Working papers results
We study a Mean-Risk model derived from a behavioral theory of Disappointment with multiple reference points. One distinguishing feature of the risk measure is that it is based on mutual deviations of outcomes, not deviations from a specific target. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions for strict first and second order stochastic dominance, and show that the model is, in addition, a Convex Risk Measure. The model allows for richer, and behaviorally more plausible, risk preference patterns than competing models with equal degrees of freedom, including Expected Utility (EU), Mean-Variance (MV), Mean-Gini (MG), and models based on non-additive probability weighting, such a Dual Theory (DT). For example, in asset allocation, the decision-maker can abstain from diversifying in a risky asset unless it meets a threshold performance, and gradually invest beyond this threshold, which appears more acceptable than the extreme solutions provided by either EU and MV (always diversify) or DT and MG (always plunge). In asset trading, the model allows no-trade intervals, like DT and MG, in some, but not all, situations. An illustrative application to portfolio selection is presented. The model can provide an improved criterion for Mean-Risk analysis by injecting a new level of behavioral realism and flexibility, while maintaining key normative properties.
However, this result hides strong heterogenous effects: high educated non-mothers are persuaded by the informational treatments to increase their intended use of formal child care (and to pay more); whereas low educated non-mothers to reduce their intended labor supply. These findings are consistent with women responding to monetary incentive and/or having different preferences for maternal care. These heterogenous responses across women send a warning signal about the true effectiveness - in terms of take up rates - of often advocated public policies regarding formal child care.
Subject classifications: Utility/preference: Estimation. Decision analysis: Risk.
Area of review: Decision Analysis.
on an individual's preference structure. We test the approach via an experiment in a riskless context in which subjects are asked to evaluate mobile phone packages that differ on three attributes.
responsible for. In our experiment an agent chooses between a lottery and a safe asset; payment from the chosen option goes to a principal who then decides how much to allocate between the agent and a third party. We observe widespread blame: regardless of their choice, agents are blamed by principals for the outcome of the lottery, an event they are not responsible for. We provide an explanation of this apparently irrational behavior with a delegated-expertise principal-agent model, the subjects' salient perturbation of the environment.