Working papers results
When financial markets are not fully developed large shareholders are an important feature of an efficient corporate governance system. Thanks to their (relative) financial strength, banks are good candidates to perform this leading role in the governance of firms. However, in the type of monitoring provided and in the strategies that they may choose, banks are affected by significant conflicts of interests: expecially when they exert power through proxy votes and they are important lenders of the firm.
We propose a general formal structure for symmetric information delegation games that encompasses many existing economic applications in the fields of oligopoly theory, the theory of the firm, strategic trade policy and international political economy. We prove that all individually rational allocations are implementable in delegation games with non separable utility. Secondly, we show that contract renegotiation and non observable contracts have similar effects only in particular cases. We prove that all the equilibria obtained when renegotiation is excluded are implementable as renegotiation proof equilibria, provided that the side transfer technology implies a dead-weight loss increasing in the size of the transfer.
The broadcasting industry is still very concentrated all over the world, after 15 years in which new technologies and public policies allowed to overcome the constraint of limited availability of frequencies on the radio spectrum. We argue that the monopolistic competition set up, traditionally used to analyze the broadcasting industry, does not fit the empirical evidence. Instead we analyze the free entry equilibrium in a multistage game in which the decision on program quality (attractiveness) is crucial and the associated fixed costs are endogenously determined. We show that concentration might arise in the long run even in large markets despite entry is free.
We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government.
Now in:
European Economic Review, 1999 (forthcoming)
This paper analyses how to extract market expectations from asset prices, with a particular example: using the term structure of interest rates to estimate the probability the market attaches to the event that a country, Italy, joins the European Monetary Union at a given date. The extraction of such a probability from the term structure is based on the presumption that the term structure contains valuable information regarding the markets assessment of a countrys chances to join the EMU. The case of Italy is interesting because in the survey regularly conducted by Reuters the probability of joining EMU in 1999 fluctuated between 0.07 and 0.15, while, during the same period, the measures of computed by financial houses -- also based on the term structure of interest rates -- have ranged between 0.5 and 0.8. The paper proposes a new method for computing these probabilities, and shows that the discrepancies between survey and market-based measures are not the result of market ine fficiencies, but depend on an incorrect use of the term structure to compute probabilities. The technique proposed in the paper can also be used to distinguish between convergence of probabilities and convergence of fundamentals, that is to find out whether an observed reduction in interest rate spreads signals a higher probability of joining EMU at a given time, or simply reflects improved fundamentals.
This paper analyses the dynamics of wives labour force participation in Spain during the late 1980s from a non-parametric descriptive perspective. This research is motivated by two basic facts: One, there is evidence that female labour supply behaviour in Spain is changing since the late 1980s. Two, while the analysis of participation stocks is covered in the literature, there is no published research on mobility or flows. In the first part of this paper there is a description of the three-monts transition rates over two-waves. The underlying assumption is the First Order Markov Hypothesis. In the second part, the Markov assumption is questioned. This is done by carrying out an analysis of survival over 7 waves in which re-entries are ignored. Moreover, there is also an analysis of mobility contingent on past labour market state, which includes re-entries in the analysis. This allows me to study the likelihood of relapsing in a particular state, or the likelihood of surviving contingent on past labour market states. The results are interesting because they reveal features of female labour market behaviour unknown to date.
We show how to extend the construction of infinite hierachies of beliefs (Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)) from the case of probability measures to the case of conditional probability systems (CPSs) defined with respect to a fixed collection of relevant hypotheses. The set of hierarchies of CPSs satisfying common certainty of coherency conditional on every relevant hypothesis corresponds to a universal type space. This construction provides a unified framework to analyze the epistemic foundations of solution concepts for dynamic games. As an illustration, we derive some results about conditional common certainty of rationality and rationalizability in multistage games with observed actions.
I include the variables wives age and cohort and children in a participation equation to explore how the following two economic issues affect participation. First, a structural change in terms of participation over the life-cycle. Because a structural change does not affect all women of the young cohorts, I distinguish between long-run participating women (i.e. those whose participation behaviour resembles that found after the structural change) and a priori inactive women (i.e. those with a traditional behaviour). Second, it explores the impact of current social policies on mothers participation. Despite that a negative correlation between children and mothers participation (especially pre-scholars) is considered a stylized fact in the literature, long-run participating women may not withdraw from the labour market after maternity to avoid the likely experience loss (i.e. real wage decline) due to long absences. This analysis is carryed out by exploiting a longitudinal Spanish survey (the ECPF). Despite some lacking variables, the use of panel data methods yields to satisfactory results.
Much of the recent growth and development literature is based on the notion that economies may exhibit multiple equilibria, due to coordination failures. Surprisingly, little attention has been given to analyze which economic institutions may solve such failures. We examine the role of banks as 'catalysts for industrialization. When there are limits to contracting, and complementarities exist among investments of different firms, we derive coordination costs endogenously and show that banks can acts as catalysts provided that: (i) they are sufficiently large to mobilize a critical mass of firms, and (ii) they possess sufficient market power to make profits from coordination. We also show that the costs of coordination depend critically on the contracting instruments available to banks. In particular, allowing banks to hold equity reduces and sometimes eliminates the cost of coordination. We use our results to interpret the patterns of early industrialization of Belgium, Germany, and Italy in the late 19th century. These countries experienced quick industrialization with the active involvement of large and powerful universal banks, which engaged in both debt and equity finance.