studies are used
instead.

Francesco Daveri and Cecilia Jona-Lasinio
Keywords: Off-shoring; productivity growth; Italy's decline; Manufacturing
2008 - n° 338 04/04/2008
We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about
their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision. Voters can either implement
the project in the first period, or they can postpone the decision to the
second period. We analyze the effects of different majority rules. Individual first
period voting behavior may become "less conservative" under supermajority rules,
and it is even possible that a project is implemented in the first period under a
supermajority rule that would not be implemented under simple majority rule.
We characterize the optimal majority rule, which is a supermajority rule. In
contrast to individual investment problems, society may be better off if the option
to postpone the decision did not exist. These results are qualitatively robust to
natural generalizations of our model.

Matthias Messner and Mattias K. Polborn
Keywords: supermajority rules, information, investment, option value
2008 - n° 337 26/03/2008
We analyze the effect of judicial errors on the innovative activity of firms.
If successful, the innovative effort allows to take new actions that may be ex-post wel-
fare enhancing (legal) or decreasing (illegal). Deterrence in this setting works by affecting
the incentives to invest in innovation (average deterrence). Type-I errors, through over-
enforcement, discourage innovative effort while type-II errors (under-enforcement) spur it.
The ex-ante expected welfare effect of innovations shapes the optimal policy design. When
innovations are ex-ante welfare improving, laissez-faire is chosen. When innovations are
instead welfare decreasing, law enforcement should limit them through average deterrence.
We consider several policy environments differing in the instruments available. Enforcement
effort is always positive and fines are (weakly) increasing in the social loss of innovations. In
some cases accuracy is not implemented, contrary to the traditional model where it always
enhances (marginal) deterrence, while in others it is improved selectively only on type-II
errors (asymmetric protocols of investigation).

Giovanni Immordino and Michele Polo
Keywords: norm design, innovative activity, enforcement, errors
2008 - n° 336 25/03/2008
In 2003 the Brazilian central government (CG) launched an anti-corruption program. Since then municipalities have been randomly selected to be audited on a monthly basis. Evidence in the literature suggests that the probability of re-election of an incumbent mayor decreases as the number of reported corruption violations rises before the municipal elections. By exploiting the exogenous variation in the timing of the release of the audit reports and the Brazilian institutional scheme, this paper sheds light on the mechanisms through which the Brazilian anti-corruption program functions. After the release of the audit reports, municipalities where more than two corruption violations were reported receive 26% fewer transfers from the CG. Total expenditure on infrastructure is also reduced. While the CG increases the amount of transfers to municipalities where the mayor is both affiliated with the partys president and found to be honest, it helps politically aligned municipalities with high levels of released corruption to move through the punishment process more quickly. The effects of the dissemination of corruption information on the probability of re-election of incumbent mayors seem to gradually disappear with time. Yet, when these effects have completely faded and voters have time to feel the consequences of receiving fewer transfers, the probability of re-election of corrupt politicians decreases.

Fernanda Brollo
Keywords: Intergovernmental transfers, corruption, accountability, decentralization
2008 - n° 335 12/02/2008
This paper brings together several important strands of the econometrics literature: errorcorrection,
cointegration and dynamic factor models. It introduces the Factor-augmented Error
Correction Model (FECM), where the factors estimated from a large set of variables in levels
are jointly modelled with a few key economic variables of interest. With respect to the standard
ECM, the FECM protects, at least in part, from omitted variable bias and the dependence of
cointegration analysis on the specific limited set of variables under analysis. It may also be in
some cases a refinement of the standard Dynamic Factor Model (DFM), since it allows us to
include the error correction terms into the equations, and by allowing for cointegration prevent
the errors from being non-invertible moving average processes. In addition, the FECM is a
natural generalization of factor augmented VARs (FAVAR) considered by Bernanke, Boivin and
Eliasz (2005) inter alia, which are specified in first differences and are therefore misspecified in
the presence of cointegration. The FECM has a vast range of applicability. A set of Monte Carlo
experiments and two detailed empirical examples highlight its merits in finite samples relative to
standard ECM and FAVAR models. The analysis is conducted primarily within an in-sample
framework, although the out-of-sample implications are also explored.

Anindya Banerjee and Massimiliano Marcellino
Keywords: Dynamic FactorModels, Error CorrectionModels, Cointegration, Factor-augmented Error Correction Models, VAR, FAVAR