Working papers results

We provide evidence on whether providing university students with feedback on their past
exam performance affects their future exam performance. Our identification strategy exploits a natural experiment in a leading UK university where different departments have historically
different rules on the provision of feedback to their students. We find the provision of feedback has a positive effect on students' subsequent test scores: the mean impact corresponds to 13% of a standard deviation in test scores. The impact of feedback is stronger for more able students and for students who have less information to start with about the academic environment, while no subset of individuals is found to be discouraged by feedback. Our findings suggest that students have imperfect information on how their effort translates into test scores and that the provision of feedback might be a cost effective means to increase students' exam performance.

We analyze the value of information in the market for corporate control. The raider and the shareholders are privately and imperfectly informed about the post-takeover value of the firm. We show that public information provision reduces the dispersion of the shareholders' beliefs resulting in a transfer of surplus from the raider to the shareholders. What is more, if the raider is privately informed all his private information is revealed through the price offer, hence he prefers not to acquire private information, provided that the shareholders do not engage in information acquisition. The target shareholders, on the other hand, have incentives to acquire information-solicit a fairness opinion-after the raider makes a price offer. However, when both parties have access to an information market, they both have incentives to acquire information.

We view economic time series as the result of a cascade of shocks occurring at different times and different frequencies (scales). We suggest that economic relations that are found to be elusive when using raw data may hold true for different layers (details) in the cascade of economic shocks. This observation leads to a notion of a scale-specific predictability. Using direct extraction of the details and two-way aggregation, we provide strong evidence of risk compensations in market returns, as well as of an unusually clear link between macroeconomic uncertainty and uncertainty in financial markets, at frequencies lower than the business cycle.

The paper aims to analyze the effects of plague on the long-term development of Italian cities, with particular attention to the 1629-30 epidemic. By using a new dataset on plague mortality rates in 49 cities covering the period 1575-1700 ca., an economic geography model verifying the existence of multiple equilibria is estimated. It is found that cities affected only by the 1629-30 plague recovered in the short run, whereas cities affected by both the 1575-77 and 1629-30 epidemic show persistent decline in the long run. This new finding contrasts with previous literature and is hence interpreted in the light of the new concept of "urban frailty".

In this paper we review some recent work on public intervention in economic environments where fifirms undertake investments in research or in physical assets, and then choose appropriate business practices to extract profits from the outcomes of the investment process. Public policies may take different forms: the release of an authorization; the setting of fines and damages for liability; or the choice of legal standards in antitrust law enforcement. The business practices are privately profitable but may be welfare enhancing or socially harmful. When expectations are optimistic, public policies face a trade-off between ex-ante effects on investment, that suggest hands off, and ex-post control of practices when harmful, that requires intervention. Our general result suggests that public policies should be softer when innovation is an important source of welfare improvements.

Experimental evidence suggests that agents in social dilemmas have belief-dependent, otherregarding preferences. But in experimental games such preferences cannot be common knowledge, because subjects play with anonymous co-players. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the context of a trust game, assuming that the trustee's choice may be affected by a combination of guilt aversion and intention-based reciprocity. We recover trustees' belief-dependent preferences from their answers to a structured questionnaire. In the main treatment, the answers are disclosed and made common knowledge within each matched pair, while in the control treatment there is no disclosure. Our main auxiliary assumption is that such disclosure approximately implements a psychological game with complete information. To organize the data, we classify subjects according to their elicited preferences, and test predictions for the two treatments using both rationalizability and equilibrium. We find that guilt aversion is the prevalent psychological motivation, and that behavior and elicited beliefs move in the direction predicted by the theory.

 

 

An extensive literature has studied lobbying by special interest groups. We analyze a novel lobbying channel: lobbying businessmen-politicians through business proxies. When a politician controls a business, firms attempting to curry favors shift their spending towards the politician's business. The politician benefits from increased revenues, and the firms hope for favorable regulation in return. We investigate this channel in Italy where government members, including the prime minister, are not required to divest business holdings. We examine the evolution of advertising spending by firms over the period 1994 to 2009, during which Silvio Berlusconi was prime minister on and off three times, while maintaining control of Italy's major private television network, Mediaset. We predict that firms attempting to curry favor with the government shift their advertising budget towards Berlusconi's channels when Berlusconi is in power. Indeed, we document a significant pro-Mediaset bias in the allocation of advertising spending during Berlusconi's political tenure. This pattern is especially pronounced for companies operating in more regulated sectors, as predicted. Using a model of supply and demand in the advertising market, we estimate one billion euros of extra revenue to Berlusconi's group. We also estimate the expected returns in regulation to politically motivated spenders of similar magnitude, stressing the economic importance of this lobbying channel. These findings provide an additional rationale for rules on conflict of interest.

We use frequency domain techniques to estimate a medium-scale DSGE model on different frequency bands. We show that goodness of t, forecasting performance and parameter estimates vary substantially with the frequency bands over which the model is estimated. Estimates obtained using subsets of frequencies are characterized by signicantly different parameters, an indication that the model cannot match all frequencies with one set of parameters. In particular, we find that: i) the low frequency properties of the data strongly affect parameter estimates obtained in the time domain; ii) the importance of economic frictions in the model changes when different subsets of frequencies are used in estimation.
This is particularly true for the investment cost friction and habit persistence: when low
frequencies are present in the estimation, the investment cost friction and habit persistence are estimated to be higher than when low frequencies are absent.

This paper proposes a framework to evaluate the impact of longevity-linked securities on the risk-return trade-off for traditional portfolios. Generalized unexpected raise in life expectancy is a source of aggregate risk in the insurance sector balance sheets. Longevity-linked securities are a natural instrument to reallocate these risks by making them tradable in the financial market. This paper extends the strategic asset allocation model of (Campbell Viceira 2005) to include a longevity-linked investment in addition to equity and fixed income securities and describe the resulting term structure of risk-return trade-offs. The model highlights an unexpected predictability pattern of the survival probability estimates and gives an empirical valuation of the market price of longevity risk based on the LeeCarter(1992) mortality model and on the time series of prices for standardized annuities publicly offered by US insurance companies.

We evaluate the impact of timing on decision outcomes, when both the timing and the relevant decision are chosen under uncertainty. Sports betting provides the testing ground, as we exploit an original dataset containing more than one million online bets on games of the Italian Major Soccer League. We find that individuals perform systematically better when they place their bets farther away from the game day. The better performance of early bettors holds controlling for (time-invariant) unobservable ability, learning during the season, and timing of the odds. We attribute this result to the increase of noisy information on game day, which hampers the capacity of late (non-professional) bettors to use very simple prediction methods, such as team rankings or last game results. We also find that more successful bettors tend to bet in advance, focus on a smaller set of events, and prefer games associated with smaller betting odds.